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I. Introduction
Law mediates between the ideal and the real. American constitutional
law, in particular, is a realm of idealization tempered by the claims of a
resistant, unruly reality. This is an essay about the mediating nature of
American constitutional law, the ambivalence built into an activity that
aspires both to give meaning to ideals and to be effective in the real world.
Inescapably, this dual aspiration affects both the interpretation of rights
and the implementation of remedies when rights are violated, but this
essay concerns remedies, the area of judicial activity that most clearly em-
bodies the tension between the ideal and the real.
The function of a remedy is to "realize" a legal norm, to make it a
"living truth."1 While most legal theory concentrates on the ideal, the
hard stuff of recalcitrant reality is equally important to jurisprudence.
This essay looks towards a jurisprudence of the remedial-which in large
measure must be a jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost between
declaring a right and implementing a remedy. My immediate subject is
the problem of fashioning judicial remedies for racial segregation in
schools, in particular how the courts have faced the problem of white re-
sistance to desegregation decrees. I focus on two moments. The first is
1955, when the Supreme Court of the United States declined to order the
immediate desegregation of unlawfully segregated schools, approving in-
stead the imperfect remedy of gradual desegregation under the standard of
"all deliberate speed."' 2 The second moment is today, when the courts are
considering responses to the phenomenon of "white flight," including the
possibility of limiting integration remedies in order to encourage whites to
remain within a desegregating school system. The intellectual and practi-
cal problem posed in each situation is whether and how the law should
adjust its remedial aspiration in the face of a resistant reality-in particu-
lar, under what conditions and premises, if any, public opposition to a
legal rule may properly be the basis for limiting judicial remedies for its
violation. It may at first seem wholly illegitimate for courts to take
account of resistance, since doing so appears to deny the very right that
the court has affirmed. But, as I argue in this essay, resistance cannot be
ignored. Among the difficulties-indeed, the anguish-necessarily endured
by those seeking to produce change in the world is that at times they must
cede ground because of opposition. Remedies for violations of constitu-
tional rights are not immune from that reality.
The problems of remedial limitation considered here involve a particu-
1. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958) ("Our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is
thus made a living truth.").
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
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lar remedial instrument, the modern injunction. The very evolution of this
extraordinary remedial weapon, now central to the modern conception of
judicial power, is inseparable from the desegregation effort and resistance
to it. The contemporary character and potency of the injunction emerged
along with an increasingly clear understanding, beginning with Brown v.
Board of Education,' of what desegregation meant: the transformation and
reorganization of public education in the United States to eliminate the
effects of de jure segregation "root and branch. ' '4 The injunction was both
the child and parent of that meaning; while it evolved to carry out the
courts' agenda, that agenda could not have emerged and been taken seri-
ously unless an instrument of equity was at hand to help achieve it.5
Resistance to Brown itself played an enormous role in the evolution of
the injunction, both unleashing expansive assertions of equity power and
threatening to limit the power unleashed. This resistance took many forms
that endangered the vindication of rights: violence; flight from public
schools; boycotts; hostility and incitement; foot-dragging by officials legally
obliged to desegregate; and new acts of official segregation. It was the
relentless refusal of citizens and public officials to accept the meaning of
Brown-their persistent failure to accept change and to act in good faith
to implement the law-that required the courts to intrude with such coer-
cion, with such detail, with such stubborn patience and courage, and with
strategic and managerial preoccupations that strained the boundaries of
the traditional judicial function. In Thomas Hardy's phrase, these were
"desperate remedies." 6 To be sure, there were plenty of good faith dis-
putes about what was required, but judicial remedies became so intrusive
largely because public resistance precluded alternative methods for making
Brown a reality. And yet resistance constrained what it provoked. When
resistance pushed judges to assume expansive powers and adopt the role of
strategic planners, the strategies considered were often ones to limit losses.
Resistance, and the problems of dealing with it, has forced the judge at
least to consider taking account of opposition by approving imperfect rem-
edies, remedies that do not fully vindicate rights.
The first part of this essay presents an analytic structure to help ex-
amine this darker side of the transition from an abstract legal standard to
its approximation in social reality. It distinguishes between two funda-
mentally different approaches that might be used in ordering equitable
remedies and evaluating their imperfections: "Rights Maximizing," which
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
4. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
5. See 0. FIss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4-6 (1978); Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activ-
ism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1313-16 (1982); Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1979).
6. The phrase is the title of his first published novel (1871).
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takes the viewpoint of the victims alone; and "Interest Balancing," which
also considers other social interests. From the perspectives of these two
approaches, the central part of the essay analyzes the problem of public
opposition to desegregation decrees and the resulting pressure upon courts
to approve imperfect remedies. While some have argued that courts should
ignore resistance, and others have been quick to give way to it, my analy-
sis leads to a more complex position. Both remedial approaches require
courts to recognize that resistance can weaken victims' rights and to con-
sider strong measures to prevent or defeat that resistance; under both ap-
proaches, however, courts may at times approve limited desegregation
remedies because of resistance, although the occasion and scope of appro-
priate limitations depends upon the approach that is used. The essay next
criticizes the courts' frequent failure to be candid when they do limit
remedies in response to public opposition. It concludes by discussing some
broader questions about rights themselves and about the character of legal
scholarship; while for the most part the essay discusses remedies against
the background of defined rights, this concluding section suggests that
rights are not sharply separable from remedies and that, like remedies,
rights will also be affected by public attitudes and resistance.
II. Remedial Limits and Remedial Theory
The core remedial principle repeatedly articulated by the courts in de-
segregation cases is that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the
nature and extent of the constitutional violation."" The basic goal of an
injunction, we are told again and again, is not simply to enjoin the en-
forcement of unconstitutional laws and to prohibit new violations, but also
to eliminate the continuing effects of past violations.8 The courts are eva-
sive and inconsistent, however, on the question most relevant here:
whether (and to what extent) they will approve injunctive remedies that
are less than completely effective in achieving the remedial goal and are
therefore imperfect. The Supreme Court has often stated that discrimina-
7. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (Milliken I); see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977);
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (Milliken II); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1971).
8. A frequently cited formulation is found in Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154
(1965) ("ITlhe court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the fu-
ture."). See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459-61 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16,
21 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 & n.4 (1968); cf. Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975) (Title VIrs remedial aim).
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tion remedies must remove "all vestiges" of the violation;9 the focus is
thoroughly victim-oriented, and there are no limits on the corrective goal.
In other instances, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that this
principle is not absolute. The Court sometimes modifies the "remove all
vestiges" goal by stating that remedies must eliminate the violation's ef-
fects only to "the greatest possible degree . . ., taking into account the
practicalities of the situation."10 At other times, the Court's qualifying
language commands a more comprehensive balancing and "reconciling [of]
public and private needs,"'" suggesting that courts may settle for some-
thing less than eliminating the effects of the violation to the greatest extent
possible, if such extensive remedial efforts would have unduly "burden-
some effects" on other interests.l
These shifting formulations make clear that there is no simple equiva-
lence between violation and remedy. Sometimes there will be a gap; reme-
dies may fail to completely vindicate rights, even basic constitutional
rights. Courts both tolerate remedies that ultimately turn out to be imper-
9. Green v. County School Bd. 391 U.S. 430, 437-438 (1968); see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973); Wright
v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460, 463 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
10. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (emphasis added); see Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (Milliken II) (remedies should be "designed as nearly as possible
'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the ab-
sence of such conduct' "); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (court has duty "so
far as possible" to eliminate discriminatory effects of the past).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown I) ("Traditionally, equity has
been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs.").
12. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 & n.15 (1977) (Milliken II) ("[T]o ensure that
federal-court decrees are characterized by the flexibility and sensitivity required of equitable decrees,
consideration must be given to burdensome effects resulting from a decree that could 'either risk the
health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process'" or would unduly interfere
with "interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs."); see Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211, 3214 n.3 (1982) (although "'in some circumstances busing will be an
appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, . . . in other instances its "costs," both in
financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable' ") (citations omitted).
The same opinion frequently expresses more than one remedial principle. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), expresses all three: equity's aim is "to eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation," id. at 15 (emphasis added), "to achieve
the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation," id. at 26 (emphasis added), and "to correct, by a
balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution," id. at
16 (emphasis added); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (Milliken II) (reme-
dies "must be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct'" and must also "take into account
the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs") (citation omitted); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S 324, 364, 375 (1977) (suggesting both that courts
should provide "'the most complete relief possible'" and that "in formulating any equitable decree, a
court must draw on the 'qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity the instrument for
nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims' "); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (remedies for
Title VII violation should both "secur[e] complete justice" and "so far as possible eliminate the dis-
criminatory effects of the past").
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fect and order remedies that they know will be imperfect. While courts
frequently approve imperfect injunctive relief, however, they do not al-
ways candidly acknowledge gaps between right and remedy. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the courts have not set forth a theory of remedial
imperfection or even a framework for thinking about it.
A. Two Remedial Approaches
The starting point for such a theory is to distinguish between two fun-
damentally different approaches to choosing an equitable remedy, each
reflected in the courts' inconsistent utterances. Under the approach I shall
call "Rights Maximizing," the only question a court asks once it finds a
violation is which remedy will be the most effective for the victims, where
"effectiveness" means success in eliminating the adverse consequences of
violations suffered by victims. The costs of alternative remedies are there-
fore irrelevant except when such costs actually interfere with a remedy's
effectiveness, or when the alternatives are equally effective and a criterion
other than maximum effectiveness must be the basis for selection. Under
the approach I shall call "Interest Balancing," remedial effectiveness for
victims is only one of the factors in choosing a remedy; other social inter-
ests are also relevant and may justify some sacrifice of achievable remedial
effectiveness. In evaluating a remedy, courts in some sense "balance" its
net remedial benefits to victims against the net costs it imposes on a
broader range of social interests. Thus, even if a particular remedy would
be the most effective in curing the violation, its costs may be sufficiently
high that an Interest Balancing court would choose a less effective remedy.
These two approaches separate two points of view that frequently are
blurred in analyzing equitable remedies: that of victims of the violation
who seek to eliminate its effects, and that of persons who bear the costs of
remedying the violation and may seek to limit their burdens."3
A central fact, however, is that under either approach courts may ap-
prove an injunctive remedy that does not eliminate all effects of the viola-
tion suffered by the plaintiff-victims. The idea of a perfect remedy is a
13. These two approaches to remedies have parallels in two approaches to rights that have been
central in the philosophic tradition. There are certain similarities between Rights Maximizing, which
views the legal principle of making the victim whole as an absolute rule against which all remedial
steps must be measured, and a "deontological" approach to rights; and there are affinities between
Interest Balancing and a "utilitarian" approach to rights. As I indicate below, however, one possible
defense of Rights Maximizing's absolutism might be made in rule-utilitarian terms. See infra pp. 607-
08 (discussing prophylactic argument in favor of Rights Maximizing). Similarly, one version of Inter-
est Balancing-requiring a tradeoff when a constitutional remedial interest conflicts with another
constitutional right-might be defended in deontological terms. See infra p. 603. Moreover, the con-
ception of Interest Balancing that I embrace in this essay does not permit a de novo utilitarian balance
at the remedy stage since it treats the constitutional right and its remedial vindication as values that
must be given substantial weight. See infra p. 607.
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frequent illusion, defied by a resisting, multidimensional world. The occa-
sions for tolerating remedial imperfection differ under the two approaches,
however. Under Rights Maximizing, an incompletely effective remedy is
acceptable only if a more effective remedy for the victims is impossible to
achieve. Under Interest Balancing, an imperfect remedy is also permissi-
ble when a more effective remedy is deemed too costly to interests other
than providing a remedy for victims. Thus, the two approaches can also
be understood in terms of the different sources of remedial imperfection
that they admit: Rights Maximizing recognizes only unavoidable limits,
while Interest Balancing also permits some tradeoffs with other values.
Both approaches, of course, proceed within boundaries set by basic re-
medial goals. Most obviously, remedial goals under either approach are
limited by a definition of the right-that is, what counts as a violation and
as a legally relevant effect. In addition, remedial goals are limited by a
general definition of the remedial enterprise-usually an understanding
that courts should seek both to prevent new violations and to eliminate
effects of prior violations, but should not require steps unrelated to curing
violations. These threshold definitions determine what it means for a
remedy to be "fully effective," and therefore provide criteria for measur-
ing the relative effectiveness of particular remedies as well as for limiting
their permissible scope. In school desegregation cases, for example, the
equal protection violation is limited to acts of de jure segregation and does
not include de facto segregation;1" remedial goals, therefore, are limited to
preventing and eliminating effects of de jure segregation.15 Because the
14. E.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
15. The violation may be defined not simply as a limited category of unlawful actions but also as
a limited category of their effects. For example, longstanding de jure segregation of a community's
schools probably adversely affects not only the schools but also the racial composition of neighbor-
hoods and community well-being. If all of these effects were deemed part of the violation and there-
fore subject to remedial action, the remedial goals might include constructing school attendance pat-
terns that would have existed absent the de jure segregation, eliminating the racial identifiability of
segregated schools, furnishing remedial education and eliminating the inferior educational conditions
that often exist in traditionally segregated black schools, eliminating dignitary harms from state-
imposed segregation, and eliminating the residentially segregative effects of school segregation. Indeed,
the goals might also include remedying the adverse consequences of the cycle of inferior jobs, lower
incomes, social conditions that perpetuate racial prejudice, and (coming full circle) inferior educational
opportunity and achievement in schools. Where the actual effects of de jure segregation ripple out-
ward so extensively, however, the courts might define the violation to include only certain "legally
relevant" effects, such as those on the schools themselves. Cf Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971) ("The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large
task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the
jurisdiction of school authorities."). Concepts of legal causation may also impose definitional limits on
a defendant's responsibility; for example, the idea of proximate cause restricts a defendant's tort lia-
bility to effects that he was under some duty to prevent. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42 (4th ed. 1971). A definitional limit can also arise through rules concerning who has
standing to sue, as in the antitrust field. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 904-07 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2548
(1982).
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meaning of particular rights is often vague and even evolving, the discus-
sion of remedies can be a slippery business. Thus, when people disagree
in their assessments of the relative "effectiveness" of a particular remedy
in curing the violation of a right, they are often disagreeing about how the
right itself should be defined.16 But a court's definition of the "violation"
or "right" is usually sufficiently definite to generate real limits on reme-
dial goals, limits that make it meaningful to speak of a "fully effective"
remedy as something finite and bounded."'
Within remedial boundaries determined by the definition of the particu-
lar right at issue, the extent to which a court approves an imperfect
remedy depends upon whether the court adopts a Rights Maximizing or
Interest Balancing approach. While few competing interests seem to me
sufficient to justify limiting remedial effectiveness once a constitutional
violation is shown, I have come to accept that social interests other than
the victims' interests cannot be totally ignored when a court fashions an
injunctive remedy. Thus, I conclude that some form of Interest Balancing
should be used, and that remedies should not be evaluated in Rights
Maximizing terms alone. Before examining the limits permitted only if
one embraces Interest Balancing, however, I first consider remedial limits
that may be unavoidable under both approaches, limits that may arise
even if one is totally victim-oriented and committed to achieving a com-
pletely effective equitable remedy.
B. Unavoidable Remedial Imperfection
While it may seem that complete remedial effectiveness for victims is
always possible provided a court is prepared to impose the costs of imple-
menting the perfect remedy-that is, while it may seem that remedial im-
perfection is acceptable only if the judge is an Interest Balancer rather
than a Rights Maximizer-the complexities of the remedial enterprise
undermine this view. Remedial limits may be unavoidable either because
of conflicts arising out of multiple remedial goals or because of practical
difficulties in devising means to achieve those goals.
16. Criticism of a remedy, therefore, may reflect criticism of the underlying right. For example, a
recent attack on the vision of equity underlying contemporary remedies in school desegregation cases
may be partly explained by the author's apparent view that "separate but equal" was constitutional
and that Brown I was wrongly decided. See G. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (1982).
17. While this essay, following the courts' own language, generally speaks about remedies within
a framework of defined rights, I recognize that rights must often be understood dynamically-not as a
rigid benchmark, but rather as evolving concepts whose meanings are shaped over time by remedial
efforts to actualize them. See infra pp. 664-65, 676-79.
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1. Multiple Goals
Once a right has been violated, particularly if the violation has ex-
tended over a long period of time and has had many effects, there may be
more than one legally relevant remedial goal.1 ' For two interrelated rea-
sons, multiple goals may unavoidably lead to remedial imperfection. First,
achieving one remedial goal may be impossible without requiring some
sacrifice of another remedial goal. In the case of school desegregation, re-
medial goals include the elimination of the racial identifiability of schools
and the amelioration of educational harms to black children resulting from
a long regime of de jure segregation. Mandatory integration achieved by
long-distance busing may be the most appropriate remedy to eliminate a
school's racial identifiability, but educational changes within a largely
one-race setting may conceivably be the most effective way, at least over
the short term, to improve black students' academic performance or to
ameliorate other effects of decades of de jure segregation.19 To give an-
other example, the goal of preventing violence against blacks during the
desegregation process may be achievable only if massive armed force is
introduced to quell the resistance, but as a result other objectives of the
desegregation process may be compromised."0 In these situations, strate-
gies for attaining different goals are incompatible. Such unresolvable and
unavoidable conflicts within the remedial aspiration itself make it impossi-
ble to achieve a fully effective remedy.
Second, there may be irreconcilable conflicts among the victims.31
Where the violation affects a group of individuals who bring a class ac-
tion, a fully effective remedy requires that all victims in the plaintiff class
receive relief. Where there are multiple remedial goals, however, imper-
18. See supra note 15.
19. There may even be a conflict between the two most commonly stated remedial goals: eliminat-
ing the racial identifiability of the schools and recreating the attendance conditions that would have
existed absent the violation. Longstanding de jure school segregation may in fact have contributed to
residential segregation. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971). Thus, absent school segregation,
there might have been more residential integration and therefore more school integration in neighbor-
hood schools. To eliminate racially identified schools and achieve school integration today, long-
distance busing may be needed; this makes it impossible to retcreate the attendance conditions that
arguably "would have existed" absent the violation, that is, integration in neighborhood schools. The
remedy can provide neighborhood schools or integration, but not both.
20. See infra p. 619.
21. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-487 (1976); Berger, Away from the Court House and Into the
Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707, 717, 731-33 (1978); Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STA. L. REV. 1183, 1186-91 (1982); Yeazell, Intervention and the
Idea of Litigation: A Comment on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244, 249-56
(1977); Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The
Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868, 881 (1979). Words like "victims" and "blacks"
may therefore be misleading in this context since they suggest more cohesiveness and identity of inter-
ests than may actually exist.
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fection may be unavoidable because the relief that some plaintiffs want
may be impossible to provide if other plaintiffs are to receive what they
want. The point is not simply that different victims may want different
"benefits" from the court, but that they may have conflicting views about
what kind of benefits constitute an effective and appropriate remedy for
the violation. These possible clashes of interest multiply in classes that
have an evolving membership-for example, plaintiff classes in school de-
segregation cases that are defined as all black students who are now or
who will be enrolled in the school system.22 Moreover, there may be a
clash not simply between the interests of present and future class mem-
bers, but also between the short-term and long-term interests of individual
members of the plaintiff class.
Both sources of unavoidable remedial imperfection require a court to
make choices about how to distribute the imperfection; it must decide
among different versions of "imperfect effectiveness." If multiple goals
cannot all be realized fully, the court must choose which goals to compro-
mise. The judge is therefore compelled to evaluate the relative importance
of conflicting remedial goals, a ranking that requires an assessment of the
relative evil of various legally relevant effects of the violation. Similarly, if
a fully effective remedy cannot be furnished to all members of the plaintiff
class, the court must decide which victims' interests to sacrifice. This re-
quires the court to adopt either a substantive or procedural rule for appor-
tioning remedial benefits among the victims.23
22. E.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 308 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1980);
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732, 743, 749 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 394 (D. Kans. 1979); c. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 9 n.6 (1981) (institutionalized retarded persons); Wetzel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir.) (employees in Title VII suit), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975); Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (prisoners), modified,
643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
23. A number of substantive solutions to this problem are possible. For example, a court commit-
ted to furnishing the "most effective" remedy might try to maximize benefits in a utilitarian sense by
providing the greatest benefit for the greatest number of victims. Alternative definitions of the "most
effective" remedy-definitions that consider the distribution of remedial benefits within the victim
class-are possible, however. Thus, one might argue that the most effective remedy is one that pro-
vides equal (if not full) benefits for each victim; or one could favor rules of preference among class
members, such as a preference for current class members over future ones or a preference for named
plaintiffs over others. In addition, if remedies produce different benefits over time and there is a
conflict between the short-term and long-term interests of members of the plaintiff class, some time
frame must be adopted within which to evaluate a remedy's effectiveness.
In contrast to these substantive solutions to the problem of distributing imperfection, the court
might use the class action device to furnish a procedural solution: Let the plaintiffs themselves decide,
through their class representative or some other mechanism of class choice. But if there are conflicts
among the plaintiffs and if all remedies will be imperfect, no single class representative can appro-
priately speak for all; nor is any rule of class choice, such as majority rule, self-evidently the correct
means for resolving conflicts among victims. The court itself would have to decide among possible
procedural rules.
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2. Instrumental Deficiencies
A second kind of unavoidable remedial imperfection results from instru-
mental difficulties in achieving remedial goals.24 Before remedial goals are
actually achieved, a judge is no more than a promoter of remedial effec-
tiveness. Even if a proposed decree facially requires a fully effective rem-
edy, it may end up being quite ineffective. This is hardly surprising, given
the human and worldly limitations that make it so difficult to devise and
implement an ambitious injunction-for example, the imperfection of dis-
coverable knowledge about social institutions, the complexity of strategic
judgments about how to change them, the possibility of unanticipated new
developments, and the judge's necessary dependence on other social actors
who may obstruct the transforming enterprise through inadvertence or
resistance.
All of these causes of remedial ineffectiveness cannot possibly be elimi-
nated or avoided at the decree-formulation stage, even by a Rights Maxi-
mizing judge committed to full remedial effectiveness at whatever cost.
Once actual ineffectiveness becomes apparent, of course, the judge can al-
ways enter a new decree designed to be more effective; indeed, a Rights
Maximizing judge would be required to do so unless no further remedial
effectiveness were possible. But the same forces that initially conspired
against full remedial effectiveness would still be likely to constrain the
remedy. In any event, the price of the court's initial failure is a period of
delay, and delay itself produces remedial imperfection since it allows ef-
fects of the violation to continue and new harms to be inflicted. Indeed, if
the initial decree is ineffective, the passage of time may produce irreversi-
ble changes that preclude further remedial success.
To be sure, while no remedial methods can guarantee success, a judge
can take various steps to reduce the risk of ineffectiveness, such as moni-
toring compliance carefully and imposing sanctions for resistance and
noncompliance. Another common step is to issue a specific remedial decree
24. Works examining the practical problems that face courts seeking to change the operation of
large government institutions include: D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); LIM-
ITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds.
1978); P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983); Berger,
supra note 21; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public In-
stitutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Frug, The Judicial Power ofthe Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715
(1978); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428
(1977); Note, Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies in Federal Administrative Enforcement, 88
YALE L.J. 407 (1978); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institu-
tional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). For a prescient discussion of inherent limitations on the
equitable powers available to federal courts in contemporary civil rights cases, emphasizing "the lack
of [judicial] police power, . . . the consequences of the federal system, and the potential of massive
resistance," see B. Marshall, Equitable Remedies as Instruments of Social Change-Civil Rights
(1964) (unpublished speech) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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rather than require the defendant simply to achieve generally-phrased re-
medial goals. For example, desegregation remedies frequently require de-
tailed student and faculty reassignment procedures, specific program and
curricular changes, and citizen participation in decree implementation."5
Detailed decrees in these and other institutional reform cases26 are fre-
quently attacked as exceeding a court's remedial powers, on the ground
that they interfere with the defendant's discretion to take steps that would
not themselves violate the Constitution.27 But this criticism confuses viola-
tion and remedy. The best way to justify a specific decree is that it reduces
the plaintiffs' risk that the remedy will turn out to be ineffective and im-
25. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (ordering detailed
pupil reassignment plan with required black-white ratios); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate
School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (establishing rules for discharge of teachers and
use of test scores), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp.
216, 265-68 (D. Mass. 1975) (establishing parent and citizen advisory councils), aft'd, 530 F.2d 401
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp.
647, 654-55 (M.D. Ala.) (prescribing number of black teachers per school, ordering athletic coaches
to give recruiting talks at junior high schools, and providing form letter to be sent to potential football
players), aff'd as modified, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-37 (1969) (reinstating district court's specific remedial
order).
26. Highly detailed "institutional" decrees are common outside the desegregation area. In a lead-
ing case, for example, the trial court required specific water temperatures for showers in a mental
hospital whose conditions were found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 373, 382 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (ordering 110 degree water for patient use and 180 degree water
for dishwasher and laundry use), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974); see also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (prescribing one foot of
urinal trough per fifteen prison inmates and enough stationery and postage for each inmate to write
five letters per week, and requiring a bachelor's degree in dietetics or the equivalent for supervisor of
prison food services), aft'd as modified sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd in part per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Miller v.
Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515, 523 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (requiring all inmates to be given toothpaste and
soap within twenty-four hours of incarceration), aff'd in part, modified in part, 563 F.2d 741 (5th
Cir. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (requiring subdivision of prison
barracks), afr'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The remedial detail that decrees exhibit often seems
designed primarily to prevent prior lawbreakers from committing new violations in the future, rather
than to eliminate continuing effects of the prior violations. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 530, 535-36 (1982) (requiring election rule as a "reasonable hedge" against recur-
ring discrimination); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (requiring detailed pre-
interrogation warnings).
27. E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711-14 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 677 F.2d 1185, 1190-92 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 568 (1982); Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 46 PUB. INTEREST 64, 66,
68-70, 73-75 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 666, 707-18 (1978); Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common
Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1131-71 (1978); Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42.
Detailed decrees have also been criticized on the grounds that they are inefficient, require information
about the affected institutions that judges may find difficult to secure, and involve policy choices for
which judges have little guidance. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 24, at 150-69 (1983). The argument
presented here suggests only why Rights Maximizing judges may justify decree specificity as a means
of assuring the most effective remedy for victims, and does not address whether judges should refrain
from issuing specific decrees because of concerns other than providing the most effective remedy for
victims. A Rights Maximizing judge, of course, might reject a detailed decree if he concludes that,
because of information gaps or other unavoidable problems, he cannot devise an effective one.
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poses only a degree of detail commensurate with the risk of ineffective-
ness."' The specific decree is a product of the same judgment that forms
part of the justification for injunctive relief rather than damages in the
first place-the judgment that the remedy should reduce the risk that the
victims will suffer continuing harm.29 While a generally-phrased decree
may promise on its face to be fully effective, its vague commands give the
defendant significant opportunity to evade or misinterpret remedial duties;
indeed, the likelihood of evasion is increased simply because the predicate
for a subsequent contempt action is less clear, and therefore incentives for
compliance are less strong. A detailed decree is likely to increase the
probability of promptly effective remedial compliance.80
While courts undoubtedly can reduce the risk of ineffectiveness if they
are willing to impose costly requirements, they cannot make remedial suc-
cess a certainty. Even armed force may not be able to suppress all resis-
tance to a desegregation decree, and in any event may be counterproduc-
tive since it can interfere with other remedial goals. The judge is at most a
strategist for effectiveness. If resistance or other practical obstacles
threaten a remedy's effectiveness, even a Rights Maximizing court may
find some remedial imperfection unavoidable.
C. Interest Balancing and Avoidable Remedial Imperfection
Interest Balancing increases the range of situations in which a limited
remedy may be approved. Rights Maximizing looks at the world through
the victims' eyes alone, permitting only remedial imperfection that occurs
28. In some cases, of course, the specific practice being remedied can itself be understood as part
of the violation, and the criticism of the specific decree actually reflects a disagreement about the
definition of the violation. Moreover, the violation may have been a cumulation of specific practices
(such as insufficient toothpaste) that taken individually would not constitute a constitutional violation
(such as cruel and unusual punishment). In this situation, a remedy may seek to eliminate the cluster
of practices constituting the violation shown, and this may require remedial detail. In these circum-
stances, specific elements of the violation and remedy should not be evaluated in isolation.
29. The injunction reduces the plaintiffs' risks not simply because it directly eliminates the unlaw-
ful conditions, but also because the prospect of damage actions often will not produce changes in the
defendant's practices since: (i) the various victims may not have the will and financial ability to initi-
ate continual damage litigation; or (ii) the defendant (often a complex government institution) may not
be sufficiently sensitive to the financial disincentives of successful damage litigation. The courts have
never taken seriously the notion that injunctive relief in desegregation cases might be replaced by
damage actions, undoubtedly also because of the impossibility and unsuitability of putting a monetary
value on the injury in such cases. See 0. FiSS, supra note 5, at 76-77. But c. P. SCHUCK, supra note
24, at 100-21 (proposing wider use of damages); Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New
Phases in the Continuing Quest for Quality Schools, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 257, 279-82 (same).
30. Professor Fiss justifies specificity not simply "by considerations of efficacy" but also by "gen-
eral considerations of fairness (such as notice)." Fiss, supra note 5, at 50. Since defendants often object
to specificity, however, the value of notice itself is probably best seen in terms of remedial effectiveness
for victims rather than fairness to the defendant. Seen this way, notice is primarily a way of increas-
ing the incentives for compliance by creating sufficient warning to support a subsequent contempt
action for non-compliance. Specificity also facilitates the court's ability to monitor compliance, contrib-
uting to the likelihood of remedial success.
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in spite of the court's rejection of all claims competing with the interests of
victims. Interest Balancing, however, admits the possibility of tradeoffs;
some achievable remedial effectiveness may be sacrificed because of other
social interests. Thus, while both remedial approaches tolerate a gap be-
tween right and remedy due to unresolvable conflicts among remedial
strategies or unavoidable instrumental difficulties, Interest Balancing also
admits a limited remedy when a more effective one is too costly to other
interests. Interest Balancing thus tolerates a gap between right and
remedy that could be closed.
1. Costs as a Remedial Constraint
The role of costs is central to the distinction between Rights Maximiz-
ing and Interest Balancing. Under Rights Maximizing, costs play a
sharply limited role in the choice of an injunctive remedy; the costs that a
remedy imposes are relevant only when such costs actually interfere with
the remedy's effectiveness or when a court must choose among equally
effective remedies. Suppose, for example, that one goal of a remedy is to
eliminate stigmatic harms to the victim class. If a remedial strategy itself
inflicts stigmatic costs on the victims, the remedy is not fully effective;
such costs are therefore relevant in evaluating the remedy's effectiveness.
Similarly, if a remedy imposes costs on nonvictims that provoke them to
resist in a way that limits the remedy's effectiveness for victims, such
"feedback" costs also need to be considered in evaluating the remedy.
Under Interest Balancing, however, the costs of an injunctive remedy
may also operate as an independent constraint on the effort to provide an
effective remedy. Interest Balancing allows some achievable remedial ef-
fectiveness to be sacrificed in order to avoid costs that are deemed unduly
burdensome to interests other than those of victims. A variety of costs
might conceivably be balanced against remedial goals once a violation of
right has been found. In discrimination cases, such costs might include the
financial expense of a fully effective remedy, risks to the health and safety
of children from school busing, loss of the advantages of neighborhood
schools, loss of efficiency from modifying traditional meritocratic criteria,
interference with policymaking discretion and autonomy of government
institutions, interference with individual free choice, disruption of settled
expectations, difficulties of administering and monitoring implementation,
and even damage to the institutional position of courts if unpopular judi-
cial decrees are imposed. Interest Balancing admits a possibility that
Rights Maximizing forecloses-that some of these costs, some of the time,
may justify a remedy that does less than eliminate all effects of the
violation.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 92: 585, 1983
2. The Justification for Interest Balancing
Courts and commentators have apparently embraced Interest Balancing
in constitutional cases, although at times they seem reluctant to acknowl-
edge that it is a legitimate remedial approach. In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,"1 for example, 2 the Supreme Court
held that busing might be needed to achieve the remedial goal of eliminat-
ing one-race schools but openly acknowledged the need for a "reconcilia-
tion of competing values in a desegregation case," concluding that "[a]n
objection to [busing] may have validity when the time or distance of travel
is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly im-
pinge on the educational process."133 Similarly, scholars writing about in-
junctions frequently affirm that a necessary predicate of a remedial decree
is a conclusion that "the harm is sufficient to justify the remedial costs."1
34
31. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
32. In the school desegregation area, the Court has also invoked Interest Balancing in Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-47 (1974) (Milliken I), where it allowed values of "local autonomy" to
limit a more fully effective desegregation remedy. See infra pp. 645-49 (discussing Milliken I); see
also Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 446 n.13 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (construing prior desegregation cases to require that "due
consideration must be given to other values and interests" in designing desegregation remedies); supra
note 12 (other desegregation cases that formulate equitable principles in balancing terms). Lower
courts also have frequently used Interest Balancing in desegregation cases, e.g., Northcross v. Board of
Educ., 489 F.2d 15, 17 (6th Cir. 1973) (approving district court's rejection of greater desegregation
because of excessive travel time), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd.
of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (rejecting greater desegregation because of
"excessive and unnecessarily heavy administrative burden"), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975).
Interest Balancing has also limited the availability of injunctive relief in constitutional cases outside
the desegregation area, particularly in cases where federalism concerns are involved. See, e.g., Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (restricting availability of injunctive relief against officials of
state or local government); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-49 (1971) (principles of comity bar
issuance of injunction against state criminal prosecution involving violations of constitutional rights
except in cases of bad-faith harassment); c. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500
(1941) ("public interests" in avoiding "needless friction with state policies" lead federal courts to
abstain from immediately adjudicating suit). Interest Balancing is also invoked in the context of equi-
table remedies for statutory violations. E.g., City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 721-23 (1978) (Title VII); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 375 (1977) (Title VII).
33. Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31. While lengthy busing might interfere with the education of blacks
as well as whites, Swann should not be read as a Rights Maximizing opinion concerned only with
providing the most effective remedy to blacks. Since the Swann limitation would leave the affected
black students in de jure segregated schools-and would not require any alternative remedial benefits
for those students-it is hard to see how the Swann limitation would fulfill the remedial goals of
desegregation more effectively than busing would. Swann should be read as its language suggests, as
an Interest Balancing case in which "competing values" are balanced against blacks' remedial inter-
ests and will sometimes override them.
34. Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 194, 194; see
P. SCHUCK, supra note 24, at 190-91 (costs of injunctive remedy must be counted against any bene-
fits); Goodman, Some Reflections on the Supreme Court and School Desegregation, in RACE AND
SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 45, 69-70 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981) (balanc-
ing in desegregation cases); Leubsdorf, Completing the Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U. L. REV. 39,
87-89 (1977) (balancing in desegregation cases); Nagel, supra note 27, at 680-81 (separation of pow-
ers as source of limit on courts' power "to seek complete correction of the consequences of a constitu-
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Other formulations of governing remedial principles, however, suggest an
uneasiness about acknowledging that remedial costs may limit the most
effective remedy possible for victims of constitutional violations. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court's frequent statements that remedies must elimi-
nate "all vestiges" of constitutional violations, 5 or must eliminate a viola-
tion's effects "to the greatest possible degree,""8 are the language of Rights
Maximizing. The complexity of justifying Interest Balancing may help
explain some reluctance to acknowledge its use.
Under Rights Maximizing, the justification for any remedial limit is
simple: Nothing more is possible. Since Interest Balancing permits the
sacrifice of an achievable remedy for the violation of constitutional rights,
Interest Balancing is much harder to justify than Rights Maximizing, cer-
tional violation"); see also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 2.4-2.5 (1973) (gen-
eral discussion of remedial limits and balancing in equity cases).
It is frequently difficult to characterize a particular commentator as either a Rights Maximizer or
an Interest Balancer. Consider, for example, Professor Fiss' elaboration of his views in The Jurispru-
dence of Busing:
The relevance of remedial costs is often obscured in constitutional litigation. It is commonly
asserted that violation of a "constitutional right" must be corrected regardless of the cost. In-
deed, vindication-at-any-cost is often thought to be one of the special attributes of a right
deemed "constitutional." This conceptualization may be appropriate for a narrow band of
constitutional provisions, those that specifically confer a readily discernible right-such as the
provision guaranteeing trial by jury-though even then a court may take account of the reme-
dial costs in defining the incidents of the right-such as the number of jurors required or the
unanimity requirement. But for constitutional provisions like the due process or equal protec-
tion clauses the remedial costs are dearly relevant in determining whether there is a violation.
With these provisions, the judiciary has considerable latitude in shaping the contours of a
"constitutional right"-in determining whether segregation is to be deemed a denial of the
equal protection of the laws and whether blacks have a "constitutional right" to have the
system integrated. In making that judgment, the court must not only consider the harmfulness
of the particular practice being challenged but also whether it is sufficiently harmful to war-
rant the costs of eliminating it.
Fiss, supra, at 195-96. The passage begins by dearly suggesting that Fiss is an Interest Balancer who
believes that remedial costs may be a source of remedial limits once a right is defined, and that a court
may properly refrain from ordering a remedy to correct violations of that right if the costs of the
remedy are too high. Then (starting with the ambiguous phrase "incidents of the right") the passage
begins to plead the relevance of costs in defining the right itself; rights and remedies become blurred.
This blurring may be a product of Fiss' view, developed in earlier articles, that segregation (whether
de facto or dejure) violates the Constitution whenever the harm of segregation is sufficient to warrant
the costs of eliminating it. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3, 16-18, 36-39 (1974); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 583-617 (1965). In this view, which is sharply different from
current equal protection doctrine, costs would be relevant at the rights-declaring stage, not necessarily
at a separate remedy stage, and there need not be any divergence between right and remedy. In a later
article, The Forms of Justice, Professor Fiss emphasizes a sharper separation between right and
remedy, and yet seems more clearly to be a Rights Maximizer. To the extent that Fiss acknowledges
"limiting forces" and limited remedies, he appears no longer to accept cost limits on remedies but only
limits arising from forces "beyond the [judges'] control," forces that may lead a judge to "compromise
his original objective in order to obtain as much relief as possible." Fiss, supra note 5, at 54-55
(emphasis added). This is the language of Rights Maximizing. See infra pp. 677-80.
35. See cases cited supra note 9.
36. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). To the extent such passages
acknowledge that remedies may be limited, they invoke practicalities that make greater remedial effec-
tiveness impossible, not cost-based limitations.
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tainly to the victims of the violation. My own view, reached with difficulty
and held with doubt, is that at least some form of Interest Balancing is
indeed appropriate in constitutional cases. Competing costs should not al-
ways be excluded completely from the remedial calculus. But the justifica-
tion is by no means self-evident, and Interest Balancing must be used with
great caution to assure that the right receives sufficient weight in the
balance.
The issue here, it must be emphasized, is not whether costs to other
social interests should play any role in limiting how much a plaintiff can
extract from a court. Some costs obviously play a role in defining the con-
tent of the right itself. Balancing tests of one sort or another are commonly
used to determine whether a violation of constitutional right has oc-
curred.37 Infringement of a constitutionally recognized interest does not
amount to a violation of a constitutional right if the government has an
overriding competing interest. For example, the First Amendment permits
government restrictions on expressive activity if there is a clear and immi-
nent danger of serious harm;"8 similarly, the equal protection clause per-
mits gender distinctions if they "serve important governmental objectives
and [are] substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 9 Under
Interest Balancing, however, competing interests are afforded a second
veto at the remedy stage, after a violation of constitutional right is shown.
Values apparently insufficient to override constitutional interests at the
rights-declaring stage may be allowed at the remedy stage to prevent prac-
tical vindication of those rights. Why should costs ever play this limiting
role at the remedy stage?
Two possible reasons are simply explanations and not justifications.
First, the divergence between right and remedy may simply reflect a mis-
take in articulating the right. If the right is defined properly (that is, nar-
rowed to give greater weight to competing costs), the divergence between
right and remedy disappears, and there is no need for Interest Balancing.
Second, the divergence between right and remedy under Interest Balanc-
ing may reveal ambivalence and uncertainty about the right itself: Unsure
of how broadly to define the plaintiffs' interests, a court states a broadly
phrased right but delivers more modest relief. While evasion may some-
times be functional,40 it is inappropriate to deal with ambivalence about
the right by taking antagonistic positions in the separate theoretical realms
37. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS
987-1004 (1975); Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1022 (1978).
38. E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-21 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971).
39. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
40. See infra pp. 665-74 (discussing functions of judicial subterfuge).
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of rights and remedies, depositing half of one's ambivalence in each realm.
A third argument is that balancing costs and benefits at the remedy
stage is an inherent aspect of "equitable" remedies. If the reference to
equity is not an appeal to substantive values but instead an appeal to the
historic functions and flexibility of equity courts furnishing equitable rem-
edies, this justification is not altogether convincing. Equity evolved in part
to ameliorate the rigidities of courts at law that interfered with fully ade-
quate remedial vindication.41 In any event, notions of equity are not static;
history alone cannot justify a refusal to use the most effective method of
vindicating constitutional rights.
A fourth reason is persuasive but of limited scope: Some remedial limits
are rooted in the Constitution itself. The Eleventh Amendment, for exam-
ple, has been interpreted to prohibit certain retroactive monetary awards
against a state.42 An injunction that prevented individuals from exercising
their constitutional right to travel or to attend private schools would also
interfere with what courts have deemed constitutional interests. 43 In gen-
eral terms, vindicating a constitutional remedial interest may clash with
another constitutional interest. While the existence of clashing constitu-
tional interests does not determine which one should prevail, in some cases
a limited remedy is justified because a more complete remedy would im-
pose costs that are themselves held to be constitutionally prohibited. Obvi-
ously, though, not all Interest Balancing limits are constitutionally
required.
41. See 0. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 10-13, 74-76 (1972); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
1.4 (2d ed. 1977). To be sure, equity also ameliorated rigidities that might produce unfairness for the
defendant and evolved defenses that could at times bar plaintiffs from equitable remedies altogether
(e.g., adequacy of remedy at law, unclean hands, estoppel, laches). See D. DOBBS, supra note 34, §§
2.4-2.5; Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 533-35 (1982).
The general appropriateness of injunctive relief in desegregation cases, of course, has never been
questioned by the courts. Cf supra note 29 (inadequacies of relying upon damage remedies in deseg-
regation cases). The issue here is whether there is a justification for issuing an injunction that requires
something less than the complete elimination of a violation in a case where equitable relief is undoubt-
edly appropriate. The mere fact that defendants traditionally had certain equitable defenses availa-
ble-mostly ones that are irrelevant in the typical desegregation case-does not explain why, in a
twentieth-century constitutional law case, a judge should order only partial and incomplete equitable
relief.
42. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-71 (1974). Although Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity seems quite well established in legal doctrine, many judges and commentators have made
powerful textual, historical, and policy arguments against the immunity. See, e.g., Employees of the
Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309-24
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines (pts. I & 2), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 1203 (1978).
43. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-42 (1972) (right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (same); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right
to attend private schools). Some reliance interests of those who would be affected by a remedy may
also have constitutional dimension. See Pineman v. Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525, 546-53 (D. Conn.
1980) (contract clause restricts nature of remedy), vacated on other grounds, 637 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.
1981).
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Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions directly limiting remedies
suggest a fifth and much broader point. However strong remedial effec-
tiveness is as a value, it is not society's only value. Where effective reme-
dies conflict with interests that were not considered at the rights
stage-interests that are not relevant to the question of whether a right
has been violated-those interests press to be considered at the remedy
stage and, on occasion, to override the value of remedying violations of the
right. Particularly when the violation was long-lasting and broad in scope,
and therefore had widespread effects, the potential scope of an equity de-
cree creates distinctive pressure to accept constraints on relief. Such an
injunction usually does more than roll back ill-gotten gains secured by the
defendant in violating the victims' rights. To undo the effects of the
wrongs in the direct manner that the injunction contemplates, to give the
victims effective relief, the court must consider rearranging many pieces
that were irrelevant to the question of violation.
Most importantly, as discrimination cases show, an effective remedy is
often not possible without imposing significant and direct costs on selected
third parties who are nonviolators. Remedial burdens are easiest to justify
when the cost-bearer of the remedy is also the wrongdoer who violated the
plaintiffs' rights. It is, after all, a "'basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing."" Remedies for long-standing discrimination, however, often
cannot meet that norm, since relief for the defendants' legal wrongs fre-
quently imposes substantial burdens directly on nonwrongdoers-job ap-
plicants and employees who did not engage in employment discrimination
but are disadvantaged under employment quotas or retroactive seniority
requirements, 45 or families subject to a busing remedy because of the ac-
tions of government officials to whom they have given neither votes nor
support and in whose jurisdiction they may not even have lived during the
period of the violation."'
44. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
45. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774-75 (1976); Association Against Dis-
crimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 988 (1982); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972).
46. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 995 n.7 (1976) (per curiam) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). To be sure, all private and public enterprise liability, whether it involves damages
or injunctive relief, imposes costs that are then passed on to others who may be altogether innocent or
innocent except for their current membership or citizenship in the liable entity. Particular pressure to
use Interest Balancing for injunctive remedies in this context arises from the size, nature, directness,
and selectivity of the remedial costs imposed on people who may not be wrongdoers or distinctive
beneficiaries. This points to a more general question: To what extent is the justification for enterprise
liability affected by either the character of the relationship between the liable entity and the actual
remedial cost-bearer (citizen, taxpayer, customer, employee, applicant, and so forth) or the nature of
the costs imposed?
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Remedial burdens are also rather easy to justify if they take away
benefits that people have received only because of the wrongs of others.4
But injunctions often go beyond this. School desegregation remedies, for
example, do not simply take back benefits unjustly enjoyed by third par-
ties and return those parties to the position they would have occupied
absent the violation; instead, to assure that black children receive a deseg-
regated education, it is often necessary to require third parties to accept
burdens-such as long-distance transportation-that no one would have
had to bear today if the wrongs had not been committed. Similarly, em-
ployment discrimination remedies do not necessarily impose costs on those
specific job applicants or workers who have distinctively benefited from
the defendants' violations. In short, remedies for discrimination frequently
place direct costs on persons who are neither wrongdoers nor distinctive
beneficiaries of prior wrongs. Indeed, in this respect, the problem posed by
many remedies for specific "identified" violations of antidiscrimination
laws is the same one posed by voluntary affirmative action programs
adopted to overcome effects of past "societal" discrimination: Although in-
tervention is justified in order to rectify prior wrongdoing, innocent third
parties selectively bear the costs of rectification.
4 8
An adherent of Rights Maximizing, of course, would say that these
third party concerns are always properly ignored if necessary to furnish
an effective remedy for victims of constitutional violations. For an adher-
ent of Interest Balancing, however, the frequent divergence of law violator
from remedial cost-bearer, and the distinctive scope and directness of the
injunction's impact on nonviolators, make it appropriate at least to con-
sider certain costs at the remedy stage that are not relevant to the violation
stage. An Interest Balancer might generally override these third-party
costs because of the extraordinary value attached to providing an effective
remedy to victims, but nevertheless allow those costs to justify limiting the
remedy in some cases.49
47. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 363-66 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 776 (1976); Sher, Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment, 4 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 159, 164-65 (1975).
48. Numerous parallels exist between issues raised by remedies for "identified" racial discrimina-
tion (discrimination by specific persons or institutions named as defendants in a lawsuit) and remedies
for "societal" racial discrimination (discrimination extending more generally throughout our country's
social institutions and throughout its history), particularly when the scope of the "identified" violation
is considerable and the remedy commensurate. It should be possible, indeed, to develop a remedial
conception of antidiscrimination law that explores the pervasiveness and power of remedial ideas in
the field, and that sees these various remedial situations as posing a set of common problems whose
difficulties vary according to the temporal and spatial scope of the discriminatory acts being addressed
and the breadth of the remedial response. Cf. Gewirtz, Race and Equal Protection of the Laws:
Strauder v. West Virginia, in THE SUPREME COURT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 111, 126-29 (B. Marshall
ed. 1982) (noting some common remedial problems).
49. The Supreme Court has also invoked the interests of "innocent third parties" as a basis for
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While the existence of certain remedial costs may justify their
consideration at the remedy stage if they are not part of the definition of
the right, it does not explain or justify why these costs are not included as
part of the right itself, why the right-remedy gap should not be closed by
redefining the right to take such costs into account. One answer is that the
court may believe that the constitutional text does not give leeway for such
a redefinition of the right; or a court may believe that the very concept of
constitutional rights requires that those rights be articulated in a sort of
principled and general form that is unaffected by highly context-bound
and time-bound factors that might justify restricting a remedy in a partic-
ular case. The better answer is that where Interest Balancing's considera-
tion of remedial costs leads to a failure to provide a fully effective injunc-
tion, it does not necessarily foreclose other remedies. Even if an injunctive
remedy is too costly, other judicial remedies such as damages 50 may be
available to eliminate some effects of the violation, or other branches of
government may try to vindicate the right in ways that a court believes it
should not. Thus, it is meaningful not to redefine the right but to preserve
it as an aspiration that may be vindicated in other ways or places.
3. Balanceable and Unbalanceable Costs
Interest Balancers reject the view that a remedy's costs may never jus-
tify limiting a remedy; they must still decide, however, which costs are
allowed to limit a remedy, and how much limiting effect to give to those
costs. Even under Interest Balancing, some costs must be altogether un-
balanceable-that is, they will not be permitted to weigh at all against
remedial effectiveness. 1 An example of a cost that should be unbalance-
able in formulating a remedy for racial segregation is the "cost" of inter-
fering with white racists' preferences to stay away from blacks because of
their race. The objection to recognizing these costs is not simply that doing
so would interfere with remedial effectiveness; if it were, all costs would
limiting equitable remedies in statutory discrimination cases. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719, 721-23 (1978) (in gender discrimination suit involv-
ing city pension fund, retroactive award was inappropriate because it might interfere with solvency of
fund and disappoint expectations of persons covered by plan); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977) ("[E]specially when immediate implementation of an equita-
ble remedy threatens to impinge upon the expectations of innocent parties, the courts must 'look to the
practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests.' "). But see
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976) (to deny remedy "on the sole ground that
such relief diminishes the expectations of other arguably innocent employees would if applied gener-
ally frustrate . . . 'make whole' objective of Title VII").
50. This essay does not consider the applicability of Interest Balancing to damage remedies. See
supra note 29 (discussing inadequacy of damages in desegregation cases).
51. See Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, supra note 34, at 196 (court must disregard costs
whose "allowance would. . . result in the continued subordination of the racial minority" and whose
"existence and magnitude . . . are subject to indirect control").
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be unbalanceable. Rather, the rejection of these costs is rooted in their
relation to the right. The preferences of white racists are ignored not be-
cause such preferences are deemed offensive but because they involve an
objection to the right itself. This clarifies the relevant distinction between
different remedial costs: costs of the right, which are the distributive costs
entailed by. the end-state vision embodied in the right itself; and transi-
tional costs of remedies for violations of the right, which are the costs
imposed in order to move from the current situation to that end state. The
former should always be unbalanceable; an objection to the right is not an
interest that may count as an independent value to be weighed against
furnishing a fully effective remedy. But objections to transitional remedial
burdens should at least be balanceable.
If a cost is deemed balanceable, the remaining question is whether it is
sufficiently weighty to justify limiting a remedy. In general terms, a par-
ticular remedy may be rejected under Interest Balancing if its costs "out-
weigh" or "exceed" the remedial effectiveness it produces. Deciding
whether costs outweigh remedial effectiveness requires a cluster of norma-
tive judgments: The court must first decide how much to value the provi-
sion of various remedial benefits and the avoidance of certain costs, and
then compare those values (assuming, perhaps implausibly, that a com-
mon scale of valuation can always be devised). 2 Critical to my own con-
ception of Interest Balancing is the view that the social benefit of the right
and the interest in undoing effects of its violation must be given excep-
tional weight in the balance; otherwise the Constitution's allocation of
rights would be subject to a de novo utilitarian reevaluation in particular
cases. This weighting places a significant burden of justification on any
decision to accept a cost tradeoff and sacrifice some achievable remedial
effectiveness.
A danger of rejecting Rights Maximizing is that Interest Balancing will
be misapplied if it is legitimated in any form-that judges will come to
accept Interest Balancing tradeoffs beyond what my rather stringent con-
ception would find acceptable. The point is both political and psychologi-
cal. Politically, rejecting Rights Maximizing may lead the courts to ap-
prove a general conception of Interest Balancing that undervalues the
importance of vindicating rights, or may open the way for judges hostile to
the right to dilute its force by excessively diluting the remedy in particular
cases; psychologically, judges may systematically undervalue individual
52. Quite obviously, a "procedural" solution that would "let the victims decide" upon the pre-
ferred remedy is implausible under Interest Balancing, even if plausible under Rights Maximizing,
see supra note 23; since the claims of victims and cost-bearers are each relevant under Interest Balanc-
ing, some substantive choice among their interests by a neutral third party (the court) is unavoidable.
The Yale Law Journal
rights if allowed to balance them against broad social interests.53 There-
fore, even if one believes that Interest Balancing is the best approach in
theory, concern about possible abuses in its application might lead to re-
nunciation of the approach altogether: better to insist upon Rights Maxi-
mizing, even if it sometimes will lead to inappropriately sweeping reme-
dies, since the greater danger is that legitimating any form of Interest
Balancing will lead to inappropriately narrow remedies. This objection to
Interest Balancing is prophylactic, reflecting a view that judges are un-
willing or unable to apply Interest Balancing correctly in enough cases to
be entrusted with the task. This is an unacceptable and inaccurate work-
ing view about judges, however. Prophylactic rules-Miranda v. Ari-
zona54 is a good example-are appropriate when decisionmakers have
demonstrated that they cannot be entrusted with a substantively preferable
rule. But there is no reason yet to doubt the general capacity of judges to
reject improper cost justifications for limiting remedies under an Interest
Balancing approach. When defendants press too far,55 judges themselves
must resist.
D. The Place of Resistance in Remedial Theory
The remainder of this essay discusses one deeply troubling source of
remedial imperfection-public resistance to judicial remedial action-and
focuses on the various roles that resistance plays under the two remedial
approaches. Whether one adopts Rights Maximizing or Interest Balanc-
ing, resistance based on opposition to the right should be deemed un-
balanceable and have no independent moral weight. As elaborated below,
however, resistance may nonetheless be the basis for limiting a remedy in
at least three ways, each leading a court to provide less complete relief
than it would absent resistance.
First, whether a court uses Rights Maximizing or Interest Balancing,
resistance itself can interfere with the effectiveness of the remedy. While
strategies to quiet resistance may sometimes be available, a court may not
be able to tame the opposition completely, and a limited remedy might be
53. See C. Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, Feb.
1961, at 63, 66; H. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 878-79 (1960). Analogous
concerns are reflected in an argument that even though judges may properly behave as Interest Bal-
ancers, they should not admit to the public (or perhaps even to themselves) that they are not Rights
Maximizers. See infra pp. 665-74 (discussing judicial candor).
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. A recent example of an excessive invocation of Interest Balancing appears in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice's amicus curiae brief supporting the school board's petition for certiorari in the Nash-
ville schools case. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11-14,
Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Kelley (calling for cost-benefit analysis at remedy stage that
seems to give no distinctive weight to interests of victims), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983) [herein-
after cited as U.S. Amicus Brief].
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the most effective remedy possible, justifiable even under Rights Maximiz-
ing. Indeed, the most effective remedy may be one that a court limits at
the outset. Second, resistance may be based on opposition to transitional
remedial costs that a court does consider balanceable. While a Rights
Maximizing court would refuse to allow such costs (and the opposition
that invokes them) to be independent counterweights in devising a remedy,
an Interest Balancing court might limit the remedy if these balanceable
costs are sufficiently great. Third, resistance itself may impose costs on
social interests other than those of the victims, including the costs of at-
tempting to tame the opposition as well as costs of failing to tame it.
While Rights Maximizing requires that these costs be borne if they will
yield a more effective remedy for victims, Interest Balancing allows these
costs to be considered as part of the remedial balance and at times to limit
the remedy that provokes the resistance.
The next two parts of this essay examine the enduring problem of resis-
tance to school desegregation remedies. The first part, which discusses the
remedial delay that Brown itself tolerated because of resistance, focuses on
the possibility of justifying remedial imperfection in Rights Maximizing
terms. The second part, which considers contemporary limitations on the
scope of integration decrees in response to possible "white flight," applies
the remedial approaches more fully, and examines the ways in which both
Interest Balancing and Rights Maximizing deal with resistance and reme-
dial imperfection.
III. 1955: "All Deliberate Speed" and the Expense of Time
In the school segregation cases known as Brown, transitional questions
of remedy were as prominent as fundamental questions of rights. The
Supreme Court not only had to decide whether the equal protection clause
prohibited "separate but equal" public schools, but also what was the ap-
propriate remedy for deeply entrenched segregation. The Supreme Court's
opinions sharply separated these questions. A year after Brown I declared
that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," ' the Court
in Brown II addressed "the complexities arising from the transition to a
system of public education freed of racial discrimination. '57 The seven-
paragraph opinion in Brown II left open many questions-for example, it
described the remedial goals of the transition only vaguely-but the Court
made clear that this transition would not have to be immediate. Brown II
approved an imperfect remedy-delayed desegregation-and did so be-
cause of feared white resistance.
56. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I).
57. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II).
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In its famous and controversial last paragraph, Brown II instructed the
district courts to "enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opin-
ion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases." ' The phrase "all deliberate speed" is an unusual rhetorical con-
struction: The words "deliberate" and "speed" connote different things,
and "all" only intensifies the ambiguity. Style in this case is inseparable
from substance. Internal documents now available confirm that the Court
intended to signal flexibility, 9 and this apparently was how the opinion
was perceived by the Court's various publics."0 The Court was not requir-
ing immediate desegregation. Rather, taking account of "a variety of ob-
stacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance
with . . . constitutional principles," the Court was allowing delay and a
gradual transition to a nondiscriminatory school system."1 Moreover, the
opinion set no specific deadlines for full compliance. Desegregation was
58. Id. at 301.
59. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 736-44 (1975); Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 52-57 (1979). Kluger traces the
phrase "all deliberate speed" to Justice Frankfurter, who borrowed it from Justice Holmes, see Vir-
ginia v. West Virginia, 222 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1911), who in turn attributed it to English chancery cases
but who may, some speculate, actually have learned it from a poem by Francis Thompson, "The
Hound of Heaven." R. KLUGER, supra, at 686, 742-44; see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 253 (1962).
60. The New York Times, perhaps a public in its own right, reported the decision with the
following headlines: "High Court Tells States to End Pupil Segregation Within 'Reasonable' Time,"
"No Deadline Set," "Southerners React Quietly, Although Some Are Defiant," "Court Ruling Brings
Feelings of Relief-Tensions Reduced by the Absence of Desegregation Time Limit." N.Y. Times,
June 1, 1955, at 1, cols. 6-8. The newspaper also reported that the Court's ruling gratified officials of
the Eisenhower Administration and that: "Congressional reaction, for the most part, indicated relief
that the Court had not ordered a summary end to segregation under a rigid mandate. By permitting a
gradual transition from segregated to integrated school systems, many felt, serious repercussions prob-
ably had been avoided." Id. at 1, col. 8. Although its lead headline used the phrase "within 'reasona-
ble' time," taking the word "reasonable" out of the specific context used by the Court ("prompt and
reasonable start toward full compliance"), the Times also reprinted an extraordinary story from the
Associated Press captioned "'With Deliberate Speed' is the Coming Phrase":
WASHINGTON, May 31 (AP)-The Supreme Court in its opinion today said school deseg-
regation must be ended "with all deliberate speed"-a phrase likely to keep lawyers arguing
for a long, long time. Under one dictionary definition of "deliberate" the phrase is self-contra-
dictory. This definition is: "slow in action; unhurried." It seems likely, however, that the high
tribunal did not have this definition in mind. Others include: Arrived at, or determined upon,
as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations. Carried on coolly and steadily.
Careful in considering the consequences of a step. Characterized by reflection; dispassionate;
not rash. In the coming legal struggles in district courts, opponents of school integration are
likely to put a lot of emphasis on the "deliberate" part of the Supreme Court's language; foes
of segregation are expected to lay more stress on the word "speed."
Id. at 28, col. 5.
61. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II). While the commentary on
Brown II has focused on the gradualism and "deliberateness" allowed by the Court, the opinion also
contained passages embellishing "speed": Defendants must make a "prompt and reasonable start to-
ward full compliance," and "[t]he burden rests upon the defendants to establish that [additional] time
[for compliance] is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the
earliest practicable date." Id.
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carried out under the permissive "all deliberate speed" formula until
1964, when the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[t]he time for mere 'de-
liberate speed' has run out."' 62 At that point, only 1.2% of the nearly three
million black students in the South attended school with white students.
63
The text of Brown II justified gradualism and delay by reference sim-
ply to administrative problems "arising from the physical condition of the
school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of
school districts and attendance areas into compact units . . ., and revision
of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the fore-
going problems."6 ' No mention was made of time for psychological or
political adjustments. Indeed, "it should go without saying," the Court
said, "that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed
to yield simply because of disagreement with them. 1 5 It seems clear,
however, that the Justices were chiefly concerned about white opposition,
62. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). Indeed, it was not until 1968 that the
Court began to insist that desegregation plans must "promise[ ] realistically to work now." Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968); see also Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Edue.,
396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam) (refusing time extension for desegregation of Mississippi
schools). And it was not until 1971 that the Court began to provide relatively comprehensive stan-
dards for measuring whether a plan "worked." See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Prior to 1963, when the Supreme Court began to express its impatience with the pace of gradual-
ism under the "all deliberate speed" standard-see Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963);
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526,
529-30 (1963)-the Supreme Court gave plenary consideration to only a handful of school desegrega-
tion cases. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958) (per curiam)
(affirming district court's rejection of facial challenge to Alabama's pupil placement law); Florida ex
rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam) (ordering immediate admission
of black students to previously segregated graduate school); infra pp. 626-28 (discussing Cooper v.
Aaron). The Court left standing a significant number of lower court decisions that assured only the
most minimal desegregation. E.g., Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.) (allowing grade-
by-grade desegregation), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th
Cir.) (requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Hood
v. Board of Trustees, 232 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956);
Slade v. Board of Educ., 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.) (per curiam) (upholding pupil placement laws), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958). But the Supreme Court also left standing a number of Courts of Ap-
peals decisions insisting upon more effective desegregation steps. E.g., Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385
(3d Cir. 1960) (requiring full integration of all grades in public schools), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933
(1961); School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.) (striking down administrative appeal require-
ment and ordering nondiscriminatory admissions), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Orleans Parish
School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.) (denying stay of desegregation plan), motion for stay
denied, 364 U.S. 500 (1957).
For discussion of Southern intransigence and footdragging after Brown II, see H. RODGERS & C.
BULLOCK, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 69-111
(1972); J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE-THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
1954-1978, at 61-127 (1979); Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects,
64 COLUM. L. REV 193 (1964); McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed'". A Study of School Desegrega-
tion, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956).
63. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DESEG-
REGATION OF THE NATION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4 (1976).
64. 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
65. Id. at 300.
The Yale Law Journal
not administrative adjustments. 6 Fully aware that they were commanding
a sweeping transformation of long-standing and entrenched practices and
customs, the Justices wished to project a flexibility that would reduce in-
transigence and promote flexibility among whites.6 7 In addition, the Court
sought to protect itself as an institution by avoiding orders that would be
successfully defied. As Justice Black put it in conference, Southern resis-
tance inevitably would make the implementation of Brown a gradual pro-
cess; to avoid undermining its own authority, the Court "should not issue
what it cannot enforce.""8 Thus, the Court explicitly approved flexible
implementation schedules, but did not make explicit that it was allowing
this remedial delay because of white opposition.69 The Court's refusal to
admit candidly what it was doing in Brown II began a pattern of judicial
deception about the link between remedies and resistance.70
My earlier discussion of remedial theory provides a coherent perspec-
tive from which to evaluate the delay approved in Brown II. "All deliber-
ate speed" authorized and yielded an imperfect remedy; the delay that it
permitted resulted in a failure to implement fully the rights and substan-
tive remedial goals stated (albeit vaguely) in Brown .71 This delay meant
not only that effective relief for some members of the plaintiff class would
be postponed7 2 but also that some members of the plaintiff class would fail
to receive relief at all since they would graduate before any desegregation
would actually occur. The issue is whether this remedial imperfection is
justifiable under either of the two remedial approaches set out above. For
the sake of simplicity, I focus here only on the appropriateness of Brown
IH's basic decision to permit some significant remedial delay rather than to
require immediate desegregation, and not on the Court's ultimate toler-
66. See A. BICKEL, supra note 59, at 250-53; R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 737-44; E. WARREN,
THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 288-90 (1977); Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 53-54.
67. Such concerns had also influenced the substance and tone of the Brown I opinion, which Chief
Justice Warren said he prepared "on the theory that [it] should be ... , above all, non-accusatory."
Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 42.
68. R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 740.
69. Justice Frankfurter, the source of the phrase "all deliberate speed," had urged that the
Court's opinions "take due, even if not detailed account of. . . what are loosely called 'attitudes,'" in
addition to administrative factors, Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 53; but Chief Justice Warren op-
posed "mentioning 'psychological' or 'sociological' attitudes" in the opinions, and Warren's view pre-
vailed. See R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 739. Justice Frankfurter went public on this issue in his
separate opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 25 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (desegrega-
tion "not an easy, overnight task" given "deep emotions" involved; "[oInly the constructive use of
time" can achieve desired end).
70. See infra pp. 665-74 (discussing judicial candor).
71. On delay as a form of remedial ineffectiveness, see supra p. 596.
72. The cases in Brown were all brought as class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a)(3). See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also Supplemental Memoran-
dum for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief at 1-5, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (discussing applicability of class action rules to Brown
litigation).
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ance of an extended period of delay lasting through the early 1960's
(which seems more clearly inappropriate) or its failure to establish a
deadline for gradual compliance in the Brown II opinion itself.
Much of the criticism of "all deliberate speed" views it as an inappro-
priate accommodation of white feelings. This criticism finds the correct
principle governing the relationship between remedies and resistance in
the text of Brown II itself-"constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield because of disagreement with them" 7 -but views "all deliberate
speed" as the Supreme Court's approval of just such a yielding. Although
he proposed something less than immediate and complete desegregation,7 4
Thurgood Marshall's oral argument in Brown II posed this basic chal-
lenge in particularly powerful terms:
[T]he argument [to postpone enforcement of a constitutional right] is
never made until Negroes are involved.
And then for some reason this population of our country is con-
stantly asked, "Well, for the sake of the group that has denied you
these rights all of this time," . . to protect their greatest and most
cherished heritage, that the Negroes should give up their rights.75
Broader versions of this challenge have been made recently by Dean Der-
rick Bell, Professor Alan Freeman, and Judge Robert Carter, who argue
that in Brown and other Supreme Court decisions the Court balanced
black rights against white interests and chose the latter."
In effect, this criticism sees "all deliberate speed" as an application of
what I have called Interest Balancing, and Interest Balancing of a parti-
cularly indefensible sort. To these critics, the Court furnished a limited
73. 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). Similar principles are articulated in United States v. Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7, 16 (1958); Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1917).
74. The Brief filed by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund proposed that the desegregation process
begin during the 1955 fall term and be completed by the following fall term. Brief for Appellants on
Further Reargument at 10-11, 23, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Appellants' Brief on Reargument]. On the division among plaintiffs' counsel about the position to
take concerning the remedy, see R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 721-23, 726. Following the Court's
decree, co-counsel Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter expressed their satisfaction with the Court's
formulation. Carter & Marshall, The Meaning and Significance of the Supreme Court Decree, 24 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 397 (1955).
75. Reprinted in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 525 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
76. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 381-84 (2d ed. 1980); Bell, supra note 29, at
272-74; Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 241, 244-46 (1968);
Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1065-76 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freeman,
Legitimating Racial Discrimination]; Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction,
Rationalization, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 70, 75-83
(D. Bell ed. 1980); see Steel, Nine Men in Black Who Think White, in THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER EARL WARREN 82, 82-92 (L. Levy ed. 1972).
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remedy because it gave independent weight to remedial costs and viewed
interference with the sensitivities and interests of white opponents of
Brown as a balanceable cost that trumped the remedial interests of black
victims. There is an altogether different possibility, however: The failure
to order immediate desegregation may have served the interests of blacks
even while it accommodated the opposition of whites. Indeed, the Court's
initial tolerance of at least some remedial delay might be defended under
Rights Maximizing, as promising the most effective remedy that could be
provided to black victims of the violation. Doing less may be doing more.
A. The Relevance of Resistance to Remedial Effectiveness
Even the most adamant critic of "all deliberate speed" would have to
concede the appropriateness of authorizing at least some remedial delay.
Remedies often involve unavoidable administrative problems. In desegre-
gation cases, the typical remedy requires redrawing attendance lines, ar-
ranging for any needed pupil transportation, adjusting programs and fa-
cilities, and reassigning teachers. The very achievement of an effective
remedy requires that remedial orders allow time for planning and effectu-
ating their own implementation. In a sense, such delay is an extension of
the delay caused when courts take time to consider the remedy issue after
finding a violation of right. (In Brown, that was a full year.) During this
period of planning and implementation, when instrumental deficiencies
make immediate relief impossible, unlawful conditions continue and the
interests of at least some plaintiffs are sacrificed. While a full remedy
could be ordered into effect immediately, either delay would follow any-
way or a self-defeating chaos would result. Thus, an imperfect remedy in
the form of a somewhat delayed remedy may be the most effective one
possible, and therefore defensible even under Rights Maximizing.77 Obvi-
ously, though, the substantially delayed remedy of "all deliberate speed"
77. The Supreme Court had before it several examples of remedial decrees that allowed delay to
insure orderly implementation. E.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 483 (1931)
(four-year delay allowed in refuse-dumping case for construction of incinerators and funding of alter-
native waste-disposal facilities); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 187-88 (1911)
(eight-month delay to allow orderly dissolution of monopoly); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 81-82 (1911) (six-month delay to allow dissolution of monopoly and transfer of stock); Geor-
gia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (Gaseous Nuisance Cases) (nine-year lapse
during which decrees concerning noxious emissions were formulated and implemented). As institu-
tional litigation has become more prevalent, delays to allow for effective implementation have become
increasingly common. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 335 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (22 months
allowed for Alabama prison facilities to meet U.S. Public Health Service sanitary standards), aff'd as
modified, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Costello v. Wainwright,
397 F. Supp. 20, 38-39 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (one year allowed for Florida prison to reduce unconstitu-
tional levels of overcrowding), vacated and remanded, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), rev'd
per curiam, 430 U.S. 325 (1977); c. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 538, 541 & n.1 (8th
Cir. 1975) (mill permitted to continue dumping sludge for a "reasonable time" until alternative dispo-
sal scheme implemented).
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cannot be explained by unavoidable administrative problems. Administra-
tive restructuring of a school system would have justified no more than a
brief postponement in implementing a remedy."8
The troubling fact about Brown II is that the Court's actual reason for
allowing delay was largely to accommodate opposition to its decision. It is
one thing for the courts to say that conditions declared unlawful may per-
sist for a while because there are practical administrative problems that
must be solved to make a remedy effective; it is quite another to say that
conditions declared unlawful may persist because people believe that those
conditions should be lawful and do not accept their illegality. In the for-
mer case, the right is unquestioned and its most effective realization is
sought. In the latter case, the court is deferring to opposition to the very
right it has proclaimed.
Brown, however, demonstrates that such a distinction is too sharp. The
remedial goal of Brown was to dismantle a discriminatory school system
and vindicate the equal protection rights of the plaintiff class; this reme-
dial task required the participation and cooperation of whites, and there-
fore their attitudes could not be ignored." Even if white attitudes rested
exclusively on blunt opposition to the right, and were therefore completely
uncognizable as an independent interest to be balanced against remedial
effectiveness for victims, those offensive attitudes might well have been
relevant to effectiveness itself. White hostility was relevant because a rem-
edy that imposed costs on hostile whites might have triggered a range of
actions interfering with the decree's effectiveness. Public officials whose
cooperation was necessary to carry out a decree might have dragged their
feet or actually incited popular opposition; private citizens might have en-
gaged in violence or boycotts that would have made effective desegregated
education impossible. Some white opposition would undoubtedly have ex-
isted no matter what the court did, but the terms of a remedy may have
affected the extent of that opposition and therefore the extent of the de-
cree's ultimate effectiveness. If ordering full and immediate desegregation
in Brown would have exacerbated white resistance, a remedy that was
delayed to minimize that resistance might ultimately have been the most
effective from the point of view of the victims themselves.
In short, to say that a remedy may not be limited "because of" white
78. As my colleague Joseph Goldstein has pointed out, alternative school facilities are in place
almost immediately when a natural disaster destroys a school building and scrambles a town. The
administrative obstacles to compliance with the constitutional mandate -of Brown were surely no
greater.
79. In this respect, the problem of resistance and school desegregation is analogous to other classic
remedial problems in which remedial success depends upon the cooperation of parties whose coopera-
tion is not easily secured. See Lumley v. Wagner, I DeG., M. & G., 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.
1852).
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hostility (as Brown II professed) blurs the critically important distinction
between taking account of white attitudes as an independently balanceable
cost of the remedy and taking account of those attitudes in order to maxi-
mize the effectiveness of the remedy for the victim class. To deal with the
opposition as a regrettable given-not as people whose moral claims com-
pete with the moral claims of the victims to an effective remedy, but as
people whose concerns must be considered simply because they have the
power to undercut remedial effectiveness-may be in the victims' interests.
Indeed, if some remedial imperfection is unavoidable, the imperfection
produced by delay may be justifiable under Rights Maximizing. The rele-
vant question, of course, is whether the Court in Brown could have
achieved more effective results for the victims without approving delay,
which depends in part on whether white resistance could have been pre-
vented or reduced by methods that would not have compromised remedial
effectiveness as much as delay did.80 Those questions cannot be answered,
however, simply by asserting that white hostility must always be irrele-
80. A number of commentators have criticized the "all deliberate speed" formula on the instru-
mental ground that it was ineffective in facilitating desegregation and may in fact have stimulated
evasion. E.g., L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NEGRO 351, 356 (1966); R. WILKINS, STANDING FAST 218, 231-33 (1982); Black,
The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 22 (1970); Carter, supra note
76, at 243-44. Justice Hugo Black is reported to have thought in retrospect that "all deliberate speed"
was a mistake and had become an excuse for Southern footdragging. B. WOODWARD & S. ARM-
STRONG, THE BRETHREN 38 (1979). The NAACP Legal Defense Fund's brief in Brown II argued
that "gradualism, far from facilitating the process, may actually make it more difficult . . . . Our
submission is that this, like many wrongs, can be easiest and best undone, not by 'tapering off' but by
forthright action." Appellants' Brief on Reargument, supra note 74, at 17; see supra note 74.
Both the school district defendants and the Solicitor General supported some form of gradualism as
the best way to achieve effective desegregation. See R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 723-27. In his
memoirs, Chief Justice Warren reaffirmed his belief that "all deliberate speed" was the sensible
course. See E. WARREN, supra note 66, at 288-93. Perhaps the best defense of "all deliberate speed"
to date, however, was offered by Alexander Bickel. See A. BICKEL, supra note 59, at 244-54. Bickel
argued that "all deliberate speed" was both expedient and consistent with "the unique function of
judicial review in the American system." Id. at 254. First, desegregation raised many problems of
administrative reorganization that varied from place to place and that required a flexible response.
Second, since opposition and resistance could be anticipated, and "the task of law . . . was not to
punish law breakers but to diminish their number. . . ., it may not [have been] prudent to force
immediate compliance." Id. at 251. He suggests that this view was widespread at the time. Id. at 253.
Third, since the Court might need the assistance of the federal executive branch to enforce its judg-
ment, flexibility might be politically helpful in drawing the executive onto the Court's side. Id. at 251-
52; see A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 7-15 (1965). Professor Bickel's defense is
illuminating, but it furnishes no analytic framework for evaluating remedial compromise in particular
cases; as a result, many of the most important issues raised by resistance are unexplored. A more
recent instrumental defense of "all deliberate speed" has been made by J. WILKINSON, supra note 62,
at 68-77 (concluding that Court erred in "implementing and monitoring" all deliberate speed "but not
in formulating it"); see also M. SHAPIRO & D. HOBBS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
ANALYSES 540 (1978) (Court's decision "was one that any reasonable and prudent group of men
might have made"); Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 354-56, 364-70
(defending Brown II as a method of "leading fundamentally alienated combatants toward their pur-
suit of mutual accommodation").
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vant or that taking account of it is always an (improper) application of
Interest Balancing.
B. Doing Less as Doing More: The Case for Remedial Delay
I do not propose in this essay to answer the ultimate question whether
the Supreme Court could in fact have achieved a more effective remedy
for blacks without approving any delay in Brown II. My primary pur-
pose, to illuminate how resistance fits into different remedial approaches,
will be satisfied by showing the structure and premises of a Rights Maxi-
mizing rationale for the delay approved in Brown II, and by explaining
why such a rationale may be plausible.
"All deliberate speed" involved an imperfect remedy: Delay may have
been a means to quiet one source of remedial imperfection (resistance),
but delay itself was a form of remedial imperfection. An imperfect remedy
can be defended under Rights Maximizing only if other alternatives
would be no more effective in achieving remedial goals. Thus, to defend
remedial delay in Rights Maximizing terms, one must: (i) identify the
relevant remedial goals against which effectiveness is measured; (ii) iden-
tify the alternatives to remedial delay, and conclude that none of them
could, in fact, fully achieve the remedial goals; (iii) define what "most
effective" remedy means; and (iv) conclude that some remedial delay in
fact would produce the "most effective" remedy. One must, in other
words, resolve normative questions concerning standards for evaluating ef-
fectiveness as well as empirical questions concerning how well a particular
remedial strategy in fact meets the standard."1
1. The Goals
Although Brown II left remedial goals rather vaguely defined (for ex-
ample, it did not clearly state if and when systemwide integration would
be required), it did make clear that a fully effective remedy would achieve
a "racially nondiscriminatory school system," including a "system of de-
termining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis," and
would achieve these goals for all victims of de jure segregation.82 An effec-
tive desegregation remedy presumably should also address certain harms
81. It is also important to keep separate three different types of criticism that might be made of
"all deliberate speed": (i) "all deliberate speed" involved a misjudgment about which strategy would
provide the most effective relief for victims; (ii) "all deliberate speed" involved an inappropriate bal-
ancing of victim interests and white sensitivities; and (iii) the strategic judgment reflected in "all
deliberate speed" was an inappropriate exercise of the judicial function, either because courts have no
business making strategic sorts of judgments or because, in Charles Black's words, the Court's action
suggested that "something could be unlawful, while it was nevertheless lawful to continue it for an
indefinite time." Black, supra note 80, at 22.
82. 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
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imposed by de jure segregation that were identified in Brown I-that such
segregation both "denot[es]" and "generates a feeling of inferiority as to
[Negroes'] status in the community" and (or therefore) denies black chil-
dren equal educational opportunities.83 In addition, where white resis-
tance might undercut the effective achievement of these remedial goals,
preventing or quieting such resistance should be seen as an interrelated
goal. Truly effective desegregation does not mean a situation in which
white parents, children, and school officials stand outside previously all-
white schools shouting as blacks enter empty "desegregated" buildings;
nor does it mean racial violence or icy hostility producing racial isolation
within "desegregated" schools. Similarly, a remedy that would lead to the
closing down of the public schools in a community (or the adoption of a
constitutional amendment overruling Brown at the national level) could
not be deemed an "effective" remedy. 4
2. The Imperfections of Alternatives
Whatever remedial path the Court took, significant remedial imperfec-
tion was surely unavoidable. The most plausible alternative to "all delib-
erate speed" was to require full and immediate desegregation for all mem-
bers of the plaintiff class following a short, specified period for
administrative reorganization of previously segregated systems. On its
face, such a decree would have ordered a more fully effective remedy than
"all deliberate speed," but ordering a full remedy would not have meant
that all victims actually would have received one. Because of the reality of
white opposition and the ways in which it was likely to have slowed down
or blocked the effectiveness of any remedial command, a requirement of
immediate desegregation might have yielded as much imperfection as "all
deliberate speed" explicitly tolerated, and might well have provoked much
greater resistance and ineffectiveness.
Moreover, remedial imperfection might have been inevitable even if a
simple command of immediate desegregation was supplemented by an ag-
gressive deployment of judicial power to address opposition directly. To be
sure, the district courts could have used their powers in an entrepreneurial
fashion to try to coax immediate compliance from public officials and the
citizenry, perhaps by encouraging public participation in shaping the de-
83. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
84. The possibility of a constitutional amendment actually raises some subtle issues. In light of the
fact that a constitutional amendment extinguishes the right itself, it is only partly true that remedies
provoking such an amendment would be "ineffective" in vindicating the "right" in question. More-
over, since the amendment process is the very means that the Constitution provides for the public to
register resistance to an existing right, some might think it inappropriate for courts to structure reme-
dies to try to prevent resistance that would produce this sort of "ineffectiveness."
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cree or, as the Solicitor General's office had suggested, 5 by including
race-relations programs in the decree. Or the courts could have tried to
coerce compliance by using their contempt powers and other sanctions or
by summoning force of arms from the political branches."6 While a suc-
cess story was imaginable-stern orders from the Supreme Court, fol-
lowed by stern orders from the district courts, followed by perhaps a very
brief period of some dissonance, and then the rapid emergence of a spirit
of cooperation and full compliance-there are strong reasons to doubt that
such successful remedies were possible.
First, instrumental deficiencies may have prevented the Supreme Court
from completely controlling all the forms of possible resistance. Since the
district judges in the South were largely unsympathetic to Brown" -a
state of affairs that itself raised a prospect of resistance relevant to the
Supreme Court's remedial strategy-heroic efforts to implement an imme-
diate desegregation command might not even have been attempted. Even if
they had been, we cannot simply assume that the local and national politi-
cal branches would have been willing to deploy their police powers to
impose the terms of judicial remedies by force. In any event, coercion
might not have been effective in stopping boycotts or other forms of resis-
tance; indeed, aggressive methods might have simply stiffened or increased
resistance at the local or even national level.
Second, and more interesting, even if resistance could be controlled, the
methods of control might themselves have interfered with other remedial
goals. Desegregation has not been achieved effectively if it can be sus-
tained only at the point of a marshal's gun. The fact of resistance may
have made a conflict between remedial strategies unavoidable: Efforts to
eliminate one source of remedial imperfection, resistance, may have pro-
duced remedial imperfection of another sort, poor educational conditions."
3. The Concept of "Most Effective" Remedy
Since resistance would almost certainly have made a fully effective
remedy for all victims impossible in Brown, the Supreme Court faced a
choice among imperfectly effective remedial alternatives. An argument
that the imperfect remedy of "all deliberate speed" was the most effective
85. Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief at 21-22,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
86. See 0. FISS, supra note 41, at 625-31, and cases cited therein; Leubsdorf, supra note 33, at
60-64; Comment, Community Resistance to School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 114-66 (1976).
87. R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 740 (quoting Justice Hugo Black).
88. Indeed, trying to suppress resistance through armed force may not only impose costs that
interfere with remedial effectiveness, but may also impose sufficiently high "balanceable" costs to
other social interests that an Interest Balancing judge might reject using armed force for that reason.
The Yale Law Journal
among these imperfect alternatives, and therefore justifiable under Rights
Maximizing, must rest on a normative conception of what "most effec-
tive" means in this context. As suggested earlier, this may require both a
ranking of multiple remedial goals and, most significant here, criteria for
comparing different allocations of remedial benefits to different individuals
in the plaintiff class."' Desegregation cases like Brown are class actions;
when a fully effective remedy cannot be furnished to all victims in the
plaintiff class, each remedial alternative will sacrifice individual rights of
some of these victims. In Brown, different remedial alternatives would
probably have secured a different distribution among present and future
students affected by the defendants' violations. While delay in Brown
forestalled full relief for the named plaintiffs and other currently enrolled
black students, delay may have ultimately facilitated a more complete
remedy for some of these students and for other members of the plaintiff
class. (Critics of Brown who contend that the Court sacrificed individual
rights to promote "racial" or "group" rights seem to ignore the fact that
every imperfect alternative would have sacrificed some class members'
rights and that the beneficiaries of delay might have included individual
rights-holders in the plaintiff class.90) The question is which distribution
would have produced the "most effective" remedy for the class members.
Most obviously, perhaps, the "most effective" remedy might be defined
as one that maximizes benefits in a utilitarian sense by providing the
greatest benefit for the greatest number of victims in the plaintiff class.
But alternative conceptions of the "most effective" remedy are certainly
possible, conceptions that take account of the distribution of remedial
benefits within the victim class. One might argue, for example, that the
"most effective" remedy is one that favors named plaintiffs.9 ' This possi-
bility poses a serious challenge to the delayed remedy of "all deliberate
speed," and also illustrates differences in the kinds of arguments available
under Rights Maximizing and Interest Balancing. Priority for named
89. See supra pp. 594-95.
90. Professor Louis Lusky, for example, has criticized "all deliberate speed" on the ground that it
reflects a premise that Negroes "possess rights as a race rather than as individuals"; for Lusky, Brown
H's delay in vindicating "established rights" of some individual blacks is "inexplicable except on the
premise that it was justified by the great benefit that the decision conferred on the Negro race as a
whole." Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 450, 457-59 (1964); see
Carter, supra note 76, at 243-44. Given that the Brown litigation was a class action involving large
numbers of present and future black students in Topeka, however, any tradeoff of some individuals'
rights required by "all deliberate speed" might well be "explicable" and justified by recognizing that
delay may have been able to vindicate the individual rights of other members of the plaintiff class, not
simply benefit "the Negro race as a whole." Lusky would be right only if the interests of the plaintiff
classes before the Court were sacrificed to benefit other blacks; in that case the Court's action could
not be justified in Rights Maximizing terms.
91. One might also argue that current class members should stand in a position of priority over
future class members, since the current members' injuries are immediate and certain. See supra note
23.
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plaintiffs may rest, first, on their distinctive moral position as victims who
took the public risk of bringing litigation to vindicate their claims and the
claims of other victims. While we have become accustomed to class actions
and "structural" relief, the notion of a lawsuit as a dispute that at its core
concerns some visible, identifiable individuals dies hard. A remedy that
fails to benefit the named plaintiffs might be deemed "less effective" than
a remedy that eventually benefited a greater number of other members of
the plaintiff class. A preference for named plaintiffs may also reflect a
second interest: By rewarding those who bring such lawsuits, it encour-
ages other rights-vindicating litigation in the future. This incentive is a
benefit cognizable only under Interest Balancing, however, since it justifies
a remedial apportionment on grounds other than remedial effectiveness for
this victim class.
A Rights Maximizing defense of "all deliberate speed" probably re-
quires defining "most effective" in utilitarian terms. A utilitarian standard
is congenial to a defense of remedial delay since it accepts the sacrifice of
the interests of some present victims, including named plaintiffs, in order
to provide greater benefits for present and future individuals in the plain-
tiff class as a whole. But while the utilitarian standard is certainly an
appropriate way to understand "effectiveness," it is not the only way.
4. The Expense of Time
If the "most effective" remedy is defined in utilitarian terms, the em-
pirical question remains whether "all deliberate speed" constituted the
most effective remedy possible given resistance and the imperfections
likely under all available alternative remedies. Especially where there may
be conflicting remedial interests within the plaintiff class, a court cannot
totally abdicate such a question to plaintiffs' counsel (who in Brown II
opposed gradualism);"2 the court must decide the matter itself. If "all de-
liberate speed" was a strategy in the service of effectiveness rather than a
sell-out to white interests, it was a strategy to expend time as a weapon
instead of using authority and force alone. In allowing delay, the Supreme
Court promised time for social adjustment, as its own direct way of trying
to secure public cooperation (including the cooperation of the lower
courts); it also gave the lower courts time to use their powers and strate-
gies to try to defuse public opposition in their communities. The issue
under Rights Maximizing is whether this advance approval of some reme-
dial delay and imperfection was likely to produce less remedial delay and
imperfection in the end than an order insisting on immediate desegrega-
tion that might have been defied and have stimulated additional unquel-
92. On the position of plaintiffs' counsel in Brown, see supra notes 74, 80.
The Yale Law Journal
lable resistance of its own. The answer does not turn simply on the fact
that an order requiring immediate desegregation would have posed only a
probability of substantial remedial imperfection and that an order permit-
ting "all deliberate speed" promised substantial remedial imperfection on
the face of the decree. That is a real difference, of course: In the former
case, the Court may be prepared ultimately to accept remedial imperfec-
tion if the world resists its commands, but the Court at least insists upon
full compliance; in the latter case, the Court explicitly accepts some im-
perfection in advance. For a Rights Maximizing court, however, the issue
is not which remedial course demands the most from the public, but
which course will actually secure the most effective remedy for black chil-
dren. And this question cannot be answered by looking only at the words
used in the decree.
The fact that advance approval of some remedial delay assuredly pro-
duces an imperfect remedy is relevant, of course, to the empirical question
of which remedial course was likely to benefit blacks the most. The clear-
est price of "all deliberate speed" was that it bargained away some reme-
dial effectiveness at the outset. Before a court approves an assuredly im-
perfect remedy, it must have strong reasons to believe that the alternatives
will actually end up being even less effective. There are obviously many
uncertainties in making such an assessment,'" but against the background
of credible and palpable white resistance, a Rights Maximizing court
committed to furnishing the most effective remedy to blacks could not view
the risks of ordering immediate desegregation as a legal irrelevance; it
would at least have to attempt to make the empirical and strategic judg-
ment, with the burden of justification on any course that required less
than immediate compliance.
Before one could say that delay produced more effective desegregation
than would have been achieved by an order of immediate desegregation,
however, one must take account of all the expenses that time incurred.
Beyond the remedial ineffectiveness implicit in the initial approval of
some remedial delay, the most obvious expense of delay was that accom-
modating white resistance may have encouraged future resistance, produc-
ing more delays and further eroding the effectiveness of remedies." Addi-
tional resistance may have been encouraged either because remedial
flexibility undercut the solemnity and firmness of the principle being ut-
93. Among the many difficulties is the fact that the public attitudes to which a court looks before
deciding upon its remedial course of action may themselves be changed by the course of action the
court decides upon; thus, a court cannot ignore the possibility that its own uncompromising remedial
action might inspire greater public cooperation, just as it cannot ignore the possibility that inflexibility
might provoke greater resistance.
94. Thurgood Marshall had a blunter way of saying why the gradualists should not be accommo-
dated: "They don't mean go slow. They mean don't go." R. WILKINS, supra note 80, at 231.
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tered, or because the Court's willingness to accommodate resistance pro-
vided an incentive to resist. In Brown II, this effect may have been muted
because the Court did not candidly admit that it was willing to delay
remedies because of white resistance. I doubt this, but the issue of judicial
candor is sufficiently complex that I treat it separately below.95
Second, "all deliberate speed" may have had an effect on the Court
itself that parallels the effect on white resistance just noted. Rationalizing
delay in 1955 may have produced within the Court a frame of mind that
made it easier to rationalize further and excessive delay. The Court's fail-
ure to insist upon full desegregation for more than a decade after Brown
H may have reflected this dynamic. Even if some significant period of
delay would have produced more effective desegregation, it is hard to con-
clude, at least in retrospect, that the extraordinarily long delay eventually
tolerated by the Supreme Court under the rubric of "all deliberate speed"
was justifiable in Rights Maximizing terms. The Supreme Court proba-
bly could have secured workable remedies earlier-although it must be
remembered that, while it took a decade for the Court to jettison "all
deliberate speed,"" it also took almost a decade for a sufficient national
consensus to emerge for the political branches of the national government
to ratify the civil rights movement and undertake responsibility for the
systematic implementation of Brown (Congress through the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 '7 and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965,98 and the executive branch through enforcement of those laws).
This excessive delay may have been predictable once the initial decision to
accept some delay was made in Brown II. Delay once tolerated must be
terminated, but termination may be particularly difficult once a basic psy-
chology of delay is in place, especially when it enables judges to postpone
hard decisions.
Third, accommodating white resistance may have imposed dignitary
harms on blacks. Accomodation, like the segregation condemned in Brown
I itself, may have been "interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the ne-
gro group." ' Since eliminating dignitary harms is a remedial goal, a
95. See infra pp. 665-74.
96. See supra pp. 610-11.
97. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
98. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (currently codified in various sections of 20 U.S.C.
(1976 & Supp. V. 1981)).
99. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1880). The possibility of stigma arising from remedial action has been considered in "af-
firmative action" cases. The Justices have generally found such stigma either so minimal or nonexis-
tent that it does not undermine the programs' effectiveness or lawfulness. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick,'448 U.S. 448, 517-22 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 373-76 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); c. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, 320 (1977) (per curiam) (preferential
treatment of women).
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remedy that imposes stigmatic harms impairs its own effectiveness. It is
not clear, however, that taking account of white resistance imposes such
harms. Although the white opposition itself may be an affront, it may also
be a phenomenon that the court cannot immediately eliminate. A decision
to accommodate this opposition in order to achieve the most effective
remedy possible is not necessarily an insult to blacks; it does not legitimate
the opposition. Indeed, to ignore the opposition, and thereby undermine
the effectiveness of the decree, may itself reflect a lack of concern for the
victims' interests. In short, there is a difference between recognizing and
condoning. The harder questions are whether people will recognize or un-
derstand the difference in a particular case, and whether courts can act in
a way to make that difference understood.
Finally, accomodating resistance may also have had an effect on the
Court parallel to any dignitary harms suffered by blacks: Delaying a
remedy to accomodate opposition risks injuring the stature of the Court
itself. If the Court were harmed by a perceived gap between rights and
remedies, this would clearly have been an Interest Balancing cost of "all
deliberate speed." Harm to the Court, however, might also be a relevant
consequence under Rights Maximizing. A court's remedial role in a de-
segregation case is likely to extend over time, and a court that com-
promises its authority may be less able to extract compliance over time.
C. "All Deliberate Speed" as a Failed Simile
While we cannot know for sure whether requiring immediate desegre-
gation in Brown II would have been more effective than tolerating at least
some remedial delay, the Court's decision-and its possible misjudgment
about the benefits of giving time for compliance-may be explained by a
linkage that scholars have ignored. In resolving the Brown cases, the
Court gave itself extraordinary time for decision, and found that, with
time, sharp internal division had yielded to unanimity. It may therefore
have quite readily concluded that time would have a similar effect on the
country.
Thus, after having heard argument on the Brown cases during the 1952
Term, and facing sharp division in its conference meetings, the Court set
the cases for reargument the following Term. While specific questions for
the reargument were propounded, it appears that the Court postponed
decision beyond the 1952 Term primarily to buy time to reconcile contin-
uing sharp differences among the Justices and to find a way to achieve a
unified position if possible.1 00 When Earl Warren replaced Fred Vinson
100. R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 614-15.
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as Chief Justice, he was careful not to rush the internal deliberations, put
a time limit on debate, or set a date by which the Court's opinion had to
issue. Rather, he was content to launch a process of prolonged consulta-
tion and discussion. "We decided not to make up our minds on that first
conference day," Warren recollected, "but to talk it over, from week to
week, dealing with different aspects of it-in groups, over lunches, in con-
ference. It was too important to hurry it."'' Indeed, the step-by-step pro-
cess by which the Court had considered the school segregation question in
various contexts, beginning with graduate school cases in the years preced-
ing Brown, indicates the pervasive use of gradualism as the Court's mode
of attack in this area.02 The members of the Court seem to have believed
that gradualism and time were primarily responsible for the Court's ulti-
mate unanimity in Brown. In a letter written in 1957, Justice Frankfurter
emphasized this role of time and tended to downplay the personal influ-
ence of Chief Justice Warren in achieving internal accord and unanimity
on the Court:
[T]he wise use of time in the Court's dealing with the problem of
segregation under the Fourteenth Amendment was probably the
chief factor in the ultimate decision. . . . No doubt Warren had a
share in the outcome, but the notion that he begot the unanimous
Court is nonsense.' 03
Chief Justice Warren himself emphasized the link between the achieve-
ment of unanimity and the fact that his colleagues "had a long time to
think about" the issues; Justice Burton's papers record similar views.104
"Deliberate speed," said Frankfurter in another context, "takes time.
But it is time well spent."'105 Believing that the expense of time produced
harmony out of discord within the Court itself, the Justices may under-
standably have concluded that giving the country time to adjust to Brown
would also reduce discord and therefore be "time well spent."
101. Quoted in id. at 683; see also Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 39 (first conference framed as
"exploratory," with no formal vote, to avoid producing-rigid positions).
102. Plaintiffs' counsel in these cases, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, had itself employed an
incremental approach by paving the way for Brown with narrower challenges to state segregative
practices. See J. GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 587-89 (1977).
103. Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Grenville Clark and C.C. Burlingham (Apr. 15, 1957),
quoted in Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 35; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (1958) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (characterizing Brown's requirements as "the unanimous conclusion of a long-
matured deliberative process").
104. Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 35 & n.277.
105. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 188 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (arguing that applicants for Federal Power Commission licenses could be re-
quired to follow state procedural requirements and that, even though this might delay project ap-
proval, the measure of "justice" was "deliberate speed").
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This analogy, however, does not justify-although it may help ex-
plain-the Court's tolerance of remedial delay. There should have been
many reasons to question whether a process that was productive within a
small group of highly intelligent and rational judges, united by common
institutional affiliation and similar broad purposes, would also be produc-
tive if applied to the country at large. To those participating in a shared
deliberative process, time may allow reason and common aspiration to re-
place personal will and power. But for those subject to an external com-
mand, time may be one of the few remaining instruments of power, the
power to resist external power through delay-not simply because delay
creates the opportunity to rally forces to reverse the command, but because
buying time is all that the vanquished may have the power to purchase.
D. The Limiting Case: Cooper v. Aaron
Even before it proclaimed that "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed'
has run out"' 06 in 1964, the Supreme Court revealed its sensitivity to at
least some of the expenses of postponing relief for victims and marked a
limit on its willingness to accommodate opposition. The occasion was the
dramatic case of Cooper v. Aaron, decided by the Court in an extraordi-
nary special session during the summer of 1958.107 Whether or not some
remedial delay in Brown II is defensible in Rights Maximizing terms,
Cooper is the limiting case in which the argument for delay was properly
rejected.
In Cooper, the Governor of Arkansas and other state officials led a
drive to block the implementation of a gradual desegregation plan adopted
by the Little Rock school board and approved by a federal district court.
Forcible obstruction, community defiance, and threats of violence against
blacks followed. After President Eisenhower sent in Army troops to main-
tain order, the school board sought to suspend its plan altogether for more
than two years. Speaking as a chorus to affirm the Court's basic authority,
the nine Justices asserted that public "hostility to racial desegregation"
would not justify the suspension of desegregation:
The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or
yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the
actions of the Governor and Legislature ...[L]aw and order are
not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their
106. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
107. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The factual background of the case is described in A. LEWIS, PORTRAIT
OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 46-69 (1964); B. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRE-
LUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 122-45 (1964); J.
WILKINSON, supra note 62, at 88-95.
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constitutional rights. . . .Our constitutional ideal of equal justice
under law is thus made a living truth."' 8
The Court's firm action and stern rhetoric of authority seem to be a
strong counterpoint to Brown II's offer to bargain. Cooper's insistence
that desegregation proceed may seem in tension with Brown's tolerance of
delay; indeed, taken out of context, the Court's language suggests that re-
sistance to vindication of the victim's constitutional rights may not count
at all. But Cooper marked only a limit on Brown II, not a repudiation of
it. The school board's plan that Cooper v. Aaron reinstated actually per-
mitted desegregation to take place over an eight-year period.109 Gradual-
ism of this sort-a gradualism itself made necessary by fear of the public
hostility that speedier desegregation might inflame-was precisely what
Brown H allowed and Cooper preserved.
To have suspended a declared remedy in response to the government
officials' active attempt to encourage resistance, however, would have gone
far beyond Brown Is accommodation of preexisting white attitudes and
would surely have been hard to justify in Rights Maximizing terms. First,
because community defiance was clearly being encouraged and led by gov-
ernment officials themselves, the Court reasoned that such disruption
could also "be brought under control by state action."110 Since, in the
Court's view, white hostility preventing even gradual desegregation could
be reduced, complete suspension of the remedy could not be in the victims'
interests. Second, while gradualism at least sets in motion a dynamic that
plausibly leads toward ultimate remedial success, the complete suspension
of the desegregation plan in Cooper would have stopped progress
cold-indeed, set it back-and made ultimate remedial effectiveness more
difficult to attain. Third, the official defiance was a dramatic assault on
the institutional authority of the Court. Postponement of a remedy be-
cause of open resistance to a decree already issued damages a court's au-
thority far more than delay within a decree itself in anticipation of resis-
tance. Open official defiance followed by a highly visible Supreme Court
retreat would have risked unleashing broader resistance that could have
postponed relief indefinitely.
To protect blacks' interests and its own, the Court in Cooper under-
108. 358 U.S. at 16, 20. In the portion of the opinion ostensibly summarizing Brown, the Justices
said that "a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to
racial desegregation), might conclude that justification existed for not requiring the present nonsegre-
gated admission of all qualified Negro children." Id. at 7.
109. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 859-61 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 566 (1958).
110. 358 U.S. at 16. The Court viewed the defendant local officials who were directly subject to
the decree "as the agents of the State." Id.
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standably tried to speak in tones of authority and to limit the corrosive
force of resistance. Yet the opinion has an air of desperation about it,
hyperactively marshalling rhetorical and symbolic resources to combat the
tumultuous world described in the statement of facts."' For good reason:
The Court must have known how limited its powers actually were. A
court can never assure that its words are the last word. The next chapters
of the Little Rock story are rarely remembered. In spite of the Supreme
Court's action and the earlier deployment of federal troops, the Governor
of Arkansas successfully dosed down the Little Rock public schools for
the entire academic year after Cooper v. Aaron. And when the schools
were reopened, at judicial demand, little desegregation occurred for a dec-
ade.112 Only by struggling with a powerfully insistent reality was our con-
stitutional ideal of equal justice "made a living truth"-and the living
truth was an imperfect one.
IV. 1983: "White Flight" and the Expense of Partial Integration
The transitional problem of remedying discrimination in the face of
white resistance has continued to haunt the enterprise of school desegrega-
tion and pose a challenge to remedial theory. Today the courts' definition
of remedial goals in school desegregation cases is considerably dearer than
at the time of Brown II: Where there is a finding of systemwide de jure
segregation, a race-conscious integration remedy to eliminate one-race
schools is generally required, with busing often used as a remedial tool. 1 '
The phrase "white flight" captures the mode of resistance central to this
remedial enterprise today.
111. To this reader, at least, there is irony and even poignancy in the famous massing of names at
the head of the opinion, captioned "Opinion of the Court by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Burton, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice
Harlan, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Whittaker." Id. at 4. By emphasizing that the opinion
is "by" nine individuals, the strategy of the caption backfires. If the institution is only nine men, what
chance does it have against the mob in Little Rock? How much more imposing is the caption in
Brown I: "Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court," Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 486 (1954)-which invokes the authority of the Court alone, the institution, not nine identi-
fied individuals. The caption in Cooper suggests the Court's ultimate weakness, not its strength. The
inability of Justice Frankfurter to restrain his eagerness to write a separate opinion in his own name,
in spite of the Court's obvious attempt to mass behind a single caption, also emphasizes the individu-
alities within the institution.
There is a similar quality to the report in the last paragraph of Cooper v. Aaron that the "three
new Justices" who joined the Court after Brown are "at one with the Justices still on the Court who
participated [in Brown] as to its correctness . . . ." Id. at 19. The very act of trying to reaffirm the
authority of Brown undercuts it by personalizing the decision, by emphasizing that Brown is the
product of a few transient individuals who believed in it, but who well might not have.
112. The subsequent history of the Little Rock desegregation effort is described in Aaron v. Mc-
Kinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 361 U.S. 197 (1959); Clark v. Board of
Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 664-65 (8th Cir. 1966); J. WILKINSON, supra note 62, at 94-95. For recent
developments, see Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983).
113. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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White flight, like forcible obstruction, can perpetuate segregated pat-
terns, but flight is resistance by retreat and abstention rather than resis-
tance by direct obstruction. Whites who object to integration in a city's
public schools and who have the flexibility and the resources may decide
to "flee" by sending their children to private schools or by choosing to live
in another community. While some research has questioned the extent to
which flight occurs because of school desegregation-an empirical issue to
which I return-it is now widely agreed that school desegregation typi-
cally does accelerate white departures from the public school system above
the "normal" loss."14 The degree to which white flight occurs in a school
114. An explosion of scholarly studies of white flight followed the publication of J. COLEMAN, S.
KELLEY & J. MOORE, TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968-73 (1975) (concluding that decline in
white enrollments in schools in heavily black inner cities is significantly accelerated when desegrega-
tion occurs, especially where white suburbs exist). For a survey of the ensuing controversy, which was
partly methodological, see Armor, White Flight and the Future of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 187, 187-96 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980);
Pettigrew & Green, School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman "White Flight"
Thesis, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1976); Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say
About the Effectiveness of Desegregation Plans, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80-94 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Rossell, Applied Social Science Research ].
The dispute has now faded considerably. Recent work shows increasing agreement on the basic
point that although white movement away from central cities is a general demographic trend,
mandatory school desegregation remedies will significantly increase enrollment loss, particularly in the
first year. See Rossell, Applied Social Science Research, supra, at 80-94, 105-106 (summarizing nu-
merous white flight studies and their general agreement that school desegregation does accelerate
white departures). Much of this work is conveniently collected and summarized in two recent volumes
of Congressional hearings. See School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1982) (state-
ment of G. Orfield); id. at 205-06 (statement of D. Armor); id. at 217-18 (statement of C. Rossell)
[hereinafter cited as House School Desegregation Hearings]; Court-Ordered School Busing: Hearings
on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1982) (statement of J.
Ross); id. at 210 (statement of C. Clotfelter); id. at 232 (statement of R. Farley) [hereinafter cited as
Senate School Busing Hearings]. Indeed, at least one prominent scholar who had previously criticized
Trends in School Segregation, see Rossell, School Desegregation and White Flight, 90 POL. SCI. Q.
675, 686-88 (1975), has subsequently published studies agreeing with the basic white flight thesis. See
Rossell, Applied Social Science Research, supra, at 81-94, 105-106.
Among the cities that have provided strong evidence of white flight following court-ordered busing
are Boston, Los Angeles, and Memphis. In the five years following Judge Garrity's desegregation
decree in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), 60% of Boston public school families avoided participation in the
plan either by moving or enrolling their children in parochial schools. Senate School Busing Hearings,
supra, at 198-99 (statement of J. Ross). In Los Angeles, where enrollment fell from 37% white to
24% white between 1976 and 1980, one study shows that the decree caused half that loss. House
School Desegregation Hearings, supra, at 207, 214 (statement of D. Armor). In Memphis, it has been
estimated that white enrollment dropped by more than half because of school desegregation. See Nob-
lit & Collins, School Flight and School Policy: Desegregation and Resegregation in the Memphis City
Schools, 10 URB. REV. 203, 206 (1978). A recent study of the Cleveland desegregation program shows
that it contributed no more than 36% of the decline in the white enrollment that occurred between
1978 and 1980, leaving 64% to be explained by other factors. OFFICE ON SCHOOL MONITORING &
COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENROLLMENT DECLINE AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN CLEVELAND: AN
ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND CAUSES 23 (1982). Other cities where the evidence suggests that busing
significantly affected white flight are Denver, Detroit, Pasadena, San Francisco, Dallas, Oklahoma
City, Chattanooga, Birmingham, Dayton, Omaha, and Seattle. See House School Desegregation
Hearings, supra, at 207, 214 (statement of D. Armor) (asserting that busing plans have been respon-
sible for between 30% and 70% of the loss of white students in all these cities).
The Yale Law Journal
system depends upon the proportion of black enrollment in the schools as
well as other variables. If the proportion of blacks in the schools is greater
than some "tipping point," it is commonly believed that white flight sig-
nificantly escalates, and the schools may become or remain identifiably
black. A tipping point has typically been estimated to occur when the
proportion of blacks is between twenty-five and fifty percent, with the
actual point and the extent of flight in any particular situation affected by
such factors as the extent to which pupil reassignments shift white stu-
dents to formerly black schools, the perceived disruptions of busing and
changes in educational quality, the strength of whites' racial prejudice, the
degree of official support for desegregation, the nature of media coverage,
the financial and other costs of fleeing, and whites' ability to bear those
costs. A tipping point and flight therefore put a limit on achievable inte-
gration. Court-ordered integration in which the black presence exceeds the
tipping point will precipitate extensive white departures115 from a school
system and thus to a significant extent be self-defeating. The very transi-
tion from segregation to integration sets in motion a movement towards
resegregation.
The question that concerns me here is whether, under either a Rights
Maximizing or Interest Balancing approach, a court's fear of white flight
and self-defeating remedies may properly lead it to limit the scope of an
integration decree. Consider a situation in which there is a finding of sys-
temwide de jure segregation and established Supreme Court precedent
would authorize an integration order that reassigns pupils and requires
some busing. Suppose that a court concludes that full implementation of
such a remedy will result in significant white flight and the reemergence
of racial concentration within particular schools. May the court limit the
amount of required integration to something less than would be ordered if
Despite the growing consensus that busing produces white flight, there remains disagreement on the
degree of flight, the extent to which flight subsides after the first year of desegregation, and the extent
to which specific variables influence the degree of flight. For some representative views on these issues,
see House School Desegregation Hearings, supra, at 160 (statement of G. Orfield); id. at 230 (discus-
sion by C. Rossell & D. Armor); Senate School Busing Hearings, supra, at 193 (statement of J.
Ross); Giles, Cataldo & Gatlin, White Flight and Percent Black: The Tipping Point Re-examined,
56 SOC. SCI. Q. 85 (1975); Rossell, Applied Social Science Research, supra, at 80-94 (summarizing
studies).
For discussions of the impact of residential integration on white flight from neighborhoods, see
Frey, Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 425 (1979); Goer-
ing, Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of the Social Science Evidence, 44 J.
AM. INST. PLANNERS 68 (1978); Schelling, The Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood
Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (A. Pascal ed. 1972).
115. I focus here primarily on departures from a school system. Because many systems already
contain a high proportion of black students at the time a desegregation decree is formulated, however,
the achievement of integration can also be frustrated by the unwillingness of whites to enter a school
system.
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white flight were not an anticipated problem? In particular, may the court
deliberately preserve some virtually all-black schools for the purpose of
preventing white flight from the school system, in effect putting a ceiling
on the percentage of blacks that it will order enrolled in other schools so
as to stabilize integration there and prevent tipping? To give a simplified
numerical example, suppose that a school system has 120,000 students,
fifty percent white and fifty percent black, and that they have been inten-
tionally segregated in one-race schools. Suppose that, absent white flight,
a court would redraw attendance zones to produce a racial mix of fifty
percent white and fifty percent black in each school, fully curing effects of
the violation. Also suppose that flight will significantly escalate if the
black presence exceeds forty percent (the tipping point), and that the con-
sequence of ordering the "full" remedy would be that blacks would gener-
ally wind up attending mostly-black schools again. May a court faced
with this prospect order an imperfect remedy that leaves, say, 20,000
black students in their one-race schools and, with respect to the remaining
100,000 students, redraws attendance zones to create a mix of sixty per-
cent.whiteand forty percent black in "integrated" schools?
This issue is before the courts today. In a 1980 dissent from dismissal
of certiorari ifi the Dallas schools case, Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of
the Dallas NAACP,"' Justice Lewis Powell (joined by two other Jus-
tices) argued that the lower courts should have approved a desegregation
remedy preserving one-race schools, in spite of its imperfections, since he
saw the alternatives themselves as "imperfect" and "self-defeating" reme-
dial steps that would "incit[e] resegregation" and therefore not be "effec-
tive." "[Plerfect solutions may be unattainable," Justice Powell counseled;
"[o]ut of zeal to remedy one evil, courts may encourage or set the stage for
other evils. By acting against one-race schools, courts may produce one-
race school systems. ' 117 The United States Department of Justice has re-
cently taken a similar position in the Nashville and Baton Rouge desegre-
gation cases, 1 8 and numerous lower courts, often without candidly ac-
knowledging what they are doing, have in fact approved imperfect
remedies that preserve one-race schools so as to avoid white flight. 9
116. 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from dis-
missal of certiorari).
117. Id. at 448-50.
118. In the Nashville case, the Department of Justice asked the Supreme Court to uphold a
district court remedy that preserved one-race schools in part to prevent white flight. U.S. Amicus
Brief, supra note 55. In the Baton Rouge case, the Department sought to set aside a district court
order that mandated reassignment of students from one-race schools on the ground that the remedy
had produced white flight, see Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 514 F. Supp. 869
(M.D. La. 1981), and suggested in its place a plan that provided incentives for pupils to choose to
attend integrated schools. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1982, at A8, col. 1.
119. See infra pp. 637-38.
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Moreover, while the issue considered here involves judicial remedies, an
analogous legal issue has arisen in the context of voluntary attempts by
school officials to promote integration and prevent white flight from par-
ticular schools by limiting black enrollment.120
Although evaluating remedial imperfection in the present context is
complicated by persistent confusion about what a fully effective desegrega-
tion remedy is,"' the remedial issue presented by white flight and racial
ceilings is directly analogous to the issues presented by "all deliberate
speed." In both situations, resistance, a source of remedial imperfection,
tempts a court to approve a remedy that is itself imperfectly effective
(something less than would be ordered if resistance did not exist). In the
context of white flight, however, my position is more complex. Using ra-
cial ceilings to prevent flight as part of an intradistrict desegregation de-
cree cannot be defended either under Rights Maximizing or under a
proper application of Interest Balancing. Given remedial constraints that
have been imposed by an Interest Balancing Supreme Court, however,
using racial ceilings may now produce the most effective desegregation
remedy available.
A. The Legal Significance of White Flight
The contemporary remedial dilemma that has led some courts to con-
sider approving limited remedies to prevent flight starts with a recognition
120. Three Circuits have upheld limits on black enrollment in this context. Johnson v. Board of
Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 915 (1980), reaff'd on
remand, 664 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2223 (1982); Parent Ass'n
of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1979); Higgins v. Board
of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 794-95 (6th Cir. 1974); c. Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d
1122, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973) (racial ceilings to promote integration in public housing might be permissi-
ble in some instances).
The legal literature discussing issues raised by white flight in the context of desegregation remedies
is quite small. Representative works include: J. WILKINSON, supra note 62, at 177-83; Clotfelter, The
Implications of "Resegregation" for Judicially Imposed School Segregation Remedies, 31 VAND. L.
REV. 829 (1978); Levin, School Desegregation Remedies and the Role of Social Science Research, 42
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 1, 8-25; Sedler, The Constitution and School Desegrega-
tion: An Inquiry into the Nature of the Substantive Right, 68 KY. L. J. 879, 958-60, 964-66 (1979-
1980); Note, White Flight as a Factor in Desegregation Remedies: A Judicial Recognition of Reality,
66 VA. L. REV. 961 (1980). Most of the literature on racial ceilings to prevent tipping addresses the
problem outside the context of remedies for proven violations of the Constitution, and addresses resi-
dential rather than school integration. See, e.g., Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and
the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Bittker, The Case of the
Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19-21 (1976); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 HOW. L.J. 30 (1960); Smolla,
Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs that Discourage Black Entry
to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J. 891; Note, Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Valid-
ity of Race-Conscious Government Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REV.
938 (1980); Note, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Tran-
sition, 90 YALE L.J. 377 (1980).
121. See infra pp. 644-45.
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of the pivotal role that individual whites play in the remedial process.
Although ordinary white citizens are generally not defendants in a deseg-
regation suit (the equal protection "violation" is generally limited to dis-
criminatory acts of the government), the relief sought will affect their lives
and thus may lead them to flee the transformation; reciprocally, the ab-
sence of whites affects a court's ability to achieve a legally required inte-
gration remedy.
1. Why Whites Flee
To understand the judicial response to the problem of flight first re-
quires an understanding of why individual whites may decide to flee, a
process that has more facets than often acknowledged. While whites may
leave (or not enter) a locality or its public school system for a number of
reasons, the flight important here is action taken in response to perceived
costs of a desegregation remedy. Some whites may view the remedy as too
costly because it interferes with their belief in white supremacy or their
unwillingness to associate with blacks because of their color; this would be
an objection to what I earlier called costs of the right,1 since it insists
upon an end state vision that Brown rejects. This basis for flight is surely
common, and is even more readily attributable to the resistance after
Brown. But whites might also flee because they object to transitional costs
of particular desegregation remedies.123 For example, because of residen-
tial segregation, itself often exacerbated by de jure school segregation,
court-ordered school integration may require long-distance busing, with
resulting transportation costs-expense of time and money, possible safety
risks to children, and the loss of other advantages of neighborhood schools.
In addition, by bringing together groups of blacks and whites already
scarred by the legacy of past discrimination, integration may also impose
educational and other costs. Because of their previous racial isolation and
backgrounds, students in a newly integrated setting may interact poorly
with each other (and with their teachers), contributing to a strained or
hostile atmosphere and poorer education; parents of both races may even
fear violence. Education might also be impaired by the possibility that,
after long years of discrimination, black students as a group may have
lower educational achievement levels or more negative attitudes to school.
Moreover, the quality of the traditionally black schools to which a court
assigns white students may be significantly worse than the quality of tra-
122. See supra pp. 606-07.
123. See id.
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ditionally white schools; improvements may be made, but they take
time.124
These perceived remedial costs may be evaluated by a court in deciding
whether to order a remedy, but the critical point here is that such reme-
dial costs are algo evaluated by individual whites, the cost-bearers, in de-
ciding upon their response to the remedy. The Supreme Court has made
clear that it uses Interest Balancing in desegregation cases, 12 5 but gener-
ally speaking the courts have not deemed remedial costs sufficient to jus-
tify limiting a desegregation remedy, even when the cost-bearers are third-
party nonviolators; if there is to be progress, after all, if the victims are to
receive an effective remedy for the violation, some people must bear even
balanceable costs of change. The decision to flee, however, is made when
private individuals conclude that the net costs of the remedy to them, as
they perceive and evaluate the remedial costs, exceed the net costs of flee-
ing. Even if a court has concluded that a remedy's costs to competing
interests are of an improper character or insufficient weight to limit the
remedy, the cost-bearers make their own assessment-and their judgment,
at least concerning their particular situation, may be different from the
court's judgment and totally indifferent to judicial categories of analysis.
Most obviously, resistance and flight may occur because whites give
weight to remedial costs that the courts would deem unbalanceable. But
the moral complexity of flight today results from the fact that not all
white flight can be characterized this way. Resistance and flight may also
result from an objection to educational or transportation costs' that the
courts deem balanceable but simply not sufficiently weighty or compelling
in a particular case to trump the remedial interests of victims. The courts
must impose these costs as a necessary and proper price of change, but an
objection to such costs does invoke legitimate values and concerns.
The poignancy of the present moment is that costs to which whites ob-
ject may themselves be a result of past discrimination. Desegregation
remedies introduce the races to the adverse effects that prior discrimina-
tion itself has had on each racial group and may entail dislocations and
burdens that no one would have to bear today if not for this past oppres-
sion. Whites who want to flee from adverse educational consequences of
wrongs that they did not commit do not necessarily deny that a wrong was
committed. They might be willing to send their children to integrated
schools once the effects of past discrimination have been eliminated, but
124. Another possible basis for objecting to desegregation is a preference for maintaining ethni-
cally cohesive groups in a pluralist society; to a considerable extent, however, this ethnicity seems to
have roots in discrimination or to overlap with other objections to desegregation.
125. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971), for example,
the Court suggested that certain costs of busing are balanceable and at some point may be sufficiently
weighty to justify limiting the relief for victims by leaving some one-race schools intact. For other
desegregation cases applying Interest Balancing, see supra notes 12, 32; infra p. 647.
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they resist sending their children to those schools while the effects of prior
wrongs are still felt. In many situations, of course, such concerns may be
voiced simply to mask a racist unwillingness to associate with blacks. In
addition, prejudice may exaggerate whites' assessment of the adverse con-
sequences and costs of integration, and may blind whites to whatever
gains integrated schools may produce for them. But to deny that integra-
tion is likely to impose some genuine and unavoidable burdens on the
newly integrated students is to deny that past discrimination has had any
harmful effects."
Whether whites flee because of racism or a reluctance to endure real
transition costs, their behavior gives rise to a painful dilemma. One pur-
pose of school integration is to overcome the attitudinal, educational, and
even residential effects of racial oppression, but until these effects are
overcome whites may resist sending their children to integrated schools.
127
The point can be put in temporal terms. Integration takes time to be ef-
fective, and whites often do not want to give it time; if integration were
instantly effective in achieving its goals, it could be more easily obtained
and maintained. White flight is an example of a characteristic problem of
transitional efforts to transform our racial situation: The very effects of
past discrimination may undercut efforts to correct those effects.
2. Why White Flight Is Legally Relevant
Beyond its practical significance, white flight should be deemed legally
relevant: Its occurrence interferes with a remedy's effectiveness in elimi-
nating the consequences of the violation, and, as a result, it should bear on
the remedies that courts order. The law here, however, is currently very
confused and barely more articulated than it was when the Supreme
Court considered parallel problems in Brown II twenty-eight years ago.
126. The fact that both whites and blacks often object to an integration remedy because of the
characteristics, attitudes, and insensitivities of the other group as a group may seem to be an offensive
feature that such opposition shares with typical race-based conduct, but one difference should be
noted. In making adverse judgments about individuals based on perceived characteristics of their racial
groups, race-based distinctions typically ignore opportunities to individualize, to treat individuals as
individuals; they are offensive in considerable part because they consider people simply as members of
an undifferentiated racial mass in spite of more discriminating alternatives. But integration in a school
building or classroom does not only bring blacks and whites to each other individually; integration
also delivers the races to each other in groups. To a significant extent, individualization is impossible
in the social and educational setting of a school. Current characteristics of the racial groups as groups
will affect the "new" conditions under integration-including where members of the group live, the
attitudes of the group as a whole, their educational achievements, and the educational qualities of the
schools traditionally serving members of the group. While racism can exaggerate assessments of the
extent to which these group differences actually exist, some are likely to exist at the time of integra-
tion and to have at least some short-term effects that cannot be eliminated by individualization.
127. Indeed, the inequalities and differences that exist at the time integration begins may initially
reinforce or even shape negative attitudes of white and black students towards each other. See Armor,
The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1972, at 90, 102-05.
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Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the contemporary
problem of white flight, language in a few cases from the late 1960's and
early 1970's suggests that the fear of white flight may never justify any
limit on a remedy for a constitutional violation. In Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners,128 for example, the Court (invoking Brown H) said, "We
are frankly told in the Brief . . that white students will flee the school
system altogether [if the free transfer plan is not adopted]. 'But it should
go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot
be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.' ")129 In
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education,5 0 the Court
stated that "[w]hile [white flight] may be cause for deep concern to the
[school board], it cannot. . . be accepted as a reason for achieving any-
thing less than complete uprooting of the dual public school system. 131
These Supreme Court cases were summed up by the district court in
Bradley v. Milliken: "The Supreme Court has stated on several occasions
that white flight is not justification for limiting the degree of desegrega-
tion; nor will it justify a school board's refusal to desegregate."
3 2
The Court has never explained or elaborated upon its brief utterances,
and they may, like the similar statements in Brown II, simply mask the
Court's willingness to accommodate resistance in some situations. In any
event, it seems reasonable to limit these utterances to their contexts. The
situations in which the Supreme Court has rejected white flight as a rea-
son for limiting a desegregation remedy were all cases in which the school
boards invoked white flight as the reason for proposing extreme steps,
such as secession of part of the school system or a freedom of choice plan,
in circumstances suggesting that the defendant was not acting in good
faith. The proposed steps would apparently have operated to prevent fea-
sible integration, and also seemed to reflect the school boards' intent to
limit desegregation because of their opposition to Brown.133 The rejection
128. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
129. Id. at 459 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown H)).
130. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
131. Id. at 491. Perhaps recognizing that its earlier utterances were a bit too sweeping, the Court
has not mentioned such notions in any subsequent majority opinion.
132. 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1130 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd,540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433
U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
133. In Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), for example, the "free transfer" plan
enacted by the school board had been administered in a discriminatory manner. According to the
Court, the board had "systematically denied Negro children . . . the right to transfer from their all-
Negro zone schools to schools where white students were in the majority, although white students
seeking transfers from Negro schools to white schools had been allowed to transfer," id. at 454, and
had gerrymandered attendance zones to exclude black children from certain schools, id. at 454-57. In
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), the city attempted to withdraw from
the county school system two weeks after the district court ordered the adoption of a pairing plan that
would have produced substantial integration. Id. at 456-57. "Only when it became clear-15 years
after our decision in Brown v. Board of Education-that segregation in the county system was finally
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of the white flight argument in these cases should not be understood as an
absolute principle necessarily governing situations where school boards are
not recalcitrant objectors to Brown rights.
In the absence of greater guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts have acted inconsistently. Pressed by reality, a number of lower
courts have sought to limit the Supreme Court's statements to their con-
text,134 suggesting that flight itself limits the effectiveness of the remedy135
to be abolished, did Emporia attempt to take its children out of the county system." Id. at 459 (cita-
tion omitted). In United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972), the legisla-
tion authorizing the creation of the new (and substantially white) district was passed only after the
State Department of Public Instruction recommended a desegregation plan that would have left a
white majority in only one school. Id. at 486-87. "[T]he only proper inference to be drawn from the
facts of this litigation" was that the state was "creating a refuge for white students seeking to escape
desegregation" and was "hinderfing, not] further[ing,] the process of school desegregation." Id. at 489.
In all three cases, the Supreme Court should be understood as reacting to recalcitrant local authorities'
persistent attempts to avoid desegregation.
Moreover, in one sense at least, Scotland Neck and Emporia support the proposition that white
flight is legally relevant. These cases prohibited the revision of school district lines in order to prevent
the loss of white students whose absence would restrict possibilities for desegregation. Since this at-
tempted withdrawal of part of the school system might be viewed as "corporate' white flight, the
Supreme Court's holdings in Scotland Neck and Emporia suggest that flight does impair the effective-
ness of a decree and is therefore legally relevant. See Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 583 F.2d
712, 715 (5th Cir. 1978).
For this latter point, as for so much else in the preparation of this essay, I am grateful to my
exceptional research assistant, Pam Karlan.
134. See United States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 816 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 982 (1978); Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1976);
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1975); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.
Supp. 683, 700, 705 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Smiley v. Vollert, 453 F. Supp. 463, 470 (S.D. Tex. 1978),
modified sub nom. Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Tex. 1981); see also Estes v. Metropol-
itan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 449 n.15 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari) (given "context" of Court's "passing reference" to resegregation, "Scotland
Neck affords no guidance for the more usual desegregation case").
135. Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 937 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 939 (1982); Stout, 537 F.2d at 802; Blevins, 514 F. Supp. at 1257 n.22; Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 189-190 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 687
F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983); Arthur v. Nyquist, 473 F. Supp. 830,
848 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.
Ind.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973); Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855, 860 (N.D. Miss.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 165 (1976). Three
recent Justices of the Supreme Court have also adopted this view. See Estes v. Metropolitan Branches
of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 450 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). In addition, the United States Department of Justice, as part
of its argument against mandatory school busing as a remedial method, has recently taken the position
that white flight undercuts remedial "effectiveness": "The measure of any desegregation decree is its
'effectiveness' . . .. A desegregation remedy intended to eliminate one-race schools that drives large
numbers of students out of the system can hardly be reckoned effective." Memorandum in Support of
Motion by the United States to Stay Further Proceedings in the Court of Appeals at 2, 4, Davis v.
East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., No. 81-3476 (5th Cir. filed Aug. 6, 1982). A majority of the
Supreme Court may have laid the groundwork for accepting this view last year when it stated that a
California constitutional amendment limiting the authority of state courts to order busing may have
been legitimately motivated by a concern that mandatory busing was producing white flight and there-
fore "was aggravating rather than ameliorating the desegregation problem." Crawford v. Board of
Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211, 3221 (1982); see also S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S393
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1982) (Senate finding, as part of Helms-Johnston Amendment, that court-ordered
busing frequently produces flight and is "ineffective remedy").
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 92: 585, 1983
and in certain situations apparently shaping and even limiting their own
decrees (sometimes using racial ceilings) so as to prevent flight."' 6 In con-
136. From the starting point that white flight limits remedial effectiveness, lower courts have
moved in various directions. A few have sought to prevent flight by employing expansive methods,
such as ordering interdistrict relief. While such relief was rejected in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (Milliken I), several lower courts have subsequently imposed it. See, e.g., Morrilton
School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F. 2d 222, 227-30 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1071 (1980); Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 352-58 (D. Del.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S.
973 (1976); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180, 183-86 (S.D. Ind. 1975),
aff'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated sub noma. Metropolitan School Dist. v. Buckley, 429
U.S. 1068 (1977), on remand, 456 F. Supp. 183, 188-90 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (reaffirming finding of
interdistrict violation and order for interdistrict remedy), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part,
637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
Most courts that have acknowledged the remedial imperfection caused by white flight, however,
have tried to counter it by limiting their remedial decree to something less extensive than they would
have ordered absent the threat of white flight. Some courts have adopted racial ceilings, limiting the
percentage of black students assigned to certain schools to something lower than a perceived tipping
point that would accelerate white flight, even though the cdnsequence is that all-black schools remain
in the system. See, e.g., Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 269-72 (8th Cir. 1983) (to prevent
white flight and stabilize integration in a system that is 65% black, district court may "reduce the
black population" in some integrated schools and thereby maintain a number of all-black schools);
Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1291-97 (8th Cir.) (to prevent white flight in school system
with 75% black enrollment, desegregation plan need not reassign additional black children to schools
with at least 30% black enrollment even though all-black schools remain), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826
(1980), on remand sub noma. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 356 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(adopting plan), aff'd, 667 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); Bradley v. Milli-
ken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1151-53 (6th Cir. 1980) (in 90% black Detroit system, schools with at least 55%
black enrollment exempt from further' reassignment of black students), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870
(1981); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 711-13 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (in district with 75% minority
enrollment, schools with at least 25% minority population sufficiently desegregated even though all-
minority schools remain); ef Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1980)
(decree permitting one-race black schools permissible if plan "effect[s] the maximum degree of stable
desegregation"); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 311 n.8, 321 (7th Cir. 1980)
(upholding settlement agreement that defined schools with 75% white enrollment as desegregated and
that permitted some all-black schools to remain in system with 46% minority enrollment); Calhoun v.
Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1975) (system with 85% black enrollment declared unitary
when every school had at least 30% black enrollment even though all-black schools remained); Brun-
son v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 821-23 (4th Cir. 1970) (Craven, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (arguing that integration within 90% black district can be accomplished only if vast majority of
blacks remain in all-black schools). In other cases, courts have preserved one-race black schools to
prevent flight by white students in nearby racially-mixed schools, but only after concluding that
Swann-type tradeoffs make it improper to transfer students to or from predominantly white schools
farther away. See, e.g., Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1975);
Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 711-13; Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123, 1132-
34 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (busing limited to promote "stable" desegregation), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d
1374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975). In some cases, courts have approved limited deseg-
regation plans that permit integration on a voluntary basis, on the theory that whites will leave the
system if they are mandatorily reassigned to black schools. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ.,
554 F. Supp. 912, 918-20, 924-26 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (approving consent decree that allowed minority
enrollment of no greater than 30% in some schools and that permitted use of voluntary measures
instead of busing to achieve desegregation and minimize flight in 75% minority Chicago system);
Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248, 1257, 1259-60 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (continuing not-altogether
successful "freedom-of-choice" plan with "magnet" features to desegregate all-black schools because it
promised "maximum degree of stable integration practicable"); ef Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp.
468, 470-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing successes of plan that minimized flight and secured deseg-
regation by relying on choices rather than mandatory busing).
Other courts, while acknowledging that remedies may be shaped to take account of white flight,
deny that they would limit a remedy because of flight. Thus, in United States v. DeSoto Parish School
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trast to this context-specific approach to white flight, however, the First
Circuit in Morgan v. Kerrigan13 7 and other lower courts""8 have argued
that white flight producing "resegregation" after the entry of a desegrega-
tion decree simply has no legal significance, an approach that would pre-
clude taking account of white flight at all:
White flight is an expression of opposition by individuals in the
community to desegregation of the school system. From the inception
of school desegregation litigation, accommodation of opposition to de-
segregation by failing to implement a constitutionally necessary plan
has been impermissible. . .. [A]ppellants' claim that white flight de-
stroys the effectiveness of the school desegregation plan, because of
"resegregation" of the school system, founders on the constitutional
definition of unlawful segregation. . . What the layman calls
"resegregation" is not constitutionally recognized segregation. It is
racial isolation imposed by historic school district boundaries, or by
individual choices to attend private institutions. 39
A proper legal analysis of the white flight problem must begin by re-
jecting the First Circuit's conclusion that white flight and resegregation
Bd., 574 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978), the Fifth Circuit quotes Scotland
Neck approvingly, but then adds: "This is not to say that a school board or Court must ignore a likely
danger of an exodus of white students from a school system. '[I]n choosing between various permissi-
ble plans a chancellor may . . . elect one calculated to minimize white boycotts.'" 574 F.2d at 816
(quoting Stout, 537 F.2d at 802).
Analysis of the courts' responses to white flight is complicated by their own ambivalence and lack of
candor. While courts sometimes candidly acknowledge the imperfection of their remedies, see, e.g.,
Clark, 705 F.2d at 271-72; Adams, 620 F.2d at 1296, they sometimes maintain that a full remedy has
been provided even though they preserve some all-black schools because of flight, e.g., Stout, 537 F.2d
at 803; Calhoun, 522 F.2d at 719. Some courts straddle the fence, e.g., Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 712-
13; Smiley, 514 F. Supp. at 1259-61. This tension between the Supreme Court's apparent command
that lower courts ignore white flight and press for a full remedy and the lower courts' own sense that
the fullest remedy may be one that is limited is captured in the district court's opinion on remand
from Milliken I:
It is true that "white flight," like the degree of community resistance to a desegregation order,
is not one of the "practicalities" to be considered in formulating a just, feasible and workable
plan.. . . The Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that white flight is not a justifi-
cation for limiting the degree of desegregation . . . . On the other hand, it is unreasonable to
expect the Central Board to administer a large school system in a vacuum. . . . The Board
was justified in considering the "phenomenon of resegregation" in devising its plan for deseg-
regation [which preserved a number of one-race schools and sought to achieve a "stable" racial
mix] . . . . A white and middle class black exodus will assuredly result if, as a result of a
desegregation order, the school district became chaotic and hostile to intellectual achievement.
It was these "practicalities" that were considered by the Board in attempting to achieve a
degree of racial stability, and we find that it is constitutionally permissible to take practicalities
into account.
Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1129-30 (E.D. Mich. 1975), remanded, 540 F.2d 229 (6th
Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
137. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
138. E.g., Mapp v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 169, 171 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976); Brunson v. Bo.rd of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 823-27 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring).
139. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d at 420, 421-22 (citations omitted).
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have no legal bearing on "the effectiveness of the school desegregation
plan." The First Circuit confuses issues of violation with issues of remedy.
It is true that the Constitution does not condemn segregated patterns that
arise when the government, never having segregated, uses a racially neu-
tral assignment scheme in a community where whites have previously
chosen to live in "white neighborhoods" or to attend private schools.140
But the analysis must be different once de jure segregation is shown and a
remedy is required to eliminate legally cognizable effects of the violation.
As conventionally understood, the two main objectives of a desegregation
remedy are the elimination of (i) the attendance pattern effects of the
school board's segregative practices"' and (ii) the racial identifiability that
attaches to largely one-race schools because of the defendant's purposeful
segregation. 2 White flight interferes with both objectives.
First, white flight itself is an effect of the original de jure segregation,
and therefore segregated attendance patterns resulting from flight are an
effect of the original violation. Bluntly, the defendant's segregation re-
quires the issuance of a judicial decree; the decree causes the white flight.
A somewhat subtler analysis of causation leads to the same result. Because
long-standing segregation may well have contributed to the conditions and
attitudes that make whites want to flee the public school system, white
flight can be characterized as an effect of the original segregation for
which the defendant is responsible. Whites who flee are often seeking to
avoid conditions that the government's de jure segregation helped to cre-
ate, and to replicate racial patterns to which the government's own de jure
segregation has accustomed them. 43 While Morgan v. Kerrigan suggests
140. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28
(1971).
141. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (remedy should re-
dress difference between "the racial distribution of the school population as presently constituted" and
"what it would have been in the absence of. . . constitutional violations"); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973) (violation and remedy may be limited "by evidence supporting a finding
that a lesser degree of segregated schooling . . . would not have resulted even if the Board had not
acted as it did").
142. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460-61,462 n.11, 465-68 (remedy
must eliminate "racially identifiable student bodies"); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442
(1968) ("[Bloard must be required . . . to convert promptly to a school system without a 'white'
school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools.").
143. Cf Armstrong v. O'Connell, 463 F. Supp. 1295, 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (school segregation
substantial cause of residential segregation, not only because it racially identified neighborhoods, but
also because it "taught lessons of prejudice and hostility which molded and reinforced prejudicial
attitudes [that] influenced. . . housing decisions," and school desegregation remedy properly seeks to
cure reciprocal effects of this housing segregation on school attendance patterns). While the causal
hypothesis discussed in the text seems plausible, the causal relation may more accurately be described
as one of mutual reinforcement; the defendant's de jure segregation and other public and private
discrimination encourage and reinforce each other, thereby producing attitudes and conditions that
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that white flight reflects individual choices untainted by the government's
violation, the First Circuit's use of the word "resegregate" underscores the
weakness of this view. Thus, courts should address the problem of white
flight and the resulting segregated patterns as part of their broad remedial
authority to eliminate effects of the violation. A remedy that fails to elimi-
nate the reemergence of segregated patterns caused by white flight is to
that extent an ineffective remedy.
A second reason that white flight is legally relevant reflects a more
powerful remedial theory of integration, and avoids these causation issues.
Unlawful de jure segregation creates racially identifiable schools, af-
firming that schools are "for" students of a particular race, and white
flight prevents the effective elimination of the schools' identity as "black"
or "white." This racial identifiability persists as long as racial concentra-
tion continues unbroken, and it also survives a quick progression from
segregation, to momentary court-ordered integration, and then to resegre-
gation. While a court is neither obliged nor permitted to require integra-
tion indefinitely, 14 4 it must dispel the schools' racial identifiability; only by
achieving integration and then maintaining it for a period of years can the
court alter the public's perception. 45 White flight has constitutional sig-
nificance, therefore, because it recreates a school system with racially
identified one-race schools, a school system in which effective desegrega-
tion has not been accomplished. The fact that white flight may involve
individual choices to attend private schools or to change resi-
dences-themselves constitutionally protected interests14 6-does not bear
on whether flight undercuts the effectiveness of the remedy. At most, it
bears on what the courts can do to counteract white flight and secure a
more effective remedy.
To recognize that white flight interferes with the effectiveness of a de-
result in flight. In any particular case, of course, significant white movement to private schools or to
other neighborhoods may have occurred even in the absence of de jure segregation and the decree, but
to the extent that causation remains a matter of empirical speculation, it seems appropriate to pre-
sume (rebuttably) that the government, already a proven segregator, is responsible for the white flight
that recreates its design. Cf Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-14 (1973) (presumption
that defendant who purposefully segregated one part of district is legally responsible for all segrega-
tion observed); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1290-91 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 826 (1980); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 706 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (same).
144. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433-37, 440 (1976).
145. As one court has put it, where achieving a unitary system is the concern, "[olne swallow does
not make a spring." Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971); see
also Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1296 n.31 (8th Cir.) (requiring "short period of
mandatory stabilization"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
611 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that nine years is sufficient); Steele v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 767, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1971) (three years may be enough); Singleton v.
Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 541 F. Supp. 904, 914-15 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (ten years); United
States v. Corinth Mun. Separate School Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336, 1339-40, 1345 (N.D. Miss. 1976)
(five years).
146. See cases cited supra note 43; infra pp. 650-52.
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segregation remedy in a legally relevant way is the starting point for sen-
sible legal analysis of the remedial problem it poses. Recognition means
that the measures of remedial effectiveness-the remedial goals-must in-
clude the prevention of flight that would recreate one-race schools and
undercut the achievement of desegregation. 47 To paraphrase the distinc-
tion emphasized in the discussion of "all deliberate speed," even though a
court may not take account of white flight in order to satisfy opposition to
Brown rights as a value in itself, a court should take account of white
flight because it undermines remedial effectiveness.148 To ignore flight-to
suggest that it is legally irrelevant or that it never exists-does not pro-
mote the victims' interests. This highlights one aspect of what is so confus-
ing about the Supreme Court's statement in Scotland Neck that white
flight "cannot . . . be accepted as a reason for achieving anything less
than complete uprooting of the dual public school system."149 Although
the passage might be read to require that courts ignore white flight, the
failure to prevent flight will itself be a reason why a remedy will have
achieved something less than "complete uprooting."
Since white flight results in an incomplete remedy, the prospect of its
occurrence is relevant to devising a remedy under both Rights Maximiz-
ing and Interest Balancing. Under Rights Maximizing, as the Supreme
Court has said when using the language of this approach, the courts must
achieve "the greatest possible degree of school desegregation, taking into
account the practicalities of the situation. . . . The measure of any deseg-
regation plan is its effectiveness."1 50 Whether the flight is motivated by
objection to the right or objection to transitional costs, flight must be con-
sidered like any other "practicality" that might undercut a remedy's "ef-
fectiveness." Under Rights Maximizing, the courts must try both to
achieve integration and to prevent white flight. If flight can be prevented
without compromising remedial effectiveness, it must be prevented-even
if that means expanding the relief beyond what would be ordered if flight
were not a problem.
Under Interest Balancing, which is the Court's primary remedial ap-
proach, white flight may also be relevant for other reasons. Even where
effective integration remedies that prevent flight exist, the balanceable
costs of preventing flight may be too great; remedies that are less effective
may be deemed preferable. In addition, white flight itself may impose bal-
anceable costs, such as erosion of a community's tax base, that must enter
147. See supra p. 618.
148. See United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 924-25 (N.D. Il1. 1983) (Chicago)
(distinguishing between "catering to bias" and seeking "to minimize parent resistance and thereby
serve [the] larger goal").
149. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972).
150. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
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the Interest Balancing calculus. Interest Balancing permits taking account
of certain remedial costs of both achieving integration and preventing
flight, and, in that sense, may sometimes allow approval of a limited rem-
edy "because of" white flight.
B. Preventing Flight: Racial Ceilings as the Last Alternative
This framework indicates how to analyze remedies that preserve some
one-race schools and use racial ceilings to prevent flight. While racial ceil-
ings are a way of preventing the remedial imperfection that results from
white flight, this strategy for preventing flight itself guarantees an imper-
fect remedy: In order to accommodate resistance, it fails to desegregate
some black schools and therefore fails to give a remedy to some black
children. Although in some cases a desegregation remedy preserving one-
race schools may not in fact be imperfect (the schools' segregated condition
may be unrelated to the violation),151 or may be imperfect for reasons
other than preventing white flight (the court may have made the Interest
Balancing tradeoff suggested in Swann, concluding that the travel time
and distances necessary to desegregate those one-race schools are too
great), the situation considered here involves an imperfect remedy that
preserves some one-race schools and limits racial mixing in other schools
to prevent flight. Absent the prospect of flight, courts in this situation
would order a further reduction of racial concentration at one-race
schools.
As with "all deliberate speed," there is only one possible Rights Maxi-
mizing justification for approving an assuredly imperfect remedy that pre-
serves one-race schools and limits integration-all alternative remedies are
likely to yield even greater imperfection. As elaborated below, I doubt that
this will be the case. Using racial ceilings is not justifiable simply because
they might be more effective than a systemwide integration order that,
standing alone, would produce massive white flight. There are other re-
medial alternatives that would generally be more effective in reducing the
number of one-race schools and reducing flight without significantly inter-
fering with the remedy's effectiveness in other ways-most clearly, in-
terdistrict relief that would add whites from adjacent school districts.
Nor can ceilings generally be defended under a proper conception of
Interest Balancing since, in my judgment, interdistrict relief would not
impose sufficiently high balanceable costs to justify sacrificing its use. In
151. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). Once dejure segrega-
tion is shown in a substantial part of the school system, the burden is on the defendants to establish
that any one-race schools are "not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part."
Id. That burden is a heavy one. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207-09 (1973).
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Milliken v. Bradley,15 however, an Interest Balancing Supreme Court
rejected interdistrict relief. The contemporary pressure to accept remedies
that deliberately preserve one-race schools to prevent flight is largely a
product of the Milliken I tradeoff that sacrificed a generally more effective
remedy because of its costs. Given Milliken I, however, we may now be
driven to accept racial ceilings as part of the remedy, either because other
available alternatives will yield even less effective relief or because those
alternatives will themselves be deemed so costly and impractical that addi-
tional Interest Balancing tradeoffs will be made.
In what follows I seek to demonstrate this by comparing various reme-
dial strategies that might stabilize integration to prevent tipping and
flight, each responsive to reasons whites might have for fleeing: (i) adding
whites (interdistrict relief); (ii) raising the tipping point by affecting
whites' incentives to attend integrated schools; and (iii) deliberately pre-
serving some one-race schools and imposing ceilings at other schools.
Comparison of the relative effectiveness and imperfection of these reme-
dial alternatives is complicated by continuing uncertainty about what the
Supreme Court means by full "desegregation" when a long-standing sys-
temwide violation has been found, and in particular what degree of inte-
gration is necessary in specific schools to eliminate the effects of sys-
temwide violations. Even the most limited understanding of those remedial
requirements, however, includes the elimination of one-race schools as a
measure of remedial effectiveness. 153 Tipping and substantial white flight
undermine the effectiveness of any decree, since they promptly recreate
many racially identified black schools. Thus, a proportion of whites suffi-
cient to prevent tipping and flight is needed, not because this ratio is itself
necessary to eliminate a school's racial identity (a lower ratio might be
sufficient for that), but because failing to achieve that ratio will produce
tipping and flight, and the resulting absence of whites will leave effects of
the violation uncorrected.1 54 Theories of an appropriate desegregation
remedy often focus on other racial ratios as the measure of effective "de-
segregation," of course. 155 The measure under any theory of an effective
152. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
153. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537-40 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461-63 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 28 (1971); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir. 1980).
154. For example, even if sustaining a 65% black presence for a few years would yield a level of
integration sufficient to eliminate the racial identity of previously all-black schools in Detroit, tipping
may occur unless a higher white ratio is achieved, and therefore it would be impossible to secure even
the 35% white presence that would be sufficient to cure the violation. Put another way, a racial mix
that would be sufficient to cure the violation if the mix were stable may require a black presence that
exceeds the tipping point and will produce white flight. This problem generally arises because the
black presence in the school system at the time relief is ordered exceeds the tipping point.
155. For example, effective desegregation might be said to require a racial mix in particular
schools that roughly approximates the racial distribution in the district as a whole. (Swann v. Char-
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remedy nonetheless requires the prevention of flight that would recreate
one-race schools.
1. Increasing the Pool of Whites Through Interdistrict Relief
The critical legal development that now requires us to take racial ceil-
ings seriously is the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Brad-
ley,156 which rejected the most obvious strategy to prevent white flight and
secure a more effective remedy for victims of segregation. Where a remedy
for de jure segregation within a city's school system seems likely to pro-
duce substantial flight because the percentage of blacks in the system ex-
ceeds the tipping point, the clearest way to prevent that flight is to in-
crease the pool of whites within the scope of the remedy. This could be
done by ordering interdistrict or metropolitan relief that draws into the
school system a sufficiently large pool of white suburban students so that
the racial mix in the schools prevents the tipping point from being
reached. Moreover, whatever basis whites might have for objecting to de-
segregation, interdistrict relief would also remove an incentive for flight,
since fleeing from city to suburbs to avoid school integration would be
ineffective.
Milliken I essentially foreclosed interdistrict relief. The district court
had found that both the city of Detroit and the state of Michigan had
engaged, for many years, in systemwide de jure segregation within De-
troit. At the time of trial, the school system within Detroit had a majority
black student body, and whites and blacks were generally concentrated at
separate racially identified schools. If the remedy simply redistributed
white and black children throughout the Detroit system, the schools would
be predominantly black and, as the district court found, would probably
become virtually all-black because many of the remaining whites would
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971), suggests that this is an appropriate "starting
point" for the remedy.) Or it may require a racial mix that roughly approximates the racial distribu-
tion in the metropolitan area, see infra pp. 646-47. Or it may require some other racial distribution.
For example, eliminating attendance pattern effects of the violation may lead a court to try to achieve
a racial mix that removes precisely the "incremental segregative effect" of the violation. See Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). But see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 458 n.7, 465-68 (1979) (limiting applicability of Dayton, at least on burden of proof).
Alternatively, eliminating a school's racial identity may require the presence of some different quan-
tum of other-race students sufficient to change public perceptions of a school. See Bradley v. Milliken,
620 F.2d 1143, 1151-53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980); Brunson v. Board of Trustees,
429 F.2d 820, 820-23 (4th Cir. 1970) (en bane) (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting); Sedler, supra
note 120, at 880 n.3. Another quantum theory of desegregation holds that integration can be a suc-
cessful educational and psychological experience for newly integrated minority-race students only if
their numbers reach some critical mass. See Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1296 n.30 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 712 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
Crain & Mahard, How Desegregation Orders May Improve Minority Academic Achievement, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 693, 699 (1981).
156. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
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flee. 157 By a vote of 5-4, however, the Supreme Court held that interdis-
trict relief was impermissible absent an "interdistrict violation."1"
The majority opinion in Milliken I is confusingly written. At times, the
Court suggests that its conclusion is consistent with Rights Maximizing.
The Court invokes the principle that "the scope of the remedy is deter-
mined by the nature and extent of the violation," and suggests that an
intradistrict decree would completely eliminate all effects of the violation
within Detroit and "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."' ' In
seeking interdistrict relief, the Court implies, plaintiffs were trying to
eliminate conditions unrelated to the city and state's de jure segregation,
such as de facto segregation between city and suburban school systems."
Such conclusions, however, seem to me clearly false and an implausible
way to understand the case. In this situation, Rights Maximizing would
have comfortably accommodated a remedy that secured integrated Detroit
schools by including other Michigan public schools (those in the Detroit
suburbs) within the remedial plan.
Even if links between intentional housing discrimination and the segre-
gated schooling patterns in the metropolitan area were ignored,"6" metro-
politan relief might have been ordered based on at least two distinct theo-
ries, each fully consistent with the principle that the remedy should do no
more than eliminate effects of the defendants' violations. Most clearly,
even assuming a narrow view of what desegregation requires, there were
not enough whites in Detroit to desegregate the schools because whites
were likely to flee as a result of a purely intradistrict remedy and this
flight would undermine the effectiveness of the decree.
Alternatively and more broadly, quite apart from the likelihood of any
new flight, desegregation required a higher ratio of white to black stu-
dents than could be achieved by an intradistrict remedy. Once racially
identified by deliberate segregation, black schools do not lose their racial
identifiability if the remedy simply sprinkles a few whites among them
and leaves their racial composition largely black and vastly more black
than schools in the surrounding metropolitan area. Thus, in a school dis-
trict like Detroit, where at the time of judgment a high proportion of the
157. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1973) (quoting district court's findings
of fact).
158. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (Milliken I).
159. Id. at 744, 746.
160. Id. at 728 n.7, 738-41, 745-47; id. at 755-56 (Stewart, J., concurring).
161. The district court relied on this link as one of its reasons for ordering interdistrict relief. Id.
at 728 n.7 (majority opinion); see also Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: A Tactical
Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751, 757-76 (1975) (discussing how metropolitan
school remedy might be based on housing violations).
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students were black, desegregation requires metropolitan relief to assure
that blacks do not attend racially identified schools. In addition, longstand-
ing de jure school segregation within Detroit quite plausibly helped to
create a cycle of inferior black education, black unemployment and pov-
erty, depressed social conditions, and racial polarization, that all contrib-
uted to white departures from Detroit and the resulting higher percentage
of blacks within the public school system. 62 Therefore, a remedy based on
the racial mix of students in the district at the time the decree was imple-
mented would not eliminate the attendance pattern effects of the violation.
In short, given the nature and scope of the violation, a rule generally
prohibiting interdistrict relief promises a remedy that will be
incomplete.163
What appears to explain Milliken I is not that a within-Detroit remedy
would fully eliminate effects of the violation, but rather that an interdis-
trict remedy that would clearly have been more effective was thought to
impose costs that were too great. The costs were not the practical
problems of implementing an interdistrict decree; as Justice White's dis-
sent demonstrated, the distances that students would have had to travel
under an interdistrict decree would have been no greater than those re-
quired under many intradistrict decrees, nor would the administrative
burden have been significantly greater.'" Rather, the Court appears to
have given overriding weight to the suburbs' interest in "local auton-
omy,""1 5 and this value was allowed to trump the plaintiffs' interest in a
more effective remedy.""6 Milliken I, in other words, is an example of
Interest Balancing, a fact that becomes even clearer in the Supreme
Court's later characterizations of the case. 167 A Rights Maximizing court
162. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 779-80 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (Milliken I);
supra note 143.
163. On remand from Milliken I, the court of appeals was blunt about the legal significance of
the Supreme Court's action: "[G]enuine constitutional desegregation cannot be accomplished within
the school district boundaries of the Detroit School District." Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 240
(6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 443 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
164. Id. at 767-68 (White, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 741-42 (majority opinion).
166. In this respect, Milliken is not an isolated case. Local autonomy and other federalism values
have often played a role in shaping remedies in constitutional cases, whether or not those values have
constitutional stature. E.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 377-80 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-
19 (1890).
167. In Milliken II, for example, the Court observed:
[F]ederal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition
that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation, or if they are
imposed upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected by the constitu-
tional violation, as in Milliken I ...
433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The "or" seems to concede that Milli-
ken I gave weight to the value of local autonomy even though, as a result, the decree did not eliminate
the legally relevant effects of the violation. This view is reinforced by the Court's suggestion that "the
The Yale Law Journal
would have approved interdistrict relief; the Milliken I court, however,
sacrificed remedial effectiveness to protect another value, local
autonomy. 188
Although I am a supporter of Interest Balancing, I think that Milliken
I was wrongly decided; particularly since the state of Michigan itself was
found responsible for the violation, the value of "local autonomy" for sub-
urban subdivisions created by the state seems too weak an interest to over-
ride a more effective remedy in this case. First, while control of a school
system by a specific "local" administrative unit may sometimes contribute
to innovative education, parental participation, and community self-defini-
tion, it often is simply an administrative or political artifact. Even if in-
terdistrict relief in certain instances might so undermine exceptional ad-
vantages of this local autonomy that an effective desegregation remedy
should be sacrificed, Milliken I's flat rule drawing the remedial boundary
at the district line is extremely overbroad and gives insufficient weight to
the equal protection remedial interest. Second, and even more important
to Milliken itself, a state or state instrumentality certainly should not be
allowed to prevent desegregation by invoking the state's own delegation of
autonomy to local school boards when the state has used its very power
over localities to facilitate segregation." 9
Moreover, in school systems where long-standing de jure segregation is
found and there are presently a high proportion of blacks, the conse-
quences of this Interest Balancing tradeoff are striking. To be sure, in-
terdistrict relief would not necessarily have solved all the problems of de-
segregation and white flight. For example, at some point the distances
necessary for students to travel from one district to another to achieve
integration might be deemed too great, and a sufficient racial mix to
achieve full desegregation in all schools might be unattainable. In addi-
tion, some whites might still perceive the costs of integration as too great
and they would, still have the option of fleeing to private schools or even
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs" are a separate "factor" to be
taken into account by an equity court in shaping a remedy, id. at 280-81. See also Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976) (Milliken I based on "limitations on the remedial powers of the federal
courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities").
168. While Milliken's rule generally barring interdistrict relief cannot be justified by the remedial
principle that the court invokes-that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the violation-a general refusal to allow interdistrict relief might reflect an altogether different
principle: that the source of the remedy is determined by the source of the violation. Such a principle
might generally bar bringing the suburbs into a remedy when the only source of the violation was the
city. In a case like Milliken itself, however, where the state (and not simply the city) is a violator, this
principle does not suggest that the source of relief should be limited to the city; the remedy could
properly include the state and its local subdivisions. See infra note 169.
169. More generally, even if state officials have not directly discriminated, there is much to be
said for the propositions that the state is constitutionally responsible whenever any local unit that it
has the power to control violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the state through any of its
local units may appropriately be ordered to remedy such violations.
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beyond the suburbs.170 By foreclosing interdistrict relief, however, the
Milliken I tradeoff forecloses the most obvious and most obviously effec-
tive way to prevent flight and reduce or eliminate one-race schools. 17 1
The fact that Justice Powell himself provided the swing vote in favor of
Milliken I's Interest Balancing reveals the hollowness of his later dissent
from the dismissal of certiorari in Estes-the Dallas schools case-which
is written as if he were a victim-oriented Rights Maximizer." Joined by
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, Justice Powell defends the district court's
decision to preserve many one-race schools in Estes and argues that such a
remedy was the most effective possible in light of white flight.1' Justice
Powell chastises other lower courts for approving "self-defeating reme-
dies"174 that have shown "little concern . . . for the question of effective-
ness" and for the "impact a remedy is likely to have on resegregation.
175
Calling for greater realism about "the imperfect nature of court action in
schools cases," he blames the "unattainab[ility]" of "perfect solutions" on
the "complexities of modern urban communities. ' 176 The unavailability of
170. Thus, even the availability of interdistrict relief would not necessarily have guaranteed fully
effective desegregation remedies that both achieved integration and prevented flight. It is therefore
possible that the other remedial strategies to prevent flight that are considered below might have to be
considered (including deliberately preserving some one-race schools). The unavailability of interdis-
trict relief, however, almost certainly makes it harder to desegregate the schools and increases the
amount of remedial imperfection (such as the number of one-race schools) that must be tolerated.
171. Scholars with a variety of opinions on the merits of school busing and its impact on white
flight agree that metropolitan remedies significantly reduce white flight. See House School Desegrega-
tion Hearings, supra note 114, at 160-61, 210, 216 (statements of G. Orfield, D. Armor & C. Ros-
sell); Senate School Busing Hearings, supra note 114, at 232 (statement of R. Farley); G. ORFIELD,
MUST WE BUS?: SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY 97-101 (1978); Rossell, Applied So-
cial Science Research, supra note 114, at 89. Interdistrict relief also has at least two other advantages.
First, because there are frequently wealth disparities between city and suburb, interdistrict relief
would generally promote greater contact among students from different sodal classes, which is thought
to be important to improving blacks' educational achievement levels. See ON EQUALITY OF EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY 22-25, 71, 86-88, 153-65 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972); Crain &
Mahard, supra note 155, at 696-97. Second, there is at least the possibility that, over time, patterns of
residential segregation between suburb and city would be reduced as families move closer to their
childrens' schools. See House School Desegregation Hearings, supra note 114, at 192-94, 198-203
(statement of D. Pearce); Rossell, Applied Social Science Research, supra note 114, at 102-04 (net
migration is into white neighborhoods).
Since Milliken I, several lower federal courts have ordered interdistrict relief, invoking the excep-
tion for "interdistrict violations" stated in the Milliken opinion. See supra note 136. There is no
indication, however, that Milliken's basically restrictive force has abated.
172. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). Justice Powell also reveals that he is an Interest Balancer in
his separate opinions in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) and Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990,
995 n.7 (1976) (per curiam) (Powell, J., concurring).
173. Estes, 444 U.S. at 440-44, 448-52 (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). Jus-
tice Powell also suggested that the district court should be affirmed because there had not been suffi-
cient evidence connecting the remaining one-race schools to the violation. Id. at 445-48.
174. Id. at 439.
175. Id. at 445, 449.
176. Id. at 448.
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a remedy more effective than one preserving so many one-race schools,
however, was a consequence not simply of modern urban "complexities"
but of the Court's Interest Balancing in Milliken I itself; it was the result
of Justice Powell's own vote to sacrifice achievable remedial effectiveness
in the name of interests that he decided to value more. As the district
court explicitly stated on remand in the Dallas case, if the remedy "were
enlarged to take in the outlying suburban school districts with their over-
whelming anglo enrollment, it would be possible to diminish the inevitable
limitations on the task of eliminating racially identifiable schools in the
district. But . . . [that] possibility . . . has already been foreclosed . . .
by Miliken "I Justice Powell is to be credited for recognizing that the
measure of remedial effectiveness includes the prevention of white flight,
but his willingness to prevent flight by accepting continued one-race
schools and limited relief for blacks, rather than requiring the more effec-
tive relief possible through interdistrict remedies, cannot be defended in
Rights Maximizing terms.
2. Affecting Whites' Incentives
Given the unfortunate constraints of Milliken I, there may be no avail-
able remedy that will eliminate all one-race schools in a district containing
a relatively high percentage of black students, and none more effective
than a remedy deliberately preserving some one-race schools and using
ceilings. Within the Milliken I constraints, the most plausible alternative
to ceilings is a remedy that attempts to raise the tipping point by changing
whites' assessment of the costs and benefits of integration as compared to
flight, thereby making it more likely that whites will stay in schools that
have a high proportion of black students. But while a court is obliged to
consider this alternative, a remedy that tries to raise the tipping point
either may be less effective than a remedy using ceilings or may itself
impose unacceptably high costs.
a. Punishing Flight
With interdistrict relief foreclosed, one possible way to raise the tipping
point and prevent flight is to impose an intradistrict integration remedy
that bars white families in the public school system from sending their
children to private schools or changing neighborhoods; threats of contempt
or. other sanctions would provide incentives for compliance. By keeping
whites in the system, this alternative might well be more effective than
remedies that allow whites to flee or that deliberately preserve some one-
177. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 711 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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race schools."78 While the remedial principle empowering courts to elimi-
nate effects of the violation might point this far, the suggestion is startling,
and for good reason: As currently interpreted, the Constitution itself pro-
tects the right to attend private schools and the right to travel.179 While
the fact that a constitutional remedial interest clashes with another consti-
tutional interest hardly means that the remedial interest must give way,
one can readily predict the outcome of this particular clash; courts would
almost surely read the Constitution to allow nondefendants to live where
they want and to send children to private school, even if these actions
interfered with an effective remedy for a Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion.180 This too should be seen as a form of Interest Balancing. Values
unrelated to remedial effectiveness (here, constitutional values) lead the
courts to forego a remedial strategy that might well produce more effective
relief for blacks. Courts do have the power to enjoin private parties from
interfering with desegregation in some instances18 and may even have the
power to influence access to private schools or the suburbs indirectly, 182
but they probably lack the power to block flight directly.
178. The qualification derives in part from the fact that the coercion required to effectuate this
unlikely remedial alternative might undermine its effectiveness. See supra p. 619. Moreover, the com-
parative effectiveness of this alternative depends upon how "desegregation" is defined and upon the
black-white ratio in the district. Thus, if 90% of a district is black, a remedy that creates a number of
schools with a 50% black enrollment, but leaves numerous all-black schools, might be deemed "more
effective" than a remedy that secures a stable 90% black-10% white ratio in all schools.
179. See cases cited supra note 43.
180. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 944 (5th Cir. 1981) (desegregation
plan may not "restrain [students] from choosing to attend a private school"), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
939 (1982).
181. For example, in Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834
(1957), the district court enjoined interference with its order desegregating the county's schools. In
affirming a judgment of criminal contempt against a leader of demonstrations to prevent desegrega-
tion, the Sixth Circuit rejected a First Amendment defense, stating that "the right to speak is not
absolute and may be regulated to accomplish other legitimate objectives," including "protect[ing]
rights safeguarded by the Constitution." Id. at 95; see also United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 264-
68 (5th Cir. 1972) (court has power to enjoin non party from interfering with desegregation plan);
United States v. Farrar, 414 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1969) (no First Amendment protection for
harassment of blacks who chose to attend previously white schools, and court is "empowered and
obliged" to enjoin such conduct); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 102 (8th Cir.
1956) (court did not violate First Amendment in enjoining "type of speech" that would obstruct de-
segregation); c Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, 806-08 (8th Cir.) (upholding order enjoining
governor from using National Guard to interfere with desegregation), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829
(1958).
182. For example, quite apart from their remedial powers deriving from the duty to eliminate
effects of de jure public school segregation, courts may enjoin private schools from discriminating on
the basis of race without offending the constitutional right to attend private schools, Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and courts may bar various types of government support of discrimina-
tory private schools, Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (city may not allow segre-
gated private schools to have temporary exclusive use of public recreational facilities); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state may not loan textbooks to students attending segregated private
schools); cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (under Congressional statute,
Internal Revenue Service may not grant charitable tax exemption to racially discriminatory private
schools). Such judicial action would have the effect of reducing the appeal of private schools as escape
hatches for flight from the public schools.
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b. Providing Educational Incentives
A more plausible way for courts to reduce -flight within the constraints
of Milliken I, without deliberately preserving one-race schools and impos-
ing ceilings, is to try to raise the tipping point by improving whites' as-
sessment of integration. While whites' evaluation of integration may well
be improved by supportive and active community leadership,18 by limit-
ing the distance of busing, or by minimizing the extent to which whites
are reassigned to previously black schools,"" probably the most promising
Moreover, once a court has found de jure segregation in the public schools, the court should have
enhanced power to affect access to private schools in the name of providing a more effective desegrega-
tion remedy-whether or not the private schools themselves engage in racial discrimination. Even
though the constitutional right to attend private schools may well be a balanceable interest that con-
strains this remedial power, an Interest Balancing court should take steps to reduce incentives for
flight to private schools when the competing interests are less weighty-for example, when the reme-
dial action does not actually block access to private schools and therefore does not block the exercise of
a constitutional right. Thus, a court might enjoin the government from providing tax subsidies to
private schools that serve as an escape hatch. (Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), a recent
Supreme Court case upholding tax deductions for private school attendance, did not arise in the con-
text of racial discrimination or remedies for racial segregation, and should not be read as foreclosing
restrictions on tax subsidies in this context.) See also Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855, 859-60
(N.D. Miss. 1973) (school board's discharge of teachers who enrolled their own children in private
schools constitutionally permissible where rationally related to aim of overcoming "serious obstacle to
effective desegregation" posed by white flight), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 429 U.S. 165 (1976).
Regardless of what the courts may require, of course, the private schools themselves might take
initiatives to limit flight. This is not an altogether fanciful prospect. The Cleveland Archdiocese, for
example, has an announced a policy of not accepting into its parochial schools students who it deter-
mines are fleeing from public school desegregation. Telephone interview with Leonard Stevens, Direc-
tor of Office on School Monitoring and Community Relations, Cleveland, Ohio (Mar. 11, 1983).
183. A spirit of cooperation and confident optimism from the school board, for example, may
produce similar reactions from white residents. See, e.g., R. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEG-
REGATION 295-301 (1968); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 91-102. But see Ros-
sell, Applied Social Science Research, supra note 114, 77-78, 92 ("no conclusive evidence"). Even if
courts can encourage such a spirit, however, they surely cannot order it.
184. While courts can and do try to minimize the distance of student travel under a desegregation
decree, residential segregation may make it impossible to achieve integration unless there is significant
busing. Studies do suggest that "greater white flight occurs. . . when whites are reassigned to minor-
ity schools rather than when minorities are reassigned to white schools." Rossell, Applied Social Sci-
ence Research, supra note 114, at 87. Therefore, to minimize white resistance and flight, courts might
require that blacks rather than whites bear most of the burdens of reassignment and busing to new
schools in new neighborhoods. Asymmetrical busing, however, would not solve the white flight prob-
lem. While it may reduce flight by those whites who resist integration when it requires travel to black
neighborhoods, it will not reduce flight by whites who object primarily to a large black presence in a
school. The tipping point may be higher when blacks are reassigned to a previously white school than
when whites are reassigned to a previously black school, but stable integration may still be impossible
to achieve. Moreover, depending upon the enrollment capacity of the schools, reassigning black stu-
dents to formerly white schools without also reassigning many white students to formerly black
schools may be altogether impractical. "[Mlandatory reassignment of white students is necessary in
order to desegregate most school districts effectively." Id. at 104. At most, asymmetical reassignment
would be only a partial and incomplete strategy to achieve integration and reduce flight. Indeed, if a
decree deliberately preserves one-race black schools to avoid white reassignments that are likely to
provoke widespread flight, the decree raises problems virtually identical to those of racial ceilings.
Even were it able to provide a desegregated setting for all blacks, asymmetrical busing would raise
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step courts can take to improve whites' assessments of desegregation is to
try to improve the quality of integrated schools. Possibilities for improving
educational quality include curricular enhancements, better teacher train-
ing, remedial education, increased capital expenditures, and the establish-
ment of "magnet schools" (schools offering exceptional educational oppor-
tunities)."8 5 To some extent, such remedial measures might be rationalized
as direct compensatory relief for blacks, simply eliminating inequalities
among schools and students attributable to de jure segregation.'8 But the
more sweeping requirements, such as magnet schools, are best seen as ef-
forts to make the integration remedy effective by providing "sweeteners"
to whites to keep them in the school system. 8 To the extent that white
flight reflects concern about educational quality under desegregation, these
remedial measures seek to overcome that basis for resistance; but whatever
whites' reasons for flight, including out-and-out racism, exceptional edu-
cational opportunities such as magnet schools provide incentives for whites
to stay in or even enter a school system with a substantial black enroll-
ment. These unusual educational settings may be offered to students as
part of a desegregation plan that relies on pupil choice or they might be
part of a mandatory pupil reassignment plan; either way, educational ex-
many normative and legal problems. similar to those created by ceilings. For example, it would dis-
tribute benefits and burdens unequally according to race and might impose dignitary harms. The
courts have responded in various ways to desegregation plans calling for asymmetrical busing. Some-
times they state that an extremely lopsided burdening of one racial group would be unconstitutional.
See Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 834 (1983); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 539 F. Supp. 335, 343 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd 703 F.2d
722 (3d Cir. 1983); Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 350 F. Supp. 879, 881-82 (D. Conn. 1972). In
other cases, however, even a significantly unequal distribution of burdens has been tolerated-usually
not for the explicit purpose of preventing flight, but in the interest of furthering other remedial objec-
tives, such as improving educational quality and "community cooperation," that are certainly condu-
cive to reducing flight. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 793-95 (6th Cir.
1974); Arvizu v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 495 F.2d 499, 504-07 (5th Cir. 1974); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F.
Supp. 912, 923-24 (N.D. I1. 1983) (Chicago).
185. The leading case on the appropriateness of requiring educational improvements in a desegre-
gation remedy is Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977) (Milliken II). Post-Milliken II
remedial decrees often contain such requirements in addition to pupil reassignment provisions. See
cases cited infra notes 186, 187.
186. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (Milliken 11); Morgan v. Kerrigan,
530 F.2d 401, 427-30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.Supp.
683, 741-43 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F.Supp. 351, 357 (E.D. Mo. 1980),
aff'd, 667 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091 (1981); United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp. 657, 671-72 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980).
187. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468, 470 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.
Supp. 683, 744-50 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Berry v. School Dist., 515 F. Supp. 344, 365-67, 382-83 (W.D.
Mich. 1981), aff'd and remanded, 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1983); Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp.
1248, 1252, 1259-60 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 357 (E.D. Mo.
1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091 (1981); Coleman, New Incentives
for Desegregation, HUM. RTS., Fall 1978, at 10.
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cellence is supposed to encourage whites to attend integrated schools. Put
bluntly, these "sweeteners" are bribes in the form of educational offerings.
At great expense to the defendant, they can be made very sweet in-
deed-every Central and South Central High School turned into a School
of Athens, or at least a Bronx High School of Science. Indeed, if a court's
only objective were to achieve integration by keeping whites in the system,
it might simply order the defendant to pay whites to stay.1 8
While both a Rights Maximizing court and an enlightened Interest
Balancing court should require some educational sweeteners if doing so
would reduce the number of one-race schools, this strategy presents two
problems: It may be sufficiently ineffective in securing stable integration
so that using racial ceilings might yield a more effective remedy, and it
may be sufficiently costly so that an Interest Balancer might reject its
widespread use.
It is by no means clear that educational sweeteners, even at some high
level of sweetness, can make the desegregation plan sufficiently attractive
to secure an effective remedy-that is, both to achieve integration and pre-
vent white flight. "Freedom of choice" desegregation plans have been no-
toriously unsuccessful in yielding student choices that make much of a
dent in one-race schools, particularly those identified as black schools, and
the courts have long rejected such plans."89 The strategy of introducing
magnet schools as part of the choice system, an approach that the Reagan
Administration has recently promoted,190 has also generally proven unsuc-
cessful as a means of securing integration. 91 Providing sweeteners as part
i88. For example, the bepartment of Justice suggested that tuition scholarships to the University
of Missouri be given to students who choose to attend other-race schools in a voluntary interdistrict
plan to desegregate the St. Louis public schools. See Williams, A New Incentive for Busing, NEWS-
WEEK, May 18, 1981, at 49.
189. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-42 (1968).
190. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1982, at 8, col. 1 (Baton Rouge desegregation case).
191. Courts and researchers generally agree that voluntary techniques using magnet schools have
been of only limited value in desegregating schools. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277,
1295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805,
810 (5th Cir. 1980); Lee v. Marengo County Bd. of Educ., 588 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (5th Cir. 1979);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 410, 423 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Hoots v.
Pennsylvania, 539 F. Supp. 335, 342-43 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1983); Tasby
v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 746-47 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248, 1260
(S.D. Tex. 1981); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 514 F. Supp. 869, 873 (M.D. La.
1981); House School Desegregation Hearings, supra note 114, at 125-34, 144-45, 166 (statement of
G. Orfield); id. at 806, 830-34, 837-41 (reprinting Center for Educ. & Human Dev. Policy, Institute
for Pub. Policy Studies, Vanderbilt Univ., Strategies for Effective Desegregation: A Synthesis of Find-
ings (1981)); Rossell, Applied Sodal Science Research, supra note 114, at 91; Rossell, Magnet
Schools as a Desegregation Tool, 14 URB. EDUC. 303 (1979). But see Hart v. Community School Bd.,
512 F.2d 37, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing examples of successful magnet school programs); United
States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 924-25 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (approving voluntary desegrega-
tion measures in consent decree); Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 468, 470-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (six
one-race schools remained, but voluntary plan generally successful); Armor, supra note 114, at 223-
25. Researchers do suggest that magnet schools are more successful in securing stable integration
when they are supplements to mandatory student reassignment plans. See Rossell, supra, at 314.
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of a mandatory reassignment scheme may not prevent white flight. For
one thing, if the reluctance to choose or the wish to flee an integrated
setting reflects a concern about educational quality under integration, even
the expenditure of vast sums for extraordinary programs may not make a
school "good enough" quickly enough to overcome whites' concerns, par-
ticularly if integration increases the proportion of educationally disadvan-
taged students in the school. In addition, since racial prejudice, and not
concern about educational quality, is often the reason for opposing inte-
grated schools, whites may systematically undervalue the worth of educa-
tional sweeteners offered in the context of a majority-black school. In
short, educational sweeteners may not be able to raise the tipping point
sufficiently so that whites will accept the degree of racial mixing necessary
to "desegregate" schools throughout the district.
Furthermore, there is another reason to question the effectiveness of
educational sweeteners: Their fiscal expense may itself undermine reme-
dial success."92 Even if these fiscal costs are imposed on the defendant-
wrongdoer, they are ultimately borne by the citizens of the jurisdiction
through higher taxes. Such tax increases could in turn lead these citizens
to flee the jurisdiction, thereby re-creating the problems of flight." 'a
Moreover, even if highly expensive educational sweeteners would se-
cure an effective remedy, the Supreme Court might not allow the lower
courts to impose such expensive requirements on defendants. There is no
doubt that courts do have the legal power to order some "educational
quality" features beyond traditional requirements concerning pupil and
faculty reassignments. In Milliken 11,194 decided three years after Milli-
192. Partial funding for such sweeteners may be available from federal or state sources, but these
external funds are likely to be inadequate to fund a completely effective desegregation effort. Indeed,
the Emergency School Aid Act of 1978, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. V 1981), which previously
had provided assistance to school districts implementing desegregation plans, was repealed and consol-
idated into block grants by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 95-35, §
587(a), 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357, 480. Fiscal considerations recently led
the East Baton Rouge school board to reject a magnet school program proposed by the United States
Department of Justice in lieu of traditional busing remedies. Telephone interview with J. Harvie
Wilkinson, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice (Mar. 9, 1983).
193. There are other reasons to question the effectiveness of educational sweeteners. First, they
often require time-consuming construction and program development, and therefore can lead to delay
in remedial implementation. See Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 826 (1980). Second, sweeteners, like monetary bribes, may undermine the dignitary goals of
the remedy even though numerical integration goals are achieved. Moreover, magnet schools also pose
significant policy questions. They create quality education for some students but not for others, and
they tend to separate the most talented and enterprising students from their peers. See Rosenbaum &
Presser, Voluntary Racial Integration in a Magnet School, 86 U. CHI. SCHOOL REV. 156, 177 (1978).
Such incentives to prevent flight may also divert funds "into services appealing to middle-class white
parents at the expense of sacrificing compensatory and human relations programs meeting minority
needs." Crain & Mahard, supra note 155, at 707.
194. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
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ken I barred interdistrict relief, the Supreme Court affirmed a district
court decree ordering several "educational components" designed to facili-
tate whatever intradistrict desegregation was possible within Detroit. 9 "
The scope of Milliken II, however, is unclear. The only educational com-
ponents before the Supreme Court were a remedial reading and communi-
cations skills program "to eradicate the effects of past discrimination" in
educating minority students, a teacher training program "to cope with the
desegregation process," a counseling program, and a modification of pupil
testing procedures; while these components were hardly inexpensive, more
costly steps, such as requiring the creation of numerous magnet schools,
were not before the Court. 9 ' Thus, consistent with Milliken II, courts
might simply deem it too costly to require objecting defendants to furnish
particularly expensive educational sweeteners, even if they would help to
keep whites in the school system. 9 Put another way, an Interest Balanc-
ing court might conclude that, at some point, financial expense to the de-
fendant is a sufficiently weighty balanceable cost to trump remedial effec-
tiveness for victims. And at some extremely high level of expense, I might
agree. Keeping down extraordinary fiscal cost to the defendant would be
added to Milliken I's protection of local autonomy as a basis for sacrific-
ing some achievable effectiveness and adopting a less effective remedy.
c. Reducing the Appeal of Escape Hatches
Courts might also try to raise the tipping point by reducing the attrac-
tiveness of escape hatches for white flight. If whites knew that flight
would not have its desired effects, they would be less likely to flee. For
example, a court might impose a systemwide integration plan and assert
the power to redraw attendance zones and reestablish integration if white
195. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1132-45 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 229
(6th Cir. 1976), alf'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
196. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 272-73, 275-76, 276-77 n. 11. The cost of the components before
the Court was about $12 million. 433 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
197. There are other reasons to be uncertain about Milliken II's scope. First, Milliken I's the-
ory for upholding the educational requirements was limited. Although the district court had justified
the educational components as necessary both to provide compensation for educational deficiencies
suffered by the black victims of segregation and to minimize the possibility of resegregation, 402 F.
Supp at 1102, 1133-34, the Supreme Court opinion appears to invoke only the former remedial the-
ory. Thus, while Milliken II is clear authority for the view that courts may order educational compo-
nents to provide direct compensatory relief for prior educational deficiencies or to upgrade the quality
of traditionally black schools in order to eliminate inequalities caused by unlawful discrimination, it is
less clear authority for ordering educational improvements designed primarily to make the integration
order effective by offering whites sweeteners to stay in the school system. Second, the city defendants
(the school board) favored the decree, and the only issue was whether the state defendants could be
ordered to help subsidize these educational components. Third, the Court may have felt distinctive
pressure to approve some remedy for Detroit's black children, since it had just rendered the highly
controversial decision in Milliken I, which barred substantial integration.
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flight occurs. But this hardly seems a realistic solution to the white flighit
problem.
The courts probably do have the legal power to redraw attendance
zones within a public school district if white flight occurs in response to
the initial decree. Redrawing attendance zones after flight would not re-
strict the constitutional rights of fleeing whites as would a direct restric-
tion on flight, since no one within a school system has a constitutional
right to attend the public school of his choice.19 To be sure, the Supreme
Court's decision in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler 99
holds that "once the affirmative duty to desegregate [is] accomplished" a
district court has no further power to issue or revise remedial orders;2"'
but Spangler certainly does not suggest that the mere entry of an initial
decree constitutes "accomplishment. '20 1 Indeed, the Court states:
There was ...no showing in this case that [the] changes in the
racial mix of some Pasadena schools which were focused on by the
lower courts were in any manner caused by segregative actions
chargeable to the defendants. The District Court rejected petitioners'
assertion that the movement was caused by so-called 'white flight'
traceable to the decree itself.
2 2
The opinion explicitly leaves open the possibility that a trial court, as part
of its broad remedial authority to eliminate all effects of a violation, could
(and perhaps must) revise its original decree to overcome the effects of any
white flight produced by the decree.2" 3
It is doubtful, however, that intradistrict decree revisions could recap-
ture enough whites to make this strategy effective. Whites will always
remain free to flee any revision, and they will have clear routes for un-
molested flight so long as courts lack the power to reach into private
schools or other nearby school districts. Even whites who flee within the
school district may not be recapturable::At some point, particularly if
198. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 942 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 939 (1982).
199. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
200. Id. at 436 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32
(1971)).
201. In Spangler, the Supreme Court understood the trial court to have asserted the authority to
maintain a particular racial balance in the schools indefinitely and, to that end, revise its decrees,
repeatedly in light of shifts that might occur after the affirmative duty to desegregate was accom-
plished. Id. at 434.
202. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
203. Lower courts have reaffirmed that accomplishing desegregation may require revision of the
initial decree. Several courts have specifically indicated that flight unleashes a decree-revision power.
See, e.g., Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 937 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 939 (1982); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1980). But cf.
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 449 (1980) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing from dismissal of certiorari) (Pasadena establishes that "once resegregation occurs without state
action courts have no power to impose an additional remedy").
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white flight exacerbates residential segregation, the geographic distances
may make busing to reestablish integration too costly for both whites and
blacks. (Indeed, the very activity of "chasing" after whites may end up
being degrading to the black children the court is trying to benefit, and
thereby interfere with remedial effectiveness.) The clear advantage of de-
cree revision is that it holds out the prospect of overcoming flight without
requiring the courts to engage in before-the-fact speculation about
whether flight will actually occur; it does not create the risk that the
courts will limit the remedy unnecessarily to prevent white flight that
never would have materialized. But a court's initial failure to take strate-
gic steps to prevent white flight makes the victims assume the risk of irre-
versible reemergence of one-race schools and remedial failure, since once
white flight has occurred, many whites will be irretrievable.
Theoretically, other remedial strategies directed at escape hatches might
reduce incentives for flight.' For example, since a necessary condition for
flight is the existence of places to which whites can flee without encoun-
tering "too many" blacks, the court might in theory consider remedies that
tried to affect discriminatory conditions in those places. While it is possi-
ble that plaintiffs in a school desegregation case could join as defendants
those responsible for unlawful racial discrimination in the relevant escape
hatches, courts have not looked favorably on efforts to rope in so much of
the world in a single lawsuit.2 0 5 Moreover, desegregating those enclaves
would require eliminating not only present discrimination but also over-
coming the economic and social disadvantages resulting from society-wide
discrimination that would still leave many blacks unable to enter those
enclaves.
There is a deeper point here, I think-a point that also summarizes the
discussion thus far. Some critics have pointed to the extravagant breadth
and coerciveness of integration decrees as the cause of white flight.2 6 To
the contrary: White flight is a product of judicial modesty and limited
judicial power. Judicial remedies are much too narrow in scope to elimi-
nate all the factors that make white flight possible and likely-the atti-
tudes and conditions that make individual whites want to flee, and the
existence of white enclaves to which they can flee-even when those fac-
tors are rooted in racial discrimination. Remedies in school segregation
cases are only a partial and slow-acting response to our country's legacy
of racial discrimination. They do not immediately eliminate all effects of
204. Some possibilities with respect to private schools are indicated supra note 182.
205. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) ("One vehicle can
carry only a limited amount of baggage.").
206. See L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 16-17, 277-83 (1976).
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the defendant's own discrimination that contribute to whites' desire and
ability to flee. They do not generally address the consequences of private
discrimination or the effects of community-wide or society-wide discrimi-
nation, even though the success of remedies for the defendant's discrimina-
tion can be thwarted by the effects of the discrimination of others. The
limited nature of judicial remedies may doom even limited remedial ef-
forts. School segregation is simply a small part of our deplorable racial
past, but to provide truly effective remedies for even that part, it often
seems that an entire world must be remade.
3. Limiting Black Enrollment
This narrative establishes that an intradistrict remedy preserving one-
race schools to prevent flight can be justified, if at all, only after sacrificing
some achievable desegregation. It cannot be defended in Rights Maximiz-
ing terms, most obviously since interdistrict relief is likely to be more ef-
fective. Since all remedies less effective than interdistrict relief necessarily
incorporate Milliken I's Interest Balancing tradeoff, a defense of ceilings
must be made in Milliken Is Interest Balancing terms. Believing that
Milliken I was incorrectly decided, I conclude that in most situations ra-
cial ceilings are inappropriate and that a more effective interdistrict inte-
gration remedy should be ordered. Indeed, now that the consequences of
Milliken I are clear, the Supreme Court should overrule it.
But a district court judge today has no such power. He cannot disregard
Milliken I nor can he disregard white resistance and flight. Because of the
requirements of precedent and judicial hierarchy, the judge's decisions
must reflect the Interest Balancing of Milliken I; and they must reflect
restrictions on judicial remedial powers entailed by constitutional decisions
that guarantee citizens the right to attend private schools and to live where
they wish. Within these constraints, a district judge will be driven at least
to consider ceilings.
In a school district where the black presence exceeds the tipping point,
the remedial imperfection produced by racial ceilings might be justified on
either of two grounds. First, given the imperfection of all available reme-
dies, a remedy that helps to prevent flight by using ceilings may produce a
more effectively desegregated school system than other remedial alterna-
tives. Second, even if other remedies such as educational sweeteners may
raise the tipping point sufficiently to permit the elimination of more one-
race schools, a court may decide that the costs of such alternatives are too
high.
In light of the first possibility, a failure to consider the option of racial
ceilings seriously may further diminish the strength of Brown rights, even
while seeming to defend them. Professor Alan Freeman, for example, at-
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tacks racial ceilings as an example of the law's assuring that the "domi-
nant group's desire for integration supersedes the victim group's demand
for relief":
The purpose of such a quota is to keep the number of black people
below the level where. . . the white majority, presumably motivated
by racism, will leave the area . . . . Such a quota admits a token
number of black people to a more desirable condition of existence,
thereby illustrating progress toward the integrated society, while
making sure they remain outnumbered by the whites so as to be
powerless and nonthreatening. And at the same time the deprivation
imposed on those blacks who are denied admission is rationalized as
being in everybody's interest since an integrated society is the goal to
be attained.
20 7
While some racial ceilings may fit this description, Professor Freeman
does not adequately take account of the true dilemmas facing any single
institution, with limited power, as it confronts the legacy of our racial
past. Professor Freeman appears to be an absolutist with respect to the
rights of victims to relief, refusing to agree that any forces in tension with
full rectification deserve our attention. But if absolutism is impossible,
Professor Freeman is a defeatist. While he does not contest the empirical
fact of white flight, he counts it simply as unfortunate racist behavior. By
ignoring the consequences of white flight on the remedy, Professor Free-
man in effect maintains that even limited achievement of the integration
ideal is less important than revealing the dynamic of racism and giving the
social critic an opportunity to accuse the judiciary of maintaining white
domination. I doubt this is the route to greater racial justice. Although
grappling with imperfection may be difficult, it is part of the difficulty of
the remedial problem, of translating ideals into something real that makes
the world somewhat better for at least some people. To reject the imper-
fect may preserve the horrible.
The current remedial moment presents not a choice between absolutism
and the imperfect, but a choice among the imperfect. Faced with resis-
tance, courts should neither ignore it nor immediately capitulate to it. In
considering racial ceilings, the first and most important issue is how effec-
tive they are compared to other post-Milliken I alternatives. Remedies
must be compared in light of their potential for securing stable desegrega-
tion-that is, both achieving integration and preventing flight. While ra-
cial ceilings assure some one-race schools, they also stabilize integration at
other schools and may therefore yield fewer one-race schools than alterna-
207. Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination, supra note 76, at 1075, 1076.
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tives do. Thus, a remedy mandating full systemwide integration may end
up being less effective if it provokes very extensive flight (although even
after flight, it must be remembered, interracial contact in such school dis-
tricts is likely to be considerably greater than it would have been if no
desegregation had been ordered at all).208 A freedom-of-choice remedy
may prevent flight, but may produce sharply limited integration, even
with magnet school components; indeed, a choice remedy, like one using
racial ceilings, may itself be seen as a limited remedy whose objective is to
prevent flight by producing limited integration-but it may yield less
overall desegregation than a mandatory reassignment plan that uses ceil-
ings. These and other imperfect alternatives must be compared, but a
court committed to achieving the greatest degree of prompt and stable de-
segregation might well restrict the amount of required integration to
something less than would be ordered if white flight were not an antici-
pated problem, and might conclude that a remedy using racial ceilings is
now the most effective among the imperfect alternatives available.
Whether using racial ceilings will actually produce the greatest desegre-
gation depends upon the extent to which white flight and integration re-
ally will occur under alternative remedial schemes. This empirical ques-
tion highlights a serious problem with ceilings: Unlike other strategies to
avoid tipping, ceilings assure remedial imperfection on the face of the de-
cree. Alternative remedies raise only a probability of remedial imperfec-
tion, and imperfection of uncertain dimension. While the premise of ceil-
ings is that white flight must be addressed, realism can be a dangerous
aspiration for people, such as judges or law professors, who are often ac-
cused of not being realistic enough. Newly initiated into a jurisprudence
of limitation, judges may become too "realistic," taking reality to be more
resistant than it is. Before ordering an assuredly limited remedy in order
to prevent flight, a court must have a strong basis for concluding that
white flight actually will be provoked by a more extensive desegregation
decree and inhibited by the less extensive one.
The empirical issue is surely a complicated one. 09 The question is not
only whether there is strong enough evidence that permanent white flight
in response to desegregation decrees has actually occurred; the evidence
seems rather convincing that it frequently has. The question is whether,
before the event, such flight can be predicted in a way that is provable in
court. To the extent that the evidence will be nebulous, there is potential
for abuse, mistake, and unwarranted compromise of black children's
rights. The available evidence, however, does not support a view that the
208. See Senate School Busing Hearings, supra note 114, at 232 (statement of R. Farley); Rossell,
Applied Social Science Research, supra note 114, at 94, 106.
209. See supra note 114.
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empirical question will invariably be impossible to answer. Moreover, the
dangers surely cut both ways. Failure to take account of white flight can
compromise victims' rights too-and if flight occurs, the losses may be
irreversible. The victims of segregation are not helped by denying the ex-
istence of a palpable reality that can yield self-defeating remedies.
Beyond these basic questions about the comparative effectiveness of ceil-
ings in eliminating one-race schools, the courts must also be sensitive to
how ceilings might interfere with remedial effectiveness in more subtle
ways. First, a rule allowing courts to limit the scope of integration to
prevent resistance and flight would give whites incentives for exaggerated
displays of resistance. Second, remedies that limit racial mixing because
whites will not tolerate a greater amount may inflict dignitary harms on
black children and therefore interfere with the remedy's overall effective-
ness.210 Third, use of a racial criterion in a way that deprives some blacks
of a wanted benefit, despite the benefit to other blacks, might be seen to
violate the norms of the equal protection clause.
In these last two respects, a racial ceiling that preserves one-race
schools falls somewhere between a typical race-conscious integration rem-
edy (or other "affirmative action") and an invidious racial classification.
In order to benefit some blacks, it fails to benefit others. It is now settled
that race-conscious affirmative action is constitutional in at least some "re-
medial" contexts.2 11 Racial ceilings should similarly satisfy the Constitu-
tion in those cases where their use provides the most feasible remedy for
school segregation. In those situations, the most important element of
traditionally invidious discrimination-group harm-seems not to be pre-
sent. Group harm seems unlikely if ceilings provide desegregated school-
ing to more blacks than other remedies would, particularly since ceilings
do not deprive any blacks of public schooling itself. (Racial ceilings in the
context of public housing might harm blacks more, since such housing is
usually a scarce resource.) Moreover, the status of black children may be
enhanced, not reduced, when the courts undertake a good faith effort to
promote integration; as noted in the discussion of "all deliberate speed,"
an affront to blacks as a group is unlikely when the courts acknowledge
white resistance as a given and attempt to develop feasible remedies. The
individual's claim not to be deprived of a benefit because of his race is
obviously a strong one; if no available remedy will produce the benefits of
integration for all blacks, however, an analysis of the plaintiff class'
210. See Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 824-27 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., con-
curring); United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 920 n.9 (N.D. I11. 1983) (Chicago)
(quoting memorandum filed by Urban League); Brest, supra note 120, at 18-19.
211. See cases cited supra note 99; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971) (approving racial ratios as starting point in desegregation remedies).
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"group" benefit or stigma is appropriate, even though a racial criterion is
used.
For all the problems with racial ceilings, none is sufficiently great to
justify a conclusion that ceilings may never be used. Because a remedy
that deliberately preserves some one-race schools is an assuredly limited
remedy, however, and because it may use a racial criterion as a limiting
mechanism, the defendant should have a heavy burden of justification. It
should be required to establish either that preserving one-race schools is
necessary to maximize integration (that is, white flight would otherwise
actually occur and no more effective remedy is available);212 or that even
though more effective alternatives do exist (magnet schools, for example),
their costs are so exceptionally burdensome that a tradeoff beyond Milli-
ken I should be made.
Moreover, if a court does adopt a remedy preserving some one-race
schools to prevent white flight, its plan must carefully avoid compromising
blacks' interests beyond the amount necessary to justify the limitation.
First, even though educational sweeteners by themselves may be unable to
raise the tipping point sufficiently to eliminate one-race schools and
prevent flight, court-ordered sweeteners are likely to mitigate some of the
remedial limitations of ceilings. By raising the tipping point somewhat,
sweeteners may permit the use of somewhat higher ceilings and therefore
reduce the number of one-race black schools; if so, they should be re-
quired as part of a decree permitting ceilings. Second, the remedy must
assure that black children excluded from one integrated school because of
a credible fear of white flight have the opportunity to attend any inte-
grated school in the system where flight is not a problem. " ' There is no
excuse for denying some black children the benefits of an integration
remedy if a practical assignment scheme Could provide an integrated set-
ting for them. Third, fair criteria must be developed for deciding which
black children must remain in one-race schools. 14 Finally, for those black
212. See Brest, supra note 120, at 19-21; c. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d
1122, 1135-37 (2d Cir. 1973) (racial ceilings in public housing).
213. Such schools may well exist if the court has made Swann-type tradeoffs, declining to man-
date reassignments to certain schools because of distance and travel time. Just as flight may occur
when individuals weigh balanceable costs more heavily than the court does, voluntary transfers might
occur when individuals weigh such costs more lightly. To some extent, majority-to-minority transfer
provisions (allowing students to transfer from schools where their race is a majority to schools where
their race is a minority) may be based on this assumption. See Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123, 1139-40 (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 986 (1975).
214. In Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980), the
court approved a plan that sought to rotate the group of black children assigned to all-black schools so
that every pupil would have at least some of his or her education in an integrated setting. Id. at 1293.
Other methods of making assignments are imaginable but none is completely satisfactory: individual
choice (at least as part of the assignment process), a lottery, minimizing travel time or distance, or
designating a class representative to make the assignments.
The Yale Law Journal
children who cannot enroll in an integrated school, the court should insure
that the one-race setting is at least equal to the integrated settings in all
respects other than student racial composition, including facilities, faculty,
and expenditures. Beyond that, consideration might be given to providing
additional compensatory features in lieu of the benefits that integration
itself would presumably have provided. 1'
Returning to Justice Powell's opinion in the Dallas schools case is in-
structive at this point, since it illustrates some of the problems with racial
ceilings and the need for caution in approving them. Justice Powell, it
will be recalled, urged the reinstatement of a district court decree that
preserved many one-race schools and invoked white flight as a justifica-
tion.216 But his call for realism was much too facile. As the Fifth Circuit
said in reversing the district court's judgment, the trial judge had simply
asserted that further dismantling of one-race schools was impractical and
had not considered obvious alternatives (such as greater use of magnet
schools) or made adequate findings about the impracticality of more in-
tegrative pupil reassignments.2 17 Allowing one-race schools to exist may
be a last resort, but it is only a last resort; it is a step needing careful
justification, based on findings of fact and a considered rejection of more
effective alternatives. In the event, after the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition over Justice Powell's objection, a different district judge did ap-
prove a remedy preserving some one-race schools, but only after requiring
more complete integration than Justice Powell had so casually assumed
was possible.218
Finally, remedial theory must accommodate an important feature of the
current moment-the erosion of support, even among blacks, for the idea
that integration is the proper remedial goal once de jure segregation has
been shown. This essay began by noting that remedial "effectiveness" is
meaningful only when measured against defined rights and remedial
goals. There were many possible ways to define the remedial goals of a
desegregation decree; 2 9 the courts chose integration of previously segre-
gated schools as the centerpiece of the remedial enterprise. Both whites
215. Cf Liddell v. Board of Educ., 667 F.2d 643, 648-49 (8th Cir.) (although "not possible to
fully integrate every school in system," plan affirmed because it provided "enhanced educational op-
portunity for students remaining in the predominantly black schools"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091
(1981); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 741 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (in predominantly black schools
"beyond the reach of effective desegregation tools," enriched educational components required to pro-
mote "equal education opportunity" and "to overcome the built-in inadequacies of a segregated educa-
tional system").
216. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 438 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari); see supra p. 631.
217. Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
218. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 749-50 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
219. See supra pp. 592-93.
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and blacks have increasingly criticized this established legal doctrine as
the costs and apparent difficulties of achieving integration have increased
and confidence in the educational benefits of integration has decreased.2"'
Among blacks themselves, the weakening of support for integration reme-
dies often reflects a certain anger and despair about unyielding white re-
sistance and flight, and the resulting need either to chase after whites
(who frequently are able to find escape hatches anyway) or to cater to
their racial feelings by one strategy or another. If integration must be
pursued in this way, with so little assured success in the end, then why
not just abandon integration as the remedial goal?
The recent criticism of integration as the remedial ideal reveals what
may be a deeper point-the existence of an ultimate constraint on reme-
dial doctrine: Remedial goals are not simply chosen and fixed for all time.
They may in fact evolve. The very process of change may well transform
the goals of change. Experience-the experience of white resistance, for
example-may change some people's basic concept of the appropriate re-
medial goal in a desegregation case, of what "desegregation" means, of
what the "right" itself is.
For now, though, integration remains the central remedial goal. Im-
provement of educational quality is also a goal; as a priority, however,
remedies must seek to eliminate the unlawful segregation that may pro-
duce educational problems, not the educational problems that exist within
an unlawfully segregated setting that is itself preserved. Perhaps integra-
tion will eventually be replaced by other goals, such as educational quali-
ty. But the courts today may not abandon feasible remedial integration
and replace it with something else. Only when integration is unfeasible,
and only for those students for whom integration is unfeasible, is some
other remedy appropriate in its place.
V. Doing and Saying: Remedial Limits and Judicial Candor
The remedial dilemmas created by resistance do not end with the sub-
stantive decision to delay or otherwise limit a remedy. Linked to that deci-
sion is the question of whether judges should candidly say that their reme-
dies are affected by resistance. As noted earlier, judges have often not been
candid on this subject. First, they have often failed to acknowledge a gap
between rights and remedies. Second, even when acknowledging a gap,
they have sometimes failed to admit that they were permitting an imper-
fect remedy because of white resistance. This lack of candor has been evi-
dent in the courts' articulation of general remedial principles,2 1 in the
220. See D. BELL, supra note 76, at 411-31.
221. See supra pp. 589-91.
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Supreme Court's refusal to admit that its reason for permitting delay in
Brown II was to address the problem of white resistance,222 and in some
courts' failure to acknowledge that the scope of a desegregation remedy
may be limited in order to prevent white flight.22 ' This gap between doing
and saying, like the substantive compromises it hides, may itself reflect an
attempt to mediate between the ideal and the real. But while the courts
may properly accept some right-remedy gaps and may sometimes accom-
modate resistance, their lack of candor about these issues, I believe, is
inappropriate. 24
A. The Presumption for Candor in Judicial Opinions
Although candor is generally presumed in judicial discourse, it is not a
moral absolute. A relevant example, since it involves the judicial process
of achieving change, is that judges are frequently dishonest in the reading
of prior cases and the treatment of precedent; judges such as Cardozo are
often praised for their ability to secure change in legal doctrine through a
"creative"-but not fully candid-reading of precedent.22  Candor, how-
ever, plays a distinctive role in the judicial process, a fact that is high-
lighted by comparing this example of creative dishonesty with Harold
Bloom's analysis of analogous dishonesties that facilitate change within
the literary culture. Bloom argues that creative figures in literature, in
order "to clear imaginative space for themselves," often misread and trivi-
alize the accomplishments of past writers, and make exaggerated claims
for the originality of their own efforts. Only by such dishonest (though not
necessarily willful) distancing from the past can these creative figures free
themselves sufficiently from the inevitable and potentially suffocating in-
fluence of the great texts and thereby make their own, unavoidably small
progress.
226
222. See supra pp. 611-12.
223. See supra note 136.
224. 1 am assuming throughout this section, of course, that the courts are being less than candid.
While this is clearly so with respect to the courts' treatment of resistance, there is another possibility
when a court says that a remedy fully cures a violation and an observer says that there is an unac-
knowledged right-remedy gap: The court may be working with narrower (but perhaps only vaguely
expressed) concepts of the right and the remedial goals. In such a case, there may actually be no gap
at all between right and remedy.
225. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6-7 (1948); K. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 56-69 (1930); Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, YALE L. REP., Spring 1977, at 8,
10-11; cf. Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553, 1583-84 (1974) (creation of
precedent shaped by recognition of ways future will use it). Of course, to say that an earlier case is
"misread" assumes a certain notion of what "properly" reading that case means and what the doctrine
of precedent requires. A development of these issues is beyond the scope of this essay, but most readers
will agree readily enough that change in the common law is often secured by giving precedent a
highly strained reading.
226. H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF'INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY 5 (1973); see H. BLOOM,
A MAP OF MISREADING 83-105 (1975).
Vol. 92: 585, 1983
Remedies and Resistance
While courts also make progress by occasionally misreading prior texts,
reading Bloom reminds us how distinctive legal discourse is. For one
thing, because of the distinctive norms of the legal culture, the rhetorical
strategy of any dissembling is different; rather than exaggerate the novelty
of his actions, the creative judge emphasizes the extent to which he is
simply doing what has always been done, simply applying established case
law. The reason, of course, is that the law's very methods enshrine the
past through the doctrine of precedent. Although the creative judge some-
times candidly discards prior cases, the doctrine of precedent pressures the
judge to secure progress without visibly tearing the fabric of continuity, by
seeming to carry forward the past as he is actually breaking from it.
While this lack of candor seems a questionable transfer of a lawyer's ar-
gumentative strategy to the judge's craft, the legal culture tolerates and
approves some amount of it. Some misreading of prior cases is used to
create room for doctrinal change while preserving not only the form of
adherence to precedent, but also the degree of continuity that adherence to
the form requires and that the norms of the legal culture generally insist
upon. Indeed, the boundary of incremental change perhaps can be pre-
dicted as the degree of misreading of precedent that will be tolerated.
This suggests a more general and more important point: Candor has a
distinctive normative status in law. When poets misread or distort the past
as part of the creative process, moral condemnation is inappropriate, ab-
sent outright plagiarism. The poetic result is generally self-justifying; we
may be enlightened by understanding the process that produced the result,
but the quality of the result usually ratifies the process. Law is different;
process counts a great deal. Law involves power, and power is justified
and limited by process. Candor and sincerity are part of the distinctive
process that legitimates judicial power-a process of decisionmaking and
discourse whose requirements include writing opinions and giving rea-
soned justifications. 227 These constraints help to promote the public ac-
countability of judges and to stimulate judicial reflection and self-control.
Without a requirement of candor, the constraints would be meaningless.
Thus, misreading and other dishonesties in judicial opinions are generally
more than craft flaws; candor in judicial reasoning is part of the morality
of craft. Candor is not an absolute, but as Guido Calabresi has written in
the course of defending occasional judicial dishonesties, "too much use of
227. This is to be contrasted not only with literary life but also with political life, where candor
and subterfuge are frequently used instrumentally. Attorney General John Mitchell captured a basic
truth about American politicians when he once counselled, "[I]nstead of listening to what we say...
watch what we do." Quoted in W. SAFIRE, BEFORE THE FALL 265 (1975).
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[subterfuge] by courts destroys their credibility" and may destroy their
fundamental commitment to honesty. 28
Because of the value attached to candor in executing the judicial func-
tion, there must be a powerful presumption that candor is preferable to
deception or evasion. Not only must very strong values be interposed to
justify judicial subterfuge, but a strong burden of proof must be placed on
those seeking to establish the factual premises that would bring those
counter-values into play. Given this presumption, I conclude that there
are no sufficiently persuasive reasons to justify a lack of candor about a
right-remedy gap or the role of resistance in creating it. In particular,
subterfuge cannot be justified by arguments that it either serves the vic-
tims' interests in an effective remedy or promotes the courts' interests or
broader social interests.
B. The Effect of Candor on Remedial Effectiveness
Words are deeds, and what courts "do" may turn out differently de-
pending on what they give as an explanation. One possible justification
for subterfuge about the place of white resistance in limiting remedies is
that it will contribute to remedial effectiveness. Candor, whatever its other
virtues, may exacerbate the remedial limitations that result from taking
account of resistance-specifically, dignitary harms to blacks and incen-
tives for greater resistance. Concealment might avoid these harms.
1. Possible Dignitary Harms
For a court to admit that it is taking account of white resistance might
produce dignitary harms if the court is perceived as endorsing white atti-
tudes that lead to resistance and flight. Whether courts would be perceived
that way is an empirical question whose answer depends upon a number
of variables affecting communication between the courts and the public,
only some of which judges control. On the one hand, a carefully written
opinion candidly acknowledging the role of white resistance and flight
might not be perceived as insulting at all. In a case such as Brown II, the
Court could state clearly that remedial steps accommodating resistance are
being approved reluctantly and only to enhance the remedy's effectiveness.
Such a careful explanation would display respect, not disrespect, for the
228. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 175, 180 (1982). Scholarship
itself is not immune from this tension. Is recognition to be secured by meticulously collecting and
candidly acknowledging all prior utterances that count as influence (thereby inevitably weakening
one's own claim to notice) or by exaggerating one's originality (thereby displaying less scholarship and
less fidelity to reporting the truth)? Most of us would quickly say that we should and do aspire to the
former-but most of us also know that creative leaps, recognition, and influence can often be more
easily achieved by exaggerating our originality, and we occasionally succumb. On the subject of can-
dor and dishonesty, see generally S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
(1978); G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1931).
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victims. On the other hand, the dynamic that produces a dignitary affront
may be subtler than lawyerly drafting can control. The public, whose re-
actions are the ones that determine whether there has been an insult, may
fail to understand a distinction between accommodating white opposition
to maximize remedial effectiveness and legitimating white opposition for
its own sake. The mere acknowledgement of white resistance and flight
may produce dignitary harm simply by highlighting offensive private
conduct.
Moreover, there are two wild cards that complicate the courts' relation-
ship to the public and make it difficult to predict the impact of what a
court says. First, since the public rarely reads judicial opinions, its reac-
tion to a court's decision depends on the description and interpretation of
that decision by the press; the indispensable and unavoidable role of the
press is one of the greatly neglected subjects in debates about the impact
and perceived legitimacy of judicial action. Second, it is possible that the
manner in which a court justifies a particular remedy will make no digni-
tary difference at all. We who live by the lamp may exaggerate the im-
portance of words.229 Reasoned explanations in opinions may promote ju-
dicial self-control or provide a basis for external control through criticism
by others within the legal profession; the laity, however, may "read" an
event a certain way quite apart from the words printed about it. When
Brown II failed to order immediate compliance, were many people actu-
ally misled about the reasons? Did blacks doubt that the reason concerned
the prospect of white resistance? Would elaborate words from court or
press-whether candid or deceptive-have made any difference?
2. Possible Incentives for Resistance
Subterfuge might also be thought to enhance remedial effectiveness be-
cause candid acknowledgment of the place of resistance in limiting reme-
dies might create incentives for more resistance.2"' With respect to Brown
II, the argument might be this: While some white resistance was inevita-
ble, an announcement that the Court was permitting delay to accommo-
date feared opposition would have invited more opposition by those who
wanted to pressure lower courts to extend the period of delay. The point
is obviously not trivial, but its empirical predicate is very uncertain, turn-
229. See I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 24 (1953); McClosky, Economic Due Process
and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34.
230. See supra p. 622. An analagous concern was once noted by Judge Harold Leventhal in
explaining why judges should not explicitly instruct juries that they could disregard and "nullify" the
governing law in the interests of justice: Some jury nullification was inevitable and even desirable, but
explicitness by the judge would encourage nullification beyond the optimal level. United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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ing on how the Court would have explained the role of resistance,
whether it would also have indicated time frames for white adjustment,
and how the court-public relationship discussed above actually would have
developed. But it is hard to believe that the Court's failure to acknowledge
the true reasons for "all deliberate speed" produced less resistance than a
candid and careful explanation would have.
There are analogous but even weaker arguments for subterfuge in the
white flight cases. The most interesting possibility is that a candid expla-
nation by the courts that they might limit remedies because of feared
white flight would encourage anti-integrationist whites to demonstrate an
exaggerated likelihood of their flight, and lead courts to order more lim-
ited remedies than actually necessary to keep whites from fleeing. The
point here really concerns information. A court needs accurate informa-
tion about the likelihood of flight in order to know whether to limit the
remedy; candor might distort the information flow by provoking highly
magnified (and socially damaging) threats of resistance. If so, subterfuge
(the courts' "secret flight" from resistance, to be literal) might produce
less cautious and more effective remedies, premised on more accurate
information.
In any event, before concluding that subterfuge serves remedial effec-
tiveness, one must recognize that subterfuge itself also imposes costs on
victims. For example, if a court dishonestly says that its partial integration
remedy fully cures the violation, it would have to apply that conclusion
consistently; being consistent would prevent it from providing supplemen-
tary remedies such as damages, which by definition could be awarded only
if the violation had not been completely cured. More generally, subterfuge
carries a serious risk that the boundaries of any compromise of victim
rights will be blurred. Candor helps to prevent slippage-that is, judicial
action that ends up allowing a gap between right and remedy beyond
what is justified and beyond what was initially thought reasonable. By
requiring everyone to face up to the remedial compromise, candor facili-
tates the control and limitation of compromise.
Overall, then, arguments that subterfuge promotes remedial effective-
ness do not seem strong enough to override the powerful presumption for
candor. Indeed, given that presumption, the very fact that the empirical
basis for such arguments seems so uncertain should be sufficient reason to
favor candor.
C. The Effect of Candor on Judicial and Social Interests
Even if subterfuge neither enhances nor undercuts remedial effective-
ness in a particular case, it may serve the institutional interests of the
courts. Some deception may be needed, for example, to forge a majority
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opinion (or, as in Brown II, a unanimous one). 31 This use of subterfuge
might serve an external function, such as promoting public acceptance of
some judicial action. Moreover, subterfuge may have no external purpose
at all, but may be agreed upon early in deliberations solely to maintain an*
internal harmony on the court which sustained and candid discourse
would disrupt.
A related reason for dishonesty is that a court may be trying to protect
either its remedial function in a particular case or its institutional position
more generally. It might be thought, for example, that the prestige and
authority of courts would suffer if they were to admit candidly that the
public sometimes resists their judgments and that they sometimes provide
less than full remedies because of such resistance. Even if that were true,
though, the courts' prestige also depends on their honesty and candor. Un-
detected, of course, judicial dishonesty will not harm the courts' public
image. But dishonesty always creates the risk of its detection, and, with
detection, harm to the courts' stature that may exceed any losses that re-
sult from candidly acknowledging limited power.
Lower courts that deny they are limiting remedies because of possible
flight may have a different institutional reason for doing so: As inferior
courts obliged to follow appellate court precedent, they may believe it nec-
essary, or at least prudent, to invoke Supreme Court language that seems
to bar remedial limitation, even if they do not in fact obey that language.
As suggested earlier, Supreme Court decisions do not flatly prohibit limit-
ing remedies to take account of white flight;232 their language should be
understood either as a subterfuge itself (in which case its invocation by
lower courts raises essentially the same issues as the Supreme Court's own
subterfuge) or as a rejection of the white flight limitation only in the par-
ticular kinds of fact situations involved in those cases. 3 (in which case
lower courts are not obliged to apply it more broadly). There is no justifi-
cation, however, for lower courts' departing from Supreme Court prece-
dent by means of a subterfuge. Even if one believes that at times the lower
courts may not only indicate disagreement with appellate courts but also
attempt to innovate, it is hard to see how legal rules can evolve in a sensi-
ble and orderly way if innovative lower courts conceal what they are do-
ing and thereby make it hard for appellate courts to review the innova-
tion. Whatever justification there may be for a court's creative
231. The subterfuge yielding a majority opinion might be an ambiguity that masks differences
among judges or an unambigous formulation included as the price a judge exacts in return for joining
the opinion. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 350
(1974); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1298, 1310-13 (1960).
232. See cases cited supra note 133.
233. See supra pp. 636-37.
"misreading" of its own precedents, lower courts must either follow ap-
pellate precedent or candidly reveal their disagreement.
A final possible justification for subterfuge is the "tragic choices" argu-
ment that Professor Calabresi has invoked in other contexts. Where fun-
damental values conflict and courts must choose between them, a subter-
fuge that conceals the conflict may be "ideal-preserving," whereas candor
might erode the ideal. Subterfuge may "hide a fundamental value conflict,
recognition of which would be too destructive for a particular society to
accept," and thereby may "allow society to hold to two conflicting ideals"
without abandoning either."8 4 In order to evaluate whether subterfuge
might in fact preserve ideals in the context of desegregation remedies, we
first must clarify why the courts should seek to preserve an ideal that they
choose not to vindicate.2" 5 After all, while candid acknowledgment of a
conflict in ideals would lead to an explicit tradeoff that reduces the
"value" of one of the ideals, the reduced value might seem a truer mea-
sure of what our values actually are and what our ideal presently is. One
possible reason to affirm an ideal in exaggerated form is simply the sta-
bility or comfort furnished by illusion; what courts would preserve is not
an ideal but the illusion that some norm is our ideal. But there is a better
reason: Even though we may not vindicate a norm today, it is not necessa-
rily an exaggeration to affirm that norm as an ideal if we understand the
ideal as an aspiration-as something that we hope to be able to vindicate
more fully in the future.23 ' Preserving the ideal maintains a tug towards a
more ideal world.
At least in the context of desegregation remedies, however, I would turn
the "tragic choices" justification on its head, and argue that candor itself,
and not subterfuge, better preserves ideals against a reality that can erode
234. G. CALABRES1, supra note 228, at 172-73; see G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 228,
at 78-79; Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 428-30 (1979); c. Kelman,
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REG., Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33, 40 ("[Tlhe argument
against making the process [of valuing life] explicit is. . . that the very act of doing so may serve to
reduce the value of those things.").
235. Calabresi distinguishes the "ideal-preserving, conflict-denying, tragic choice" subterfuge from
another type that is justified by a more directly functional argument that "sometimes use of indirec-
tion and of 'technically incorrect' language [such as phrasing a nonabsolutist rule in absolutist lan-
guage] can bring us closer to the desired result than would the use of more precise language." G.
CALABRESI, supra note 228, at 173. This latter "more accurate results" justification would also pro-
vide a reason for preserving an ideal that the court chooses not to vindicate. To invoke this justifica-
tion here, however, would collapse the different types of subterfuge; it would make the "tragic
choices" argument dependent on the "more accurate results" argument, not separate from it. Thus we
need an explanation for the "ideal-preserving" theory that goes beyond the "more accurate results"
rationale.
236. This is clearly true for limited remedies adopted under Rights Maximizing-the right accu-
rately states our norm, and the courts will fully vindicate it whenever it is possible to do so. But even
where the courts sacrifice presently achievable versions of a norm because of costs and competing
values under Interest Balancing, we can still say that our rights are something more than the net
result of the tradeoff between the "right" and other valued "interests" because other forms of remedy
are still available.
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them. Making explicit both the right and any remedial shortcoming is the
best way to preserve the right. A subterfuge that compromises an ideal
without saying so creates a risk that the ideal will be weakened, that peo-
ple will come to think that the ideal means only what has been imper-
fectly realized. By candidly acknowledging that they are providing some-
thing less than a full remedy, courts leave the unfulfilled right as a
beacon. This leaves open the possibility that at some point the courts
themselves will be able to furnish a more complete remedy, or that other
branches of government may take action that the court regrettably declares
itself unable to do; and it empowers the holders of what has been declared
a "right" with moral and legal authority to press for the right's fuller
realization. Pretending to have provided a full remedy may remove pres-
sure for a truly full remedy.237
Indeed, there is a danger that subterfuge might be used intentionally to
serve that function. "Critical" legal scholars have focused attention on the
use of "legitimating" devices in the law-ways in which the law seeks to
deceive certain social groups that our society is really delivering its ideals,
to mask the existence of contradictory norms, and therefore to promote
stability and the interests served by the status quo, such as the interests of
whites instead of blacks."3 8 The tragic choices subterfuge might be seen as
such a legitimating device. When used to avoid acknowledging the reality
of social conditions that are "too damaging to admit," '239 this subterfuge
bears a striking resemblance to legitimating strategies that critical scholars
argue are primarily "damaging" to the underclass and are used for that
237. A third possibility must be acknowledged, however: The courts' words about the nature of
their remedies (whether candid or dishonest) may be irrelevant. Once the ideal has been ex-
pressed-which is the important step-reality may "speak" for itself about whether the ideal has been
implemented. This may be one of the points of the following passage at the end of Roy Wilkins's
recent autobiography:
An enormous discrepancy exists between the way we talk about equality in the abstract and
the value as translated into law and practice. History offers us a peculiar irony: the idea, the
value of equality is probably nurtured most by the protests of the very people who do not have
it. Without us, without our struggle, the country would have foundered in moral emptiness
long ago.. . . We have sought justice, only to be thwarted by old hatreds, obstacles that white
people have not had to overcome. But we have never given up-never quit. We have believed
in our country. We have believed in our Constitution. We have believed that the Declaration
of Independence meant what it said. All my life I have believed these things, and I will die
believing them. I share this faith with others-and I know that it will last and guide us long
after I am gone.
R. WILKINS, supra note 80, at 342-43. I suspect that the autonomous tug of the ideal is greatest when
the gap between reality and the ideal is so stark that people cannot readily dispute the existence of a
gap. What the present moment reveals, however, is that as the most obviously unjust conditions disap-
pear, disputes may emerge about what the ideal of equality really means.
238. See Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination, supra note 76, at 1051-52, 1102-03,
1107-14; Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, supra note
76, at 75-88.
239. G. CALABRESI, supra note 228, at 173.
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reason.4' Stripped of its accusatory garb, the descriptive core of the criti-
cal argument seems valid here: Subterfuge functions to weaken the force
of the ideal rather than strengthen it.
I see only one significant danger in insisting upon a candid acknowledg-
ment of a right-remedy gap. If judges come to feel freer about separating
issues of remedy from issues of right, they might articulate rights too
broadly, by removing from their deliberations about the right certain prac-
tical constraints that properly play some role in defining those rights.2 "
Put another way, if rights-declaring becomes too idealized, is too much of
a beacon, the statement of rights may be exaggerated and the difference
between what is promised and what is delivered exacerbated. In fact,
however, the pressures are all in the other direction: Judges will always
be reluctant to advertise that they are delivering less than the "right," and
therefore will be far more likely to trim the right to fit the remedy than to
exaggerate the right.242
In summary, any gap between right and remedy, between the ideal em-
bodied in our rights and the reality of what courts can deliver in a parti-
cular case, should be candidly acknowledged rather than concealed by
subterfuge. In making that gap visible, we not only preserve ideals but
also foster conditions for giving those ideals greater force in the world.
VI. Beyond Remedies
This essay has focused, on the problem of resistance at the remedial
stage of litigation, arguing that remedies must take account of resistance
from the world they hope to transform and that in some cases courts may
properly make comprotnises and limit remedies because of this resistance.
What is at stake here, however, concerns rights as well as remedies, and
my argument about remedies would be incomplete without suggesting, al-
beit briefly, its relevance to the constitutional -function more gener-
ally-and to the activity of legal scholarship itself.
A. The Domain of Constitutional Law
My argument is relevant to constitutional rights in two ways. First, the
pressure of particular acts of resistance will also inform the scope of rights
in particular cases, and at times lead courts to limit the scope of those
rights. For example, First Amendment speech rights can be limited in
some cases by the so-called "hecklers' veto." While the police must ordi-
240. Indeed, one of Calabresi's examples, terrible jail conditions that society is unwilling to im-
prove, id., points to a concealment that critical scholars would undoubtedly find useful for their thesis.
241. See infra pp. 676-80.
242. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 54-55.
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narily move against a hostile crowd that opposes an individual's right to
speak, in extreme cases where the police cannot otherwise control the
crowd, the police may remove the speaker; his right to speak is limited by
the ugly forces of opposition.243 In the area of sex discrimination, the Su-
preme Court has upheld a state's refusal to employ female prison guards
in an all-male prison because male prisoners might assault them and
thereby disrupt prison security.244 Here, rights to nondiscriminatory em-
ployment were compromised because of a threat of violence that had no
independent moral weight (to say the least) but that, in the Court's judg-
ment, had to be appeased. In a few cases, lower courts have qualified the
rights of white police officers to be treated without racial discrimination
by upholding affirmative action plans preferring blacks on the ground that
they would do a better job than white police officers in black communities
distrustful of or hostile towards white officers.24 Finally, and most obvi-
ously related to this essay, some lower courts have circumscribed individ-
ual blacks' rights to nondiscrimination and upheld voluntary attempts by
school officials to promote stable integration and prevent white flight by
limiting the percentage of black students that may be enrolled at particu-
243. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). In Feiner, the speaker's First Amendment rights
were limited not to maximize the vindication of those rights but to protect public security. If Feiner
can be justified, the rationale is that the police on the scene had made a reasonable factual judgment
that it was impossible to prevent imminent disruption by trying to arrest the crowd of hecklers instead
of the speaker. But cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1965) (insufficient showing of immi-
nent violence because of hostile crowd); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1963)
(same); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917) ("[I]mportant as is the preservation of the public
peace [by preventing racial conflicts], this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which
deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."). One difference between the "hecklers'
veto" situation and the desegregation cases suggests why the problem of resistance is particularly
difficult in the latter context. A speaker's First Amendment rights can be fully vindicated if the re-
sisting hecklers are simply carted off; in the school desegregation cases, however, white resisters are
often needed for a remedy to be effective, and therefore their affirmative cooperation is necessary.
244. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1977).
245. See Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157
Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 105 (1981). This so-called "operational needs" argu-
ment is to be distinguished from the more traditional justification for affirmative action-that it
reduces an underrepresentation of blacks in the employer's workforce attributable to past
discrimination.
A related line of cases involves so-called "customer preferences." An employer or proprietor denies
that it has discriminatory goals but claims that its customers prefer whites (or some other group) and
that it will suffer loss of business or other harm unless allowed to satisfy their discriminatory prefer-
ences. Customer preferences are generally not allowed to justify discriminatory action. See, e.g., Fer-
nandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting argument that refusal of
defendant's South American clients to deal with female employee justified failure to promote her);
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.) (striking down airline's policy of
refusing to hire stewards despite customers' purported preference for stewardesses), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 298-304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("love
airline" cannot refuse to hire males because of their lesser sex appeal). But see Ward v. Westland
Plastics, 651 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1980) (request of customer to be only woman at meeting
allowable defense against exclusion of female employee).
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lar schools.246 Without necessarily defending the results in these particular
cases, I believe that their basic message is correct and directly analogous to
my discussion of remedies: At least at some point, attitudes of objection
and resistance that we disapprove of are properly treated as "regrettable
givens" and allowed to limit the scope of rights in particular cases.
The analysis of remedies and resistance is relevant to rights in a deeper
and more general sense, however. At stake is not simply a way of under-
standing remedies, but a way of understanding law-rights as well as
remedies-and a way of thinking about the legitimacy of the judicial func-
tion in constitutional cases. While judges must carry out their tasks with
an idealizing aspiration and reflective detachment different from other po-
litical actors, and while rights may be more idealized than remedies, the
adaptive strategies and compromises with practicalities considered in this
essay pervade all aspects of law. First, just as judges may take account of
public attitudes and public resistance at the remedy stage, they may take
account of prevailing beliefs and even resistance at the rights-declaring
stage as part of the cluster of factors that influence the meaning of our
rights and the evolution of their meaning. Second, instrumental and
strategic considerations are relevant not only when fashioning remedies
but also when defining rights. Brown II, the remedy opinion, took account
of public attitudes and likely resistance, but so did Brown I, the rights
opinion. The Supreme Court's understanding of what the textual require-
ment of "equal protection" meant undoubtedly reflected its judgment that
the country was ready for Brown, that its abandonment of the "separate
but equal" doctrine would at least be able to generate sufficient public
assent to become a "living truth." The right declared in Brown I was not
simply an abstract "ideal" in the sense of a utopian possibility; it became
the sort of ideal that we call a legal right only because the courts were
convinced that it was an ideal that could become real in our society.
Moreover, in giving birth to Brown I, the Court took account of strategic
factors much as it did in thinking about remedies in Brown II. Before
deciding Brown I, the Court strategically prepared the country through a
gradual erosion of "separate but equal," and in the end it even delayed a
decision in Brown I to secure greater judicial consensus, a purely instru-
mental strategy designed to promote public acceptance of the rights in
question.2
47
246. See supra note 120.
247. The Court ordered reargtiment of the Brown cases at the close of the 1952 Term to address
a series of questions that it propounded. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953); R.
KLUGER, supra note 59, at 614-16. The apparent reasons for posing these questions were strategic: to
buy time to resolve internal disagreements on the Court, id.; to learn the views of the new Eisenhower
administration on which the Court would be dependent for enforcement of a decision barring segrega-
tion, id. at 601-02; and, as Justice Frankfurter wrote to his colleagues, "[i]nsofar as the questions
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The essence of constitutional law is that it is an idealizing activity. It
involves a text that reflects not simply a commitment to certain vaguely
defined norms but a commitment to the idea that we are a society with
norms that stand above the hurly-burly tradeoffs of day-to-day public life.
Its custodians are judges whose oath of office requires them to take the
idealizing aspiration as their inner frame of mind, and whose role and
craft require them to be detached from the political arena and to follow
processes conducive to reflection and reason. Indeed, the enduring sense of
the legitimacy of judicial review rests upon the public's acceptance of the
idea that our society is nourished by giving both speech and power to this
idealizing mode as one among many insistent forces that clash in our pub-
lic life. But the idealizing mode in law is always tempered by the reality it
serves. A good society needs voices that speak the language of utopian
idealism, but constitutionalism is not such a voice; it is a curious sort of
idealism that is bound to the Zeitgeist-and if it drifts off too far, it is
borne back ceaselessly to the real.
In interpreting a constitutional text, courts do not and should not sim-
ply "read the election returns"-that would deny the essence of constitu-
tionalism as an idealizing activity, as an activity that offers norms whose
source transcends mere popular preference. But courts read the text illu-
minated by the world outside judicial chambers. They read the Constitu-
tion, as Justice Frankfurter once said, with the "gloss which life" puts
upon it.24 And they read the Constitution knowing that they must at least
generate assent to the norms that they affirm, or else life will corrode their
interpretations. The claims of reality are felt starting at the rights stage,
and simply continue, more insistently, at the remedies stage. In short, all
realms of constitutional law struggle with the tension between the ideal
and the real, the duality of aspiration and compromise. Pervasively, the
enterprise involves both idealization and the need to take reality into ac-
count, including compromises with the reality of resistance and public op-
position; pervasively, the nature of the enterprise includes strategic and
instrumental considerations, along with elaboration of principles. This is
what the judicial function in constitutional cases is, and, as best as I can
determine, always has been. Considerations of the legitimacy of this func-
tion must take this description of the function as a starting point.
Other constitutional scholars have appreciated and explored the duality
of constitutional adjudication, but at times their approaches appear to re-
flect an understanding of constitutional law quite different from mine. In
dealing with remedies may indicate that a decision against segregation has been reached by the
Court," to allow "an adjustment [to] be made in the public mind to such a possibility," id. at 615.
248. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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The Forms of Justice,249 for example, my colleague Owen Fiss agrees that
constitutional adjudication is both idealizing and adaptive, but for him the
tension between the ideal and the real is embodied in a sharp dichotomy
between rights and remedies: "Rights operate in the realm of abstraction,
remedies in the world of practical reality"; they constitute "the world of
the ideal and the world of the practical.
250
This characterization of the right-remedy dichotomy is not simply de-
scriptive; for Fiss, the very legitimacy of judicial action depends upon
judges' keeping their adaptive relationship with reality cordoned off in the
separate realm of remedies. The rights-declaring stage is where a judge
who must be "objective" and "independent"-independent of politics and
unaffected by the will, the beliefs, and the moral preferences of the gen-
eral public-searches to "discover the true meaning of our constitutional
values," whose existence Fiss presumes.2 51 The remedy stage is a separate
realm of "instrumental" and "adaptive" judgments, where the judge seeks
to give that meaning a reality and "to be efficacious in a world in which
his power is limited" and social forces may be "unyielding." 5 2 Remedy
supplying requires judges to be strategic and at times to "accept the real-
ity of . . . limits and compromise [their] original objective in order to
obtain as much relief as possible"; it requires judges "to enter the world of
politics" and, in the end, "to surrender some of their independence.
253
Pure rights, dirty remedies.
I disagree with Fiss' view for several reasons. First, as a description of
actual judicial behavior, Fiss' distinction between rights declaring as "the
world of the ideal" and remedy supplying as "the world of the practical"
is much too sharply drawn. All dimensions of the law are affected by the
world of the practical, the real, the subjective, the political-in short, "the
world" as we know it.2 54 The duality of the ideal and the real exists, but
it pervades the judicial function. The two-sidedness is not conveniently
deposited in the separate categories of right and remedy. The practicalities
cannot be cordoned off into a separate domain to keep rights-declaring
purely "ideal." There is a permeable wall between rights and remedies:
249. Fiss, supra note 5. Other writings that reflect a particularly strong sense of a similar duality
include: A. BICKEL, supra note 59; E. ROSTOW, THE IDEAL IN LAW 1-12, 72-73 (1978); Burt, supra
note 80; Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982).
250. Fiss, supra note 5, at 52, 58. Most of the descriptive phrases used in this and the following
paragraph are taken from Fiss' article.
251. Id. at 11-17, 51-52, 58.
252. Id. at 54, 57.
253. Id. at 46, 54-55, 57.
254. Elsewhere, in fact, Fiss has stated that the courts' "understanding of [public] values . . . is
necessarily shaped by the prevailing morality." Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
739, 753 (1982). The prevailing morality of a society is inseparable from the practicalities, feasibili-
ties, and political realities of that society.
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The prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy-the recognition that
rights are for actual people in an actual world-makes it inevitable that
thoughts of remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges' minds will
shuttle back and forth between right and remedy.25 In fact, as the deseg-
regation problem illustrates, experience with remedies may lead people
over time to change their understanding of the underlying rights.
Nor does Fiss' sharp bifurcation of rights and remedies solve the prob-
lem of legitimacy. For Fiss, the bifurcation of functions protects the legiti-
macy of the judicial enterprise by isolating at least one activity, rights-
declaring, that operates in "the world of the ideal" and therefore can
satisfy his austere standards for judicial legitimacy: independence and ob-
jectivity. 5 ' Having isolated and legitimated the pure rights-declaring
function, he then tries to leverage in the impure remedy-supplying func-
tion like a tied product. But given Fiss' own premises of legitimacy, the
tie-in, the "unity of functions" as he calls it, 5 ' is hard to defend. If legiti-
macy is undercut when judges behave adaptively and compromise with
realities, then this behavior undercuts legitimacy at whatever "stage" it
occurs. The problem cannot be solved by the bifurcation of rights and
remedies.2"'
I doubt that the legitimacy problems can be solved starting from Fiss'
premises. One must either require judges to give up certain adaptive be-
havior at the remedy stage, or recognize that certain kinds of adaptiveness
255. Indeed, in an earlier work, Professor Fiss himself noted that "[a] judgment about violation
should reflect, and in fact does reflect, a judgment about remedy." 0. FISS, supra note 5, at 55-56.
256. Fiss, supra note 5, at 12-14, 51-53.
257. Id. at 52.
258. Fiss recognizes legitimacy problems, but insists on preserving the judicial remedy function.
Thus, Fiss himself acknowledges that at the remedy stage a judge is involved in matters concerning
which he has "no special claim of competency" and his independence is compromised. Id. at 51-55.
While this alone seems a rather devastating admission given Fiss' premises of legitimacy, the more
serious danger for Fiss-"the core dilemma" as he calls it, id. at 53-is that pressures from reality
that lead a judge to view his remedial task politically or to compromise the remedy will spill over to
the rights-declaring stage. "[D]istortion will be felt in the realm of rights, too . . . ," writes Fiss, and
the judge "will tailor the [substance of the] right to fit the remedy." Id. at 55. Fiss notes certain
"palliatives," but also their limitations, and ends up concluding that the judge must "live with" the
dilemma. Id. at 55-58.
Professor Fiss' main argument against a division of functions is that it "necessarily creates the risk
that the remedy might distort the right, and leave us with something less than the true meaning of the
constitutional value." Id. at 53. I do not doubt that a separate remedial agency may create some risks
of remedial compromise since it might be less sympathetic to the right than the court that declared it;
yet, as Professor Fiss recognizes at another point in his discussion, the prospect that a remedy will
"compromise" the right and "leave us with something less than the true meaning of the constitutional
value" is centrally a consequence of the limiting social forces that will affect any remedy-supplying
agency, including courts. Id. at 54-55. It is hard to believe that a division of functions would compro-
mise the actualization of rights so much more than unity of functions that we should accept the price
that follows from Fiss' premises---corruption of the very legitimacy of judicial action at both the right
and remedy stages. If Fiss' conditions for establishing judicial legitimacy are correct, the courts should
abandon the remedy-supplying function. For another critique of Professor Fiss' position, see P.
SCHUCK, supra note 24, at 173-78.
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do not undercut the necessary conditions for legitimacy. My own view is
the latter; Fiss has created his own dilemma, I think, by insisting on con-
cepts of judicial independence and objectivity that are far too extreme. A
necessary task, of course, is to establish boundaries on the instrumental,
the political, and the "real" in the judicial realm. But my critical point for
present purposes is that once one appreciates the necessary duality of con-
stitutional adjudication, problems of judicial legitimacy are not solved by
segregating rights from remedies, or by shifting the problems to the theo-
retically separate realm of remedies. The legitimacy of constitutional adju-
dication rests in large part on its idealizing aspirations, but it cannot be
defended by the pure idealism of any "stage" of adjudication. If constitu-
tional adjudication as we know it is to be deemed legitimate, the condi-
tions of legitimacy must accommodate both the idealizing and adaptive
nature of the enterprise and the pervasiveness of the duality.
B. The Domain of Legal Scholarship
To view law's characteristic role as mediating between the ideal and the
real also has implications for legal scholarship itself. Indeed, by its very
preoccupation and mode, this essay is a response to two emerging trends
in legal scholarship. The first trend, largely shaped by persons well read
in philosophy or economic theory, involves the articulation of ideal theo-
ries of justice or idealized models of economic behavior. For these scholars,
messy reality seems almost to be an intrusion into otherwise perfect theo-
ries, at most the occasion for last-page acknowledgement of "some
problems" with the models and theories they have articulated. To be of
the law, as opposed to philosophy and economic theory, however, one
must take reality as the primary realm of activity. Law moves beyond
articulation to implementation, and legal scholarship therefore must ad-
dress the complexities of acting within an imperfect, resisting, often vulgar
real world. In law, reality is not a footnote to theory or an appendix to
the ideal. The claims of reality are a central intellectual imperative as
much as a practical one.
The second trend in legal scholarship that I resist is one that largely
developed out of the radical politics of the late 1960's and that involves a
dismissal of idealistic conceptions of law. For these scholars-I have in
mind at least one strand of the critical legal studies movement-the reality
of social and class relationships are the determinants of judicial power.259
259. In the field of antidiscrimination law, the best example is Freeman, Legitimating Racial
Discrimination, supra note 76. The critical legal studies movement is diverse, however, and other
strands do accept significant transforming possibilities. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978); see also E.P. THOMPSON,
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For them, the task of legal scholarship is to unmask the way that law
legitimates power relationships preexisting in society. Just as I resist the
first trend because it constructs overly idealized theories and models, I
resist this second trend because it exaggerates the constraints of reality. It
trivializes the idealizing dimension and transforming possibility of law,
and deprives actors in the legal system of their deserved sense of triumph
in having utilized that idealizing aspiration to transform reality. Law can
be adequately understood only by recognizing how the ideal and the real
influence it simultaneously. 60 Law expresses principles that are shaped
by the social reality that those principles are also able to shape.
My discussion of resistance to desegregation decrees is obviously not
intended as a direct refutation of either trend in legal scholarship, but it
does illustrate some complexities that each ignores: that law is nothing
without reality, that law can and does pursue the ideal, and that the dis-
tinctive drama of legal life is that it requires living well with both.
WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265 (1975) (legal rules "may disguise the
true realities of power, but, at the same time, they may curb that power"). See generally THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (collecting essays by various criti-
cal legal scholars).
260. See Underwood, Against Dichotomy, 90 YALE L.J. 1004 (1981).
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